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This study investigates the adoption and development of local content in Uganda’s oil in-
dustry. The focus is the impact of lower oil prices on evolving stakeholder commitments 
and involvement in developing local competencies and, in turn, their impact on the indus-
try’s adoption of local content. In investigating movements and trends towards a more lo-
calised oil industry, this research assesses the three criteria of employment, procurement 
and local content development.  
 
This study is designed around the notion that there are multiple stakeholders who, to vary-
ing degrees, play a role in the development of local content. Stakeholders include, but are 
not limited to, the Government of Uganda, operating companies, donor agencies and in-
ternational oilfield service companies. Acknowledging that not all of the aforementioned 
stakeholders employ or procure from the local value chain, this research analyses trends 
and motivations of stakeholders to understand their role in local content adoption and de-
velopment.  
 
The findings of this research reveal that the collapse in the oil price between 2014-2016 
engendered incremental movements towards a more localised oil industry as operators 
increasingly employ and contract Ugandan labour and suppliers. In the period since 2014, 
we can also observe that a growing number of stakeholder interventions, notably from in-
ternational donors, has created ‘pockets of effectiveness’ in education and training, which, 
in turn are playing a major role in delivering requisite skills for the next stage in Uganda’s 
oil and gas project lifecycle. The study finds that Ugandan state interventions have been 
limited in their effectiveness, undermined by an underfunded and ill-functioning bureau-
cracy and a neglected education system. Resultantly, non-indigenous stakeholders have 
been integral to the development and adoption of local content in Uganda.  
 
Keywords: Oil and gas, Uganda, Local Content, Localisation, Nearshoring, Capacity De-
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1.0 Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
This is a study concerning local content and its development in Uganda’s nascent oil and 
gas industry, with particular attention given to the impact of plunging oil prices in 2014, 
which bottomed out in early 2016. Research shows us that nations with higher levels of 
local content1 accrue greater benefits from the industry and have a better chance of creat-
ing and maintaining sustainable and inclusive economic growth (Gbegi & Adebisi, 2013; 
Mifsud-Bonnici, 2013; Sigam & Garcia, 2012). Resource industries throughout the Global 
South, if leveraged appropriately, can have a transformational impact in enhancing growth 
and job creation. Local content is, therefore, a considerable and credible objective for any 
resource endowed nation and its government; a position that has been long professed, in 
one form or another, by academics and policymakers alike.  
 
This study contends that lower and less stable oil prices since 2014 and the ongoing politi-
cisation of oil supplies collectively represent a new oil and gas operating environment. In 
turn, this new environment for oil and gas operations has engendered a series of external 
influences on operators that are economic, political and social. Economic pressures 
largely revolve around ensuring oil operations remain financially viable while political pres-
sures include host government policy and lobbying which seeks to increase in-country 
value in light of decreasing oil revenues. In addition to economic and political pressures, 
social pressures, notably the desire of the local community for employment and opportuni-
ties for local suppliers have also been heightened, intensified by reduced operator spend-
ing on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) projects and the knowledge that fiscal wind-
falls from the industry will be less than anticipated. This study believes that, collectively, 
these pressures demand greater attention to local content development and its adoption 
by the oil industry. However, higher levels of local content are only possible in the pres-
ence of requisite local capabilities, a recurring challenge in almost all nascent hydrocarbon 














The observation that there are now multiple stakeholders involved in local content devel-
opment stands as a premise for this research and is something that stems from my per-
sonal work, delivering conferences on the topic of local content in oil and gas which 
brought together stakeholders from across the world. This observation, that international 
organisations such as oil and gas operating companies, donor and development agencies, 
oilfield service companies and other contractors are actively involved in the development 
of local competencies, marks a distinct shift from the previous paradigm which saw mini-
mal compliance with local content regulation by operators and little or no interest from do-
nors in indigenous capacity development projects for oil and gas (Andrews and Playfoot, 
2015; Pegram, 2018). Traditionally, as we can see from Andrews and Playfoot (2015), 
broad-based local content development has been a burden largely shouldered by the host 
government, whilst individuals fortunate enough to find work within the operating and oil-
field service companies are likely to receive training, to varying degrees, from their em-
ployers.  
 
Resultantly, this research has been designed to investigate an underexplored topic. It is 
apparent that very little research has been published concerning the roles and interactions 
of stakeholders in this new, multi-stakeholder environment and most importantly, no evi-
dence as to whether it is engendering improved development outcomes. Existing studies 
such as Andrews and Playfoot (2015), Pegram (2018), Pegram et. al. (2020) and Hilson & 
Ovadia (2020) are situated within this new paradigm but either focus on specific areas 
such as workforce localisation (Pegram, 2018) or don’t address the topic head on. How-
ever, it is not only the interaction between stakeholders which is unobserved; very little is 
known about the factors that are motivating stakeholders to play a role in local content de-
velopment, particularly those, such as donor and development agencies, who will not seek 
to employ or contract local content in the future. Consequently, this study explores these 
motivations and examines what engendered the movement from the previous paradigm to 
this multi-stakeholder environment. Furthermore, despite various espousals from operat-
ing companies that lower oil prices incentivise a more localised business model, there is 









governments very publicly championing local content, Uganda’s President Museveni in-
cluded (Hickey & Izama, 2017), there is a dearth of literature demonstrating the impact of 
this enhanced state interest in local content beyond the creation of a regulatory environ-
ment.  
 
The case study of Uganda’s nascent oil and gas industry was the chosen research meth-
odology for this work. This study was undertaken using a mixed methods approach and a 
sequential explanatory design, with two questionnaires being distributed in June and Sep-
tember 2019 and a series of interviews taking place between June and August 2019. 
Given the variety of engaged parties and the importance of political and economic factors 
in local content, a political economy lens was chosen through which to analyse, interpret 
and engage with the obtained data. The research findings are presented in three chapters 
(5, 6, 7), and address the attitudes, changing motivations and effectiveness of stakehold-
ers and their interventions in actualising a more localised industry as Uganda prepares for 
the development phase of the oil and gas project lifecycle.  
 
1.1 Research Premise: Converging Objectives 
 
The premise for this research revolves around the relationship between the two main 
groups of stakeholders in oil and gas production. These stakeholders are the governments 
of resource endowed nations and oil and gas operators. Both groups continue to engage 
in agreements that see oil and gas production around the world under the assumption that 
both parties will benefit from this economic activity. However, numerous prophetic exam-
ples have demonstrated that this assumption is conditional. The following sections high-
light the historical assumptions of resource production and the premise that all parties will 
only truly benefit from the oil industry if certain conditions are met.  










The pre-war era consensus assumed that resource endowment was an unqualified bless-
ing to the nations that controlled them (Gelb, 1988). This notion was maintained by a num-
ber of academics in the post-war era (Viner, 1952; Lewis, 1955; Higgins, 1968) and was 
furthered by Rostow (1961) who, among others, contended that resource endowment was 
an enabler for underdeveloped nations to industrialise. However, the post-war era demon-
strated that many resource rich nations were developing at a slower rate than their re-
source poor counterparts (Sachs & Warner, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001; Strauss, 2000; Gyl-
fason, 2004; Mehlum et al., 2006). The term the ‘resource curse’ (Auty, 1993) was eventu-
ally coined to characterise the relationship between resource abundancy and a series of 
negative outcomes, including conflict, authoritarian rule and poor economic growth. This 
was nowhere more apparent than in sub-Saharan Africa, where many nations, newly inde-
pendent, were embracing long-awaited self-determination. In the post-war period only one 
resource endowed nation, Botswana, successfully translated its endowment into sustaina-
ble economic growth, a fact that Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) attributed to sound, ‘in-
clusive’ institutions of government while Poteete (2009) notes the strength of Botswana’s 
political coalition and its adoption of pro-growth policies and institutions.   
 
Natural resource endowment has proven to be anything but an unqualified blessing. In-
stead, we can observe that growth, and more specifically inclusive growth, is conditional 
and reliant on linkages into the wider economy as well as sound resource governance. 
Whilst some states pursued wholesale nationalisation agendas in order to maximise all 
forms of linkages, the quality of governance and institutions features frequently as the ex-
planatory variable for contrasting observations and outcomes; commentators have fre-
quently made comparisons between Botswana and Nigeria, the latter being the most 
prominent exemplar of poor resource governance. However, whilst institutional quality re-
mains part of this thesis, in echoing the sentiments of academics such as de Sa (2013), 
Andrews & Playfoot (2015) and Ovadia (2016), I contend that local content, defined by the 
employment and contracting of local people and companies in the oil industry, is the prin-
ciple vehicle for generating wider and inclusive economic development in nascent re-
source economies. In frontier markets such as Uganda, actualising local content objec-









1.1.2 Oil Companies and Localised Operations 
Localising oil and gas operations, in turn, is also reliant on the willingness of the operating 
companies and their partners to employ local people and contract local suppliers. How-
ever, operators have, traditionally, demonstrated that local content is not integral to the 
profitability of oil and gas operations mainly due to its absence, notably in frontier markets, 
where the development of local capacity must precede its adoption. Authors have noted 
that when local competences are questionable, foreign investors and international compa-
nies have often presented a rational argument in favour of employing expatriates (Dowling 
& Schuler, 1990; O’Donnell, 2000). The risks of employing inexperienced, incompetent 
and under-qualified people can have a devastating impact on the environment and human 
life in the event of a disaster, as well as impacting the reputation and finances of operators 
(Wilson & Kuszewski, 2011). Oil and gas companies therefore are notoriously risk averse 
when it comes to recruitment, succession planning and contracting.  
 
In contrast to the national objective of actualising greater levels of local content, Andrews 
and Playfoot (2015) note that operators have, traditionally, pursued the minimal level of 
compliance possible to maintain their licence to operate, most notably in underdeveloped 
or frontier locations. In the absence of local competencies and inadequate national educa-
tion and training infrastructure, even in mature markets such as Nigeria in the early 2000s, 
greater Job Role Localisation (JRL) and broader supply chain localisation can appear 
costly and potentially unobtainable. As such, localisation rarely represented an economic 
objective of the operator community. However, more recent observations, particularly from 
my own work at Getenergy where I delivered conferences on local content agendas within 
oil and gas, highlighted that, in light of lower oil prices, the end of ‘easy oil’ and increasing 
host government pressure, operators were increasingly vocal about localising their opera-
tions; this notion is supported by the recent work of Pegram (2018).  
 










This thesis was designed to address a disparity between existing literature and my obser-
vations of real-world local content development and adoption in the oil and gas industry. 
Concurrently, this work also asks whether the political economy of Uganda’s oil and gas 
industry is positive for the realisation of development goals through the prism of institution-
alist theory. The qualitative and quantitative data is triangulated with published and pro-
vided data such as employment figures and procurement data allowing for trends to be 
observed. While resource curse literature highlights that oil and gas industries have often 
been associated with several dire economic and political consequences, my thesis is 
broadly based within the understanding that a localised oil industry can be a vehicle for 
economic development. The specific objectives are: 
 
1.Investigate the nature of multistakeholder involvement/engagement in the contemporary 
environment of a nascent petroleum-producing economy 
 
2. Analyse the circumstances that the oil price crash of (give date) engendered greater 
adoption of local content by international oil and gas companies 
 
3. Uncover how the political economy of an oil and gas producing country impacts local 
content development 
 
My study’s findings are delivered in three chapters; Chapter 5 presents results from ana-
lysing the attitudes of operators and other international stakeholders towards local content 
in Uganda. The second looks at the oil price crash as an event that engendered greater 
adoption of local content. The third looks at Ugandan stakeholders, notably the state, as a 
partner in developing and adopting local content in line with the government and people’s 
expectations.  
 
1.3 Methods Overview 
 
This work adopts the pragmatist research paradigm and an abductive approach, utilising 









Chapter 2 subsection 2.7.3. The pragmatist research paradigm permits the use of both 
qualitative and quantitative methods in a way that grants the investigator the tools to best 
answer their research questions, while the abductive approach allows the researcher to go 
back and forward between research methods, with one phase informing the development 
of the next. The thesis is based on a single case study, Uganda’s oil industry, as it was 
deemed appropriate for in-depth research, allowing for the identification of trends and pat-
terns, which in turn can be generalised to deliver relevant and transferable findings.  
 
The design of the study consisted of an initial questionnaire with relevant stakeholders, an 
interview phase with a smaller group of individuals and a final, more focused, question-
naire. As is the way with the abductive research approach, each phase of data collection 
informed the development of the next data collection phase. Significant time was put into 
transcribing recordings from the interviews. Interview data was analysed using NVivo soft-
ware while survey data was analysed using the Jisc software it was disseminated on. Sta-
tistical tests were carried out in order to ascertain P-values, analyse variances in partici-
pants’ responses and measure how responses vary across organisational subcategories.  
 
1.4 Thesis Structure 
 
The main aim of this thesis is to thoroughly investigate whether this new environment for 
oil and gas operations has emerged and in doing so provide an in-depth understanding of 
the roles and motivations of different stakeholders in local content adoption and develop-
ment. This thesis consists of eight chapters, including three chapters in which my research 
findings are presented. Chapter 2 of this study delivers a review of the relevant literature 
to date, highlighting not only the extensive work on linkages and other overlapping topics 
but also the dearth of research into local content adoption and its development in a multi-
stakeholder environment. Chapter 2 also analyses institutionalist political economy theory 
which is the chosen theoretical framework for this work; the chapter discusses how institu-
tionalist theory aims to make research findings more meaningful and acceptable in the re-
search field and ensures generalisability. The chapter concludes by presenting the re-









this study whilst Chapter 4 delivers context on the case study, making the research find-
ings more digestible and comprehendible.  
 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 deliver the research findings: Chapter 5 assesses the commitment 
and motivation of non-indigenous stakeholders to local content and its development; 
Chapter 6 investigates the role of external pressures on non-indigenous commitments to 
local content and its development whilst Chapter 7 looks at the role of Ugandan stakehold-
ers in developing local content as well as mandating and championing its adoption, focus-
ing on Museveni’s leadership, the civil service and academic institutions. Chapter 8 deliv-











2.0 Chapter 2: Rethinking Value Creation 
 
There are a number of bodies of literature that focus on value creation and local content 
which need to be viewed collectively to identify research and theoretical gaps. Building on 
the notion that resource endowment has proven to be anything but an unqualified bless-
ing, studies of value creation and local content in oil and gas are largely situated within 
this resource curse literature. Grossman (1981) was the first academic to introduce re-
search on local content into the wider body of literature on resource economies. However, 
several contributions to the concept of indigenous participation and local value creation 
were made considerably earlier, with Hirschman’s (1958) work on linkages being seminal. 
Hirschman’s work, like many of his contemporaries, was framed by the context of the 
post-colonial era, addressing questions pertinent to the economic development of new na-
tions. As such, local content literature is inextricably linked with the era in which it was 
written. In this chapter, existing literature will be critically assessed for its relevance in the 
contemporary era and pertinent parts extrapolated to inform this study’s conceptual frame-
work.  
 
A finding arising in this chapter is that local content as a shared objective of multiple 
stakeholders is underexplored This notion that the topic is poorly investigated in literature 
contradicts my own professional observations. When I was responsible for facilitating con-
ferences and meetings around the world that brought stakeholders together to partner 
around local content, I came across a considerable number of individuals who were very 
much aware of this multi-stakeholder environment and were themselves players within it. 
A broader critique of contemporary literature is the focus on institutional quality as the key 
determinant of successful resource governance; measures to increase institutional 
strength and the transparency and accountability of governance, for example, do not 
cover dynamic and proactive practical interventions, such as the creation of vocational 
and technical schools, that governments undertake to ensure develop local content and 
improve its adoption. Considerable works on the role of the so-called ‘Norwegian Model’ 
for resource governance reflect the predominance of literature focusing on institutional 









funds, which in some cases like Ghana, are active in developing local capacity, institu-
tional quality itself does not develop or encourage the adoption of local content. This chap-
ter also finds that whilst there is substantial literature focusing on value creation for the 
host state, existing literature largely omits any positive relationship between oil companies 
and local content, suggesting that oil companies themselves have little involvement in lo-
cal capacity development and its adoption. In turn, this means that there is little under-
standing of what the complete local content picture looks like as the roles and interactions 
of multiple stakeholders, including governments, oil operators and international donors, 
have not been viewed collectively or, in some cases, investigated comprehensively. Re-
sultantly, there is little grounded understanding about the political economy of local con-
tent.  
 
As we progress from Hirschman’s original contributions in the 1950s to more recent 
works, we can observe an evolution in the approaches to value creation and local content, 
frequently tied with the economic and political trends of the era. The first six sections of 
this chapter examine existing literature broadly concerning value creation and local con-
tent, primarily within oil and gas but more broadly within resource industries. Firstly, I con-
sider the theoretical contributions, notably linkages, which form the basis of local content 
as a body of literature, whilst the second section looks at literature concerning nationalisa-
tion which some academics (e.g. Ross, 1999) contended would satisfy the requirement for 
linkages and local content. In building on this, the third section looks at good governance 
and the exportability of the so-called Norwegian Model, a model which is based upon the 
separation of administrative functions, reflecting the importance of institutional quality, bu-
reaucratic capacity and certain revenue management interventions. It is important to note 
that this Norwegian administrative model has been implemented in Uganda, and therefore 
makes a useful case study to examine the relationships between institutional quality and 
the implementation of measures which are directly designed to achieve local content ob-
jectives. Heller and Marcel contend that more research is needed to understand the im-
pact of implementing administrative models in new resource ‘hotspots’ which have low lev-
els of existing institutional capacity, including an “examination of how political factors af-









2012, p. 37). Sections four and five address literature regarding the practical means of lo-
cal content creation. Section four assesses Local Content Policy (LCP) whilst section five 
explores literature on local content from the perspective of the operators. The first part of 
this chapter concludes by providing an overview of the perceived literature gaps.  
 
Section seven of this chapter highlights my use of the political economy lens and institu-
tional theory to frame this research. Whilst underlining how institutional political economy 
theory is relevant to my study, I also look to highlight how this research contributes to the 
aforementioned theoretical lens. The final section outlines my research hypothesis and 
questions while highlighting why this angle of investigation has been chosen.   
 




A review of the early literature on local content reveals three key concepts as essential for 
developing a useful interpretation of local content in this thesis, namely, linkages, leading 
sector (or sector focus) and resource enclave. Definitions based on review of key litera-
ture, notably that of Hirschman.  
 
Linkages – An economic link between one sector and other parts of the economy, primar-
ily backward and forward. A forward linkage involves investment in subsequent stages of 
production while a backward linkage involves indigenous inputs into the sector. 
 
Leading sector – Industries with the greatest complementarities, i.e., the number of pos-
sible forward and backward linkages. These are deemed potentially beneficial for eco-
nomic growth.  
 
Resource enclave – The notion of a resource industry existing without any or many link-










The concept of linkages is one of the most valuable contributions to local content literature 
and provides a theoretical basis for local value creation which is as relevant today as it 
was when it was written in1958. Hirschman’s (1958) espousal of ‘Unbalanced Growth’ and 
linkages represented seminal contributions to the literature on local value creation and lo-
cal content. Whilst colonial practices had often focused on the development of extractive 
institutions (i.e. institutions that sought to expatriate resource revenues), the fall of colonial 
powers brought about a new, nationalist and, in some countries, socialist approach to de-
velopment economics.  
 
Significant linkages can offer some degree of a remedy to the macroeconomic challenges 
of Dutch Disease and ‘enclave economics’. The Dutch Disease (The Economist, 1977) re-
fers to a macroeconomic phenomenon whereby the causal relationship between the in-
crease in the development of a specific sector (for example natural resources) causes a 
decline in other sectors across the economy (such as the manufacturing sector or agricul-
ture) due to factors including real exchange rate appreciation and the ‘resource movement 
effect’ (demand for labour away from lagging sectors). Meanwhile, ‘enclave economics’, 
often attributed to Singer (1950), characterised post-colonial dependency relations in the 
underdeveloped and developing world whereby foreign firms dominated export-based in-
dustries (particularly resource sectors) with minimal linkages into the domestic economy. 
Both these macroeconomic phenomena make it imperative that the state and its people 
benefit from the potentially lucrative resource industry and maximise in-country value.  
 
Hirschman’s work can be seen as an early contribution to the developmental state litera-
ture. He contended that in the emerging interconnected world, developing nations must 
take an unbalanced approach to their economic growth, focusing on a group of key sec-
tors and creating strong linkages from these sectors into the wider economy. Hirschman 
believed that increased production of one good or service builds up demand for the sec-
ond good or service, which was termed a complementarity. As such, resources should be 
concentrated into industries with the greatest total of linkages and complementarities; 
these industries were termed leading sectors. By encouraging the state to support the de-










Identifying leading sectors and promoting linkages can be difficult in a globalised era, par-
ticularly within customs unions such as the European Union where there are rules against 
protectionism and state aid to develop nascent industries. However, protectionism and im-
port-substitution industrialisation (ISI) remain common outside of Europe; it is also the 
case that state support and protection for nascent resource industries was and is wide-
spread. This protectionism often takes the form of regulation and legislation as in Uganda, 
or in some cases has led to nationalisation like Iran.  
2.1.1 Linkages and Resource Industries 
Specifically of interest to this case study, Hirschman believed that in the context of re-
source dependency, particularly in low-income economies, linkages from the commodities 
sector provided a path for industrial development and economic diversification, noting that 
“development is essentially the record of how one thing leads to another” (Hirschman, 
1981, p. 75). Linkages also provided a satisfactory theoretical approach to counter ‘en-
clave economics’. In turn, as we will see in the next section, the concept of linkages pro-
vided material for socialist writers of the 1960s and played an important role in the nation-
alisation agendas of the OPEC era.  
 
Hirschman’s espousal of the value of fiscal, consumption and production (forward and 
backward) linkages can be seen as a valuable contribution to the concept of local value 
creation. Through backward and forward linkages, I believe Hirschman’s theory offers a 
remedy to the macroeconomic phenomenon of Dutch Disease and ‘enclave economics’. 
The notion of fiscal linkages (more frequently referred to as resource rents) and consump-
tion linkages (how the resource rents are spent) have provided ample material for aca-
demic works on resource governance, however, Hirschman’s production linkages repre-
sent an early foray into local content and its necessity in developing resource economies. 
He believed that fiscal linkages alone would be insufficient to deliver any meaningful eco-
nomic growth, adding that the “ability to tax the enclave is hardly a sufficient condition for 









nism, the ability to tax must be combined with the ability to invest productively” (Hirsch-
man, 1981, p. 68–69). Production linkages, or more precisely forward linkages (subse-
quent stage of production, e.g. processing) and backward linkages (demand for inputs, 
both labour, goods and services) can provide economic opportunities into the wider econ-
omy but can represent a complex challenge for the governments of resource producing 
economies. Fiscal linkages are a simpler relationship between the process and the out-
come in which there is little need for government involvement unless some type of fraudu-
lent behaviour is observed. In many cases throughout the 20th century, production link-
ages did not develop organically from resource enclaves. In reflecting a more institutional-
ist theory of development, creating backward and forward linkages often requires govern-
ment intervention and operators that are willing to localise their workforces and supply 
chains. 
 
As mentioned, the idea of leading sectors being resource industries conflicts with the no-
tion that commodity enclaves are detrimental for economic growth (Singer 1950). Kaplin-
sky et. al. (2011) concur, attributing the failure to create strong links, primarily backward 
linkages, to the inherited wisdom that the commodities sector is an enclave activity. 
Singer’s (1950) contributions on commodity enclaves (primarily hard commodities), af-
firmed this inherited wisdom, suggesting that the hard commodities sector was character-
ised by simple technological procedures, limited learning opportunities, and diverted 
scarce entrepreneurial activities and domestic investment away from more beneficial man-
ufacturing sectors. He contested, as corroborated by Seers (1964) and Baldwin (1996), 
that linkages from manufacturing, as opposed to resource production, lead to a more com-
plex and diverse labour force, which in turn is more conducive to inclusive economic de-
velopment. Singer’s comments reflect general observations of the early post-colonial era, 
because, after all the ‘big story’ of the post war era was not in the resource endowed na-
tions, but the east Asian nations, such as Taiwan, Japan and South Korea who aban-
doned a strongly self-sufficient industrial policy in favour of an economy based on manu-
factured exports. This was often reinforced by substantial state intervention, or a dirigiste 









(2011), this is the inherent wisdom of the post-colonial era that has blighted further devel-
opment of backward linkages.  
 
Foreign dominance in native resource industries presents a challenge to Hirschman’s ar-
gument that resources sectors could stimulate economic growth through linkages. Ross 
(1999) concurred with aspects of Hirschman’s early writing, noting the more contemporary 
consensus that resource industries were unlikely to stimulate growth in the rest of the 
economy, particularly if foreign multinationals dominated resource extraction and were 
able to repatriate their profits instead of investing them into the host country; this would be 
further exacerbated if the foreign operators failed to engage with the local workforce and 
supply chains. As such, resource exporting nations would be left with booming resource 
enclaves that produced few forward and backward linkages to other parts of the economy. 
This theory is well explored and supported in Corden’s (1984) work. In the mid-1900s, 
many newly independent nations failed to develop these linkages and perhaps resultantly, 
reflecting broader political trends, nationalisation gained prominence as the remedy to 
stunted economic growth in resource rich nations. In avoiding the resource curse, authors 
such as Baran (1957) and Dos Santos (1968) believed that in many cases of resource de-
pendency, nationalisation would finally settle the problem of linkages and deliver the de-
sired levels of local participation. 
 
In summarising the relevance of the early theoretical contributions, the core principles of 
linkages and the necessity to develop economic linkages beyond purely fiscal ones are as 
relevant today as they were in the 1950s. Whilst the notion of unbalanced growth as a ve-
hicle for economic growth is at odds with literature on ‘enclave economics’ and Dutch Dis-
ease, I believe the notion of linkages is incredibly important in highlighting the role re-
source industries can play in inducing demand for services and labour in the rest of the 
economy. As such, a key component of this thesis is the notion that linkages from the re-
source sector, in this case study the oil and gas industry, into the wider economy is a req-
uisite for maximising the possible benefit of the sector to the nation as a whole. The oil 
and gas industry can be a leading sector for Ugandan growth providing it avoids becoming 










Significant linkages may also represent a solution to the aforementioned macroeconomic 
challenges and engender economic growth. As previously discussed, the operating envi-
ronment for resource exploitation has changed significantly since Hirschman’s first es-
pousal of the requirement to develop strong linkages. The majority of these changes have 
been positive for the pursuit of local content, such as the departure of the “inherited wis-
dom” that a localised oil industry would divert human resources and entrepreneurship that 
could be better utilised in other industries and, as this study proposes, the increasing will-
ingness of operators to engage in localisation projects. However, prior to this realisation, 
the concept of nationalisation grew to prominence as the primary means of maximising in 
country value.  
 




A review of the literature on nationalisation reveals two key concepts as essential for de-
veloping a useful interpretation of local content in this thesis, namely, nationalisation itself, 
and the national interest. Definitions based on review of key literature.  
 
Nationalisation – The process of bringing, in this case the oil and gas industry, under 
state control.  
 
National interest – Employing the nation’s oil reserves to serve multiple national needs, 
including guaranteeing oil supplies, providing jobs, and increasing revenues for state 
spending.  
 
Emerging from the realisation that resource economies were not an unqualified blessing, 
the concept of ‘enclave economics’ became prevalent in the 1960s and 1970s through the 
work of notable socialist economists Baran (1957) and Dos Santos (1968). At the height of 









developing world met with the growing sentiment that International Oil Companies (IOCs) 
were extractive institutions of capitalism and provided little for the local economies. As 
such, the late 1960s and 1970s saw a number of nations, like Algeria in 1971 and Iraq in 
1972, move to nationalise oil supplies in order to create an industry that would work in the 
national interest. The rise of the National Oil Companies (NOCs) in this era saw the bal-
ance of power readdressed, as IOCs lost their global dominance over hydrocarbon sup-
plies and national actors emerged to take their place, further reinforced by the creation of 
OPEC (The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries).  
 
Resultantly, the challenge of ‘enclave economics’ was remedied through the nationalisa-
tion process. Instead of foreign operating companies acting as extractive institutions, ex-
patriating profits and using their international supply chains and labour, indigenous com-
panies could, in theory, be utilised to turn resource wealth under the ground into economic 
growth. Nationalisation, a form of protectionism itself, could satisfy the need for significant 
linkages. Importantly, over time, the nationalisation approach to resource governance has 
become less common as nations in the 21st century favour a more pro-business agenda 
(Ovadia, 2016). Resultantly, in some cases, it appears that nationalisation has not been 
an effective vehicle to maximise in-country value.  
 
The aims of nationalisation can include objectives beyond the development of Hirsch-
man’s linkages. The ‘national interest’ is an enduring pillar of nationalisation which often 
encompasses wide-ranging objectives. Contributions to defining the national interest were 
made by Tordo et al. (2011), who suggest that most NOCs operate with a core character-
istic, the ‘national purpose’. The authors contest that NOCs “serve political and economic 
goals other than maximizing the firm’s profits. Perhaps this is the most relevant single fac-
tor that explains their existence and resilience in very different political, social and eco-
nomic environments” (Tordo et al. 2011, p. 8). Value creation was not limited to conven-
tional linkages previously highlighted by Hirschman (1958); in defining what is meant by 
the political, economic and even social objectives, Bentham (1988) and Grayson (1981) 
take a broad approach and point to ideas of security of supply within the domestic market, 









The socialist and nationalising trend of the post-war era was experienced throughout the 
world; however, nascent hydrocarbon nations were arguably even more prone to the so-
cialist agendas buoyed by the promises of their resource wealth. For example, Madelin 
comments that, "Algeria envisages achieving socialism through Sonatrach (Algeria’s 
NOC)" (Madelin, 1974, p. 128). In some cases, the creation of the NOC was perceived to 
be firmly in the national interest, not acting as an extractive institution but a tool for redistri-
bution. As Gorhban notes “they (NOCs) are sometimes assigned by their respective gov-
ernments to fulfil political and social tasks in which a private oil company would not wish to 
participate" (Gorhban, 1989 p. 23). As an intervention, nationalisation was consistent with 
the institutionalist, Weberian notion that ideal interventions would also serve a social good 
which the market economy may neglect.  
 
In many parts of the world, the nationalisation project was successful in actualising a num-
ber of national objectives. Khan argued that the NOC has become “an indispensable tool 
for mobilizing state policy at both national and international levels (to ensure) a national 
mobilization of resources" (Khan, 1987, p. 185-186). However, many nationalisation ef-
forts have not stood the test of time; in recent years, the economic and political agenda of 
market liberalisation and privatisation have continued to influence many nations around 
the globe. Whilst Norway, China, Brazil, India, Pakistan and Japan have all partially privat-
ised their NOCs, other nations, including Mexico and Kazakhstan have made significant 
changes to the regulatory framework, loosening the control of the NOC. These moves, 
with some exceptions (Heller and Marcel, 2012), seem to suggest that NOCs have failed 
to deliver the anticipated value to the local / national economy.  
2.2.1 The Demise of NOCs 
There have been numerous studies to investigate the alleged inefficiency of NOCs 
(McPherson, 2003; Eller et al., 2007). NOCs are frequently noted as having sub-standard 
operational efficiency due to inadequate technical and managerial capacity as well as inef-
ficient human resources policies (Jaidah, 1980; Al-Mazeedi, 1992; Gochenour, 1992). Vic-
tor (2007) found that on average NOCs produce nearly two-thirds less per unit of reserves 









contended that the inefficiency of NOCs became particularly apparent because of the in-
creasing competence of IOCs who were forced to embark on efficiency drives following a 
wave of nationalisation and the creation of OPEC. According to Stevens (2004), many 
NOCs fell behind in technical competency and lost the ability to take on more advanced 
projects on their own. 
 
Whilst NOCs still control a vast proportion of the world’s proven oil reserves, the past two 
decades have seen the influence of NOCs wane and IOCs re-emerge in locations previ-
ously off-limits. Norway, China, Brazil, India, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Japan have all 
partially privatised their NOC. Other nations, including Mexico and Kazakhstan have made 
significant changes to the regulatory framework, loosening the control of the NOC. This 
trend raises questions of the national interest and how value creation can be maximised in 
the absence of state dominance in the national oil industry. NOCs are still a force in the 
industry, however the apparent fall of the NOC has created a situation whereby value cre-
ation through local content cannot be solely a state responsibility. Nowadays, rather than 
a totally nationalised industry, a NOC often operates alongside private companies; this ap-
proach is advocated by the so-called Norwegian Model (discussed in the next section). In 
such an arrangement, the NOC’s scope for employing locals and procuring from the local 
supply chain is reduced.  
 
While this thesis does not apply the ideas of nationalisation to Uganda’s oil sector, it is im-
portant to understand and work with the concept that oil reserves are often expected to 
serve national interests, regardless of whether the industry is nationalised or not. 
Uganda’s NOC, UNOC, has a remit to champion national participation, however as a non-
operating partner, its main contributions to national value creation are likely to be through 
projects to ensure the security of supply within the domestic market and facilitating the de-
velopment of a petrochemical industry. It could also be argued that the relative demise of 
the NOC has engendered greater discussion about good resource governance which is 














A review of the literature on good governance reveals three key concepts as essential for 
developing a useful interpretation of local content in this thesis, namely, institutional qual-
ity, the Norwegian Model and the institutional capacity. Definitions based on review of key 
literature, including that of Heum and Asiago.  
 
Institutional quality – A broad concept concerning law, individual rights and high-quality 
government regulation and services. It is deemed that institutional quality reinforces eco-
nomic growth and vice-versa over time.  
 
Norwegian Model – A tripartite system of governance for the oil and gas sector, loosely 
based on Norway’s own experiences of governing its resources.  
 
Institutional capacity – The capacity of institutions of state to undertake and carry out 
their remit to achieve set objectives.  
 
More recently, a body a literature has emerged which focuses on the role of ‘good re-
source governance’ (Leite & Weidmann, 1999; Mehlum et al., 2006; Robinson et al., 2006; 
Ross, 2012). Many studies on the extractive sectors in the Global South focused on ex-
plaining the inverse relationship between natural resource extraction and development 
agendas (Auty, 1994; Auty, 1995; Frankel, 2010; Humphreys et al., 2007; Sachs & 
Warner, 1995, 2001). Authors such as Mehlum et. al. (2002) pointed out that the potential 
to turn resource endowment into economic growth may depend upon the quality of the 
host government’s institutions. This body of literature is less concerned with linkages but 
situates itself within the notion of the ‘resource curse’ and focuses on the connection be-
tween good governance practices and positive development outcomes. It is argued that 
development potential can be unlocked through certain technocratic reforms of govern-










The notion of good governance arose out of the Post-Washington Consensus (Williamson, 
1990) which recognised that most developing countries faced similar challenges, including 
government inefficiency, corruption and low bureaucratic capacity. The concept, rooted in 
neoliberal theory, proposes a number of economic and policy reforms and was strongly 
promoted by multilateral / donor organisations such as the World Bank and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund. Resultantly, these institutions often prescribed good governance in 
the Global South, encouraging neoliberal market reform (the expansion of market forces 
within the economy), the development of strong formal institutions and democracy. Com-
mitment to good governance often became a condition for access to donor funding and 
loans.  
 
Policy debate has also been framed within this good governance-resource curse nexus. 
The underlying premise is that a number of relatively straightforward interventions can 
drastically improve the development trajectories of resource endowed nations. However, 
good governance is not universally considered a panacea to the resource curse. Whilst 
Bourgouin and Haarstad (2013) accept that administrative improvements and well-tar-
geted measures may have transformative potential, they question the extent to which 
good governance alone can improve development outcomes. The authors argue that 
there are political economy processes shaping resource governance beyond a good gov-
ernance framework.  
 
Massey and May (2005) contend that World Bank’s failure to leverage oil for development 
in Chad, through restructuring, mechanisms to improve transparency and revenue man-
agement, is testament to the limitations of good governance prescriptions. Authors, such 
as Phillips et. al. (2015), believe that the Chadian example is testament to the influence of 
political economy factors, arguing that Chad’s post-colonial history, marked by factional-
ism, instability and violent conflict undermined the potential for governance reforms to pos-
itively influence the development trajectory. The authors contrasts Chad’s political econ-
omy with that of Ghana, noting that “the Ghanaian polity is closer to a Weberian rational-









rule of law, a history of democratic transitions of power, a stable parliamentary democracy, 
and a ‘functioning’ civil society” (Phillips et. al. 2015, p. 3). In turn, their observations sug-
gest that Ghana’s experience with oil is likely to be more positive. Chad experienced neg-
ative social and environment impacts, conflict and severe economic mismanagement 
(Carmody, 2009). Meanwhile, a decade after first oil, Ghana has not experienced negative 
effects on the same scale, although it is arguable that the current level of oil production is 
not significant enough to engender resource curse symptoms or Dutch Disease.   
2.3.1 The Norwegian Model and its Application to Nascent Oil and Gas Economies 
Nevertheless, it is broadly considered that certain governance practices improve the de-
velopment trajectory of resource rich nations. Norway’s approach to resource governance 
and its unique success is widely considered to be illustrative of the impact of good govern-
ance and strong institutions. Academic interest in Norway’s approach is foremost a re-
sponse to the country’s isolated success but also the exportation of the so called ‘Norwe-
gian model’ (Heum, 2008) by the Norwegian development agency, NORAD. The ‘Norwe-
gian Model’, based on the establishment of three institutional bodies, draws on the na-
tion’s institutional design, revenue model and more recently has been underpinned by 
high levels of investment in education and research and development. The Norwegian 
NOC, Equinor, is a visible manifestation of Norway’s success in avoiding the resource 
curse, creating inclusive wealth and representing a fairly unique case of a NOC that has 
developed from a small national operator into a global power.  
 
For the past decade discussion around the Norwegian Model’s relevance to other re-
source endowed nations has formed a considerable part of the debate regarding resource 
sector governance. A number of academics have discussed the extent to which Norway’s 
experiences constitute a model at all, some contend it is solely an administrative model, 
whilst others discuss whether Norway’s experiences have further application to local con-
tent. Academics (Heum, 2008; Thurber. et. al. 2011; Doric & Dimovski, 2018) refine the 
definition of the Norwegian Model to an administrative design which splits the interests of 









sight and technical expertise, and a NOC to engage in commercial interests. Other au-
thors, including Asiago (2017), examine whether the framework can be expanded to incor-
porate a model for local content as well. Asiago (2017) finds Norway’s experience with lo-
cal content insufficient to be considered a model, particularly as the government was not 
committed to any long-running or notable localisation agenda. 
 
Norway created responsible and accountable formal institutions to govern the sector. The 
tripartite model is based on the formation of three institutions, in Norway this was the Min-
istry of Petroleum for policy-making, the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate for technical 
control, regulation and advisory functions, and Statoil (now Equinor), the nation’s oil com-
pany, originally used as an instrument for implementing government policies and to take 
care of commercial interest. The separation of powers and responsibility for policy making, 
and commercial interests has been very important in ensuring transparent government ac-
tivities and that business (Equinor) remained separate from government interests (Polus 
and Tycholiz, 2017). Norway’s democratic traditions have also provided the reassurance 
that the state of play would remain constant, allowing operators to plan for long term in-
vestments in the local supply chain and local people. 
 
In the case of Norway, a strong bureaucratic tradition supported the development of the 
nascent institutions into informed, moderating forces. Authors such as Al-Kasim (2006a, 
2006b), Espinasa (2008) and Thurber et. al. (2011) have considered possible benefits of 
the separation of functions, noting that Norway’s tripartite model, or one similar, can be a 
key determinant in what Thurber et. al. (2011) term ‘oil sector performance’ as well as 
more general economic outcomes. However, Thurber et. al. (2011) contend that where in-
stitutional capacity is weak, consolidating commercial, policy, and regulatory functions into 
one body may result in better outcomes. The authors argue that the separating of func-
tions in Nigeria, pre-dated that of Norway’s institutional design and is remarkably similar. 
However, Nigeria’s indigenous bureaucracy was undeveloped when the tripartite design 
was implemented, resultantly the triad was ineffective, subdued and eviscerated by the 









human capacity, spreading competencies too thinly across multiple government bodies is 
likely to negatively impact institutional capacity.   
 
It is important to note that Norway has been instrumental in the development of Uganda’s 
administrative system for managing the nation’s oil industry, one of the many contributions 
made by development and donor agencies to Uganda’s oil sector. Within the Norwegian 
Agency for Development Cooperation’s (NORAD) Oil for Development Programme, the 
two governments began to implement a three-year programme entitled “Strengthening the 
State Petroleum Administration of the Upstream Sector in Uganda”. This was followed by 
a five-year programme which looked to build state capacity as well as a legal and institu-
tional framework to cope with bureaucratic pressure of upcoming oil production. However, 
the question remains, how compatible is Norway’s administrative model with the Ugandan 
political, economic, and social conditions. In building on this, it is necessary to consider 
how this administrative model is impacting the realisation of Uganda’s local content objec-
tives and in the context of a new operating environment globally. 
 
A publication from Polus and Tycholiz (2017) reviewed the applicability of the Norwegian 
Model to Uganda. The authors assessed whether tripartite separation of functions be-
tween the national oil company (UNOC), a petroleum authority and the ministry was likely 
to be successful in Uganda, noting “the political landscape, and an institutional structure 
characterized by neopatrimonialism and clientelism, is not easily compatible with the Nor-
wegian Model of oil-sector management” (Polus and Tycholiz, 2017, p.196). In general, 
administrative strategies which work well in countries with mature institutions may be ill-
suited to countries lacking certain institutional endowments (Grindle, 2004, 2007; Moore 
and Putzel, 1999; Rodrik, 2008; Ramírez-Cendrero & Wirth, 2016; Polus & Tychloiz, 
2017). However, Polus and Tycholiz contend that “Norwegian experience in oil sector 
management can serve as an inspiration for sub-Saharan states” (Polus and Tycholiz, 
2017).  









Asiago (2017) considered the transplanting of a local content strategy from Norway to Ni-
geria, concluding that Norway did not necessarily have ‘the model’ and if a strategy needs 
to be transplanted from one country to another, they should have fundamental similarities, 
which Norway does not. Norway, then as now, has few similarities with underdeveloped or 
developing nations; when Norway began producing oil, its possession of a highly edu-
cated workforce, substantial academic and vocational training capacity and industrialised 
economy is in stark contrast with Uganda. Heum (2008) and Sasson & Blomgren (2011) 
both provide a narrative to suggest that Norwegian government policy and regulation was 
sufficient to encourage operators to adopt a localised business model where possible. 
However, as noted by Ryggvik (1997), local employment and procurement was not sub-
stantial until Statoil’s emergence as the serious operator. According to Olsen (2013), in 
1994, the Norwegian oil industry achieved 74% local procurement, the most of anywhere 
in the world and had not been surpassed at the time of writing. More recent achievements, 
notably the expansion of Norwegian service companies and the NOC, have benefited from 
dynamic state intervention which enhanced indigenous capacity. Since the turn of the cen-
tury, the government was effective in channelling resources into education, research (such 
as the Centre for Oil Recovery in Stavanger), development and providing scholarships for 
visits abroad. Resultantly, dynamic state intervention built upon existing capacity in creat-
ing a highly attractive cluster of technical competence.  
 
Heum (2008) provides further evidence that Norway’s experience does not constitute a 
replicable approach to local content. The author highlights that Norway had not been ex-
plicit in determining how national industry was to be developed until the mid 1990s. An 
early focus looked to develop industrial competence in areas where Norway already had 
some degree of expertise, a luxury not all national oil industries have benefited from and 
resultantly reduces relevance of Norwegian experiences to the new frontier nations of oil 
and gas exploration. Dissimilarities between contemporary Uganda and 1960s Norway do 
not end there; in the early years at least, Norway did not look to develop capabilities in all 
areas of exploration and production. Ryggvik (1997) concurs, noting that the Norwegian 









dertake any initiatives to boost national educational capacity in oil and gas-related sub-
jects; despite a lack of government support, some universities established courses within 
the field of oil and gas. In 1978, the Norwegian government first made it clear that the use 
of Norwegian personnel would be an evaluation criterion used in assessing applications 
for new licenses (Ryggvik 1997), however, the share of foreign workers in the petroleum 
workforce steadily increased to 20 percent for the country as a whole and to more than 30 
percent in the main petroleum county, Rogaland (Ryggvik 1997). In many cases local peo-
ple were employed as roustabouts to make up the numbers.  
 
It could be argued that there was little design to Norway’s approach to local content. In-
stead, Norway’s local content story bears a close resemblance to the global trends of 
compliance in the early years, a movement towards greater national ownership and then 
renewed investment in education and training in the early 21st century. In the early years, 
Article 54 was established by the Ministry of Petroleum which compelled the oil companies 
to inform the Ministry that Norwegian companies were on the bidders’ list. As in other na-
tions at the time, including post-colonial states, oil companies were tasked with developing 
plans as to how to enhance the competitiveness of local firms. The rise of Norway’s NOC 
Statoil provided greater national ownership and the local content that frequently accompa-
nies it. Furthermore, as Sasson and Blomgren (2011) note, the Norwegian government 
has only become more engaged and involved in the development of competences since 
the turn of the century; motivated by the concept of turning Norway into a hub for 
knowledge and maintaining Norway’s attractiveness for oil and gas businesses despite 
slowing oil production.  
 
In summary, the concept of the Norwegian Model was born out of a model for the separa-
tion of powers which may be counterproductive in nations where institutional quality is 
weak or leaders display discretionary power. The literature is also conclusive in that Nor-
way’s approach to local content does not constitute a model robust or rigid enough to be 
transplanted. Indeed, Norway’s success in resource governance was largely reactive, 









oped gradually and was adapted to a constantly evolving internal and external environ-
ment” (Polus and Tychloiz, 2017, p. 196). Despite criticisms of the model, this thesis 
draws upon existing literature concerning the Norwegian Model, as the tripartite system 
has been implemented in Uganda. As such its applicability to nascent hydrocarbon indus-
tries is tested in this thesis. Reflecting on Thurber.et. al.’s work (2011), Chapter 7 as-
sesses whether Uganda’s institutional capacity and neopatrimonialism undermines the 
Norwegian Model and the effective administration of the oil and gas industry.  
 
The notion of the Norwegian Model has also been useful in stimulating further discourse 
into the role and importance of institutional design and strength. This debate is also illumi-
nating when investigating the case study of Uganda, providing a lens through which to 
view research findings. However, institutional capacity does not directly influence local 
content. Instead, it must be considered a precursor to government policy and other inter-
ventions that may impact the development and adoption of local content. Should institu-
tional capacity be strong, policy interventions and other initiatives, such as the creation of 
oil and gas centres of excellence, may be better implemented by government bodies.  
 
2.4 Local Content Policy in 21st Century Oil and Gas 
Key concepts: 
Local Content Policy – Policies aimed at developing and encouraging the adoption of local 
content. In existing literature, this primarily revolves around regulation rather than supply 
side policies and interventions.  
Whilst the concept of linkages is fairly mature in literature, local content is not. Much litera-
ture concerning local content is situated within the discourse on regulation, legalisation and 
policy, as well as institutional quality and good governance. Donor and multilateral organi-
sations have been prominently involved in local content policy and governance research as 
part of their commitment to promote growth and boost shared prosperity, notable publica-









Monetary Fund). Their work often corresponds with active programmes led by their organi-
sation; over the past decade it is possible to note the increasing involvement of donor and 
multilateral organisations in local content programmes.  
As noted by Klueh et. al. (2007), the quest for increasing economic benefits through local 
content traces back to the establishment of NOCs (as discussed in 2.2) and the lesser-
known developments in the UK in the 1970s, as the government sought to monitor and audit 
purchases made by oil companies. In practice, local content policy (LCP) has become more 
prominent in the 21st century as oil and gas operations emerged in new and often underde-
veloped frontiers as well as previously nationalised nations which have been opened up to 
the international market.  
Whilst Klueh et. al. (2007) highlighted that mature oil producing nations have taken differing 
approaches to governing local content or “value-added”, an important conclusion from 
Tordo et. al. is that “there is no standard package of LCPs (Local Content Policy) and tools 
that works for every country in every circumstance” (Tordo et. al. 2013, p. 18). This rein-
forces the conclusions of the previous section (regarding the Norwegian Model), that good 
governance requires an adaptive approach to evolving internal and external environments. 
The variety of circumstances in which there is a requirement to implement local content 
policy makes it challenging to prescribe a predetermined model. In extrapolating this infor-
mation, we can note that whilst other countries provide valuable examples of resource sec-
tor governance, different countries will require varied approaches.  
 
Both Klueh et. al. (2007) and Tordo et al. (2013) identify the evolution of government poli-
cies and the conventional instruments of governance that can be utilised to aid the devel-
opment of local content. Their work is useful in developing an understanding of the mech-
anisms of local content policy and delivers a conceptual overview complemented by na-
tional examples of policy implementation. Tordo et al. (2013) highlighted the following pol-
icy instruments: Policy Statements, Strategies, and Plans, Primary Legislation, Secondary 









iffs, Market Regulation, Employment Regulation, Tender Procedures, Reporting and Moni-
toring Regulation and the Recruitment, Training, and Promotion of Nationals. They con-
tend that some of these policies are assertive, and some encouraging.  
However, local content policy alone is not the solution to localisation challenges. Ihua con-
tended that local content policy in Nigeria had not achieved significant success, highlighting 
outstanding issues such as “cumbersome prequalification and entry requirements, under-
funded and ill-equipped educational institutions, laissez-faire attitude of multinationals, inef-
fective monitoring and control by regulatory authorities, and inadequate financing options 
for indigenous SMEs still hinder the policy efficacy” (Ihua, 2010, p. 3). Adedeji et. al. (2016) 
agree, adding that LCPs had not had the expected impact in Nigeria and suggesting that 
the implementation of LCP needs to be monitored closely to ensure its efficacy. Resultantly, 
the nature of the policy and the quality of the implementation are critical determinants of the 
policy’s success.  Kalyuzhnova and Belitski (2019), in a study on resource rich Kazakhstan, 
also conclude that the implementation of the explicit local content policy requires monitoring 
to ensure its efficacy.   
 
Whilst Tordo et al. (2013) highlight a number of means by which a government can man-
date and encourage operators to pursue local content goals, their work omits intervention-
ist policies, such as financing for local enterprise, the creation of academies to deliver the 
requisite competences, scholarships and the construction of business parks to provide 
suppliers with access to necessary services and amenities. I believe this is also demon-
strative of the preference of the World Bank and the IMF for a regulated, yet largely free 
market environment, rather than a more interventionist or developmental state approach. 
Mushemeza et. al. (2017), although largely focused on policy, note the effectiveness of 
government run training in enterprise centres in Angola and Nigeria in raising indigenous 
capacity and proposes the potential for future application by other governments. Whilst my 
study commenced before Mushemeza et. al.’s work was published, I agree with the senti-
ment that more research is required in this area and I look to highlight the case for greater 










This area of research, assessing the effectiveness of local content policy, is not a perfect 
science and, as yet, is largely uncritical as there are very few well-examined case studies 
which evaluate the effectiveness of different approaches to local content policy. 
Mushemeza et. al.’s (2017) study, pioneering in its empirical insights into local content pol-
icy, highlight the difficulties in examining what constitutes an effective framework for local 
content and the difficulties in delivering a comparative analysis of its effectiveness. Whilst 
a number of their conclusions are aligned with conventional wisdom that institutional qual-
ity is a critical success factor, their analysis of the strength of local content frameworks is 
subjectively rated by the authors.  
 
It is important to note that, like nationalisation and good governance practices, local con-
tent policy does not represent a panacea to value creation challenges. However, local 
content policy forms an important part of this research, underlying the principles of state 
involvement and intervention in the oil and gas sector to engender greater benefit for the 
nation. Rather than purely policy relating to regulation, this thesis addresses the interven-
tions which dynamically aid local content development in line with industry requirements.  
 
Previous studies have also demonstrated that the capacity to implement local content pol-
icy is a key determinant in whether the policies are influencing operator behaviour. This is 
undoubtedly one of the largest challenges for underdeveloped and developing nations. A 
specific criticism of Tordo et. al.’s (2013) highly influential paper, is that it constitutes an 
approach that only mandates or encourages operators to conform to local content objec-
tives. Resultantly, there is no consideration given to the role of an interventionist state, op-
erators, other industry players and donor / multilateral agencies which are more practical 
in nature and have a direct impact on local content development and subsequently, its 
adoption. Interventionist approaches that see multiple stakeholders engage in local con-
tent development include the use of scholarships to train local talent, the creation of busi-
ness zones and establishment of relevant academic and vocational institutes.  
 
It is arguable that Tordo et. al.’s omission may be because of the often-secretive opera-









only become more committed to local content in recent years, the latter can also be ap-
plied to donor interventions. Tordo et. al. comment that “local content is a complex and 
fast-evolving area. Until quite recently most international oil and gas companies viewed 
local content as part of their corporate social responsibility agenda. But a plethora of new 
government policies and regulations has shifted local content into a compliance regime” 
(Tordo et. al. 2013, p. 61). Whilst this was a valid observation at the time, I contend that 
local content is, now, more than a matter of compliance. Instead, we must now look to 
identify local content as a cost-efficient business model that is being implemented for the 
benefit of operator and state alike; this in turn means that my research must focus on op-
erator initiatives as a component of local content development. 
 




A review of the literature on oil and gas operations in the context of local content reveals 
three key concepts as essential for developing a useful interpretation of local content in 
this thesis, namely, localisation, workforce localisation and globalisation. Definitions based 
on review of key literature.  
 
Localisation – The process of moving away from operational inputs being non-indigenous 
in nature, to employing and contracting nationals and local firms.   
 
Workforce localisation – The process of training and developing local workers to take up 
roles occupied by expatriates within a firm. 
 
Globalisation – The process by which the world is becoming increasing interconnected. 
In the case of oil and gas, which has long been an industry reflecting globalisation, na-










It is broadly agreed that operators must link their strategies with local content policies and 
government objectives in order to deliver an enduring positive socio-economic impact 
(Ayentimi et al., 2016; Hansen et al., 2014; Ngoasong, 2014). Despite this notion, Ngo-
asong contends that “it remains debatable whether the business practices of IOCs are 
consistent with what actually makes a difference in terms of economic development” (Ngo-
asong, 2014, p. 478). In contrast to my personal experience in the industry and the narra-
tives proffered by operators and their representatives at the time of the oil price crash, ac-
ademics such as Warner (2011) and Adewuyi & Ademola (2012) did not observe IOCs or 
multinational operators to be active or engaged with localisation agendas. In reflecting the 
nature of local content, literature largely separates human capacity with procurement and 
supply chain management.  
 
Ngoasong (2014) contends that poor mechanisms for reporting and monitoring make it 
more difficult to observe trends in local employment, procurement and operator-led local 
content development. As such, much of the employment and procurement data accessible 
will be courtesy of the companies themselves, which in some cases may lead to the dis-
semination of mistruths in order to maintain the illusion of compliance. Tordo et. al. (2013), 
Henisz et al. (2014) and Andrews & Playfoot (2015) suggest that, historically, the only mo-
tivation for operators to meet local content quotas is to legitimise their position with the 
host government and local stakeholders. With a conclusion similarly dismissive of operator 
commitments, Weldegiorgis et. al. contended that “too often local employment and pro-
curement policies have been simply a good will gesture” (Weldegiorgis, et. al. 2017, p. 
31). This notion is arguably most applicable in undeveloped or developing nations where 
indigenous capacity does not naturally satisfy operator requirement for labour and pro-
curement, resultantly adopting local content would make less business sense.  
 
A common theme in more historical literature concerns expatriate managers and has fo-
cused on facilitating the adjustment of the manager, their spouse and family to the new lo-
cation (Baker & Ivancevich, 1971; Black, et. al., 1991; Hayes, 1974; Hixon, 1986), reflect-
ing the increasing globalised nature of the oil industry and other sectors like it. According 









expatriates and improving their productivity rather than addressing the problem of how to 
replace them with a maximum of skill transfer and a minimum of disruption” (Fryxell, 2004, 
p. 270). Resultantly, this body of literature worked in conflict with localisation agendas.  
 
In responding to the above literature on globalisation, a number of academics contended 
that a localised workforce has a number of benefits (Fryxell, et. al., 2004; Hailey, 1996; 
Law et. al., 2009). In spite of the consensus that workforce localisation is likely to have 
more benefits than drawbacks, operators have traditionally shown little desire to localise 
their workforce and supply chains for overseas projects as there was an abundance of 
easy oil and resultantly operational profitability was less impacted by oil price fluctuations. 
Nowadays, it is increasingly the case that new oil discoveries are offshore, which are more 
expensive to develop, and in less developed nations, like Uganda or Guyana. Resultantly 
many operational costs have gone up as well as the requirement for skilled labour. 
 
Whilst local procurement and Job Role Localisation (JRL) are often mandated through leg-
islation, regulation or contractual obligations, occurrences of non-compliance are com-
monplace (Esteves et. al., 2013). The benefits of operating a localised business have 
been well discussed among academics; JRL is a solution to expatriate failure rates, im-
proving rapport and confidence amongst national staff which in turn increases retention 
rates and improves government relations (Karam, et. al., 2015; Selmer, 2003), whilst other 
authors claim that JRL reduces costs (Kobrin, 1988; Fayol-Song, 2013). Pegram (2018) 
contends that JRL is becoming increasingly important in the current operating environ-
ment. However, it should be noted that the term JRL is not always approached from the 
perspective of the operator or the private sector. In a number of studies, job role localisa-
tion is actually approached from the perspective of the state and considers the challenges 
and necessary inputs to localise relevant industries, this is common in literature concern-
ing Emiratisation such as Faisal et, al. (2018) but in essence is similar to work on local 










Pegram et. al. (2018) believes that operators frequently work in isolation as a result of the 
competitive and often secretive nature of the industry, which “means different organisa-
tions frequently attempt to solve the same problems without addressing systemic local 
content issues” (Pegram et. al. 2018, p. 17). However, research tells us that cooperation 
and working as a cluster can enhance knowledge sharing, concentrate efforts to deliver 
competences as well as advance local competitiveness and capability in line with the 
needs of industry (CCSI, 2016; Morris, et. al., 2012; Sigam and Garcia, 2012). Sigam and 
Garcia (2012), also contend that clusters are particularly beneficial when synergies are 
created across the value chain; the authors note the coming together of stakeholders, 
government, universities, mining firms and local companies in Chile’s mining industry. This 
notion is a central feature of my thesis; I believe there is now more stakeholder engage-
ment in the oil industry around local content than ever before as local content becomes a 
common and more desirable objective among all stakeholder groups.  
 
Significant investment and support are often required of operators to pursue localisation 
efforts (Arthur and Arthur, 2014), Uganda is no different due to its dearth of inherited com-
petences. Although there is a common understanding within the industry that localisation 
can represent part of an efficient business model, there is an absence of research con-
cerning the scale of investments required of operators in order to localise their operations. 
Many existing studies suggest that JRL can reduce costs, without quantifiable evidence to 
substantiate these claims (Dickmann et al., 2017; Fayol-Song, 2013; Hickey, 2017). This 
lack of substantiation was addressed by Pegram et. al. (2018), whose study highlighted 
that whilst not all job roles should be localised, the training and development investment 
timelines presented empirical evidence to suggest that JRL can lead to cost reductions. 
These findings of Pegram et. al. (2018) have further implications for this thesis, informing 
an important premise that higher levels of local content represent a cost-effective business 
model for oil operators.   
 
Pegram et. al (2018) assessed the viability of localising particular job roles using a case 
study from Eni Ghana, although it is clear that there is more to learn about the mechanism 









stakeholders have a shared interest and responsibility to deliver local content. In echoing 
the recommendations of Pegram et. al. (2018), further research is required to explore how 
localisation efforts differ between operators and how effective these efforts are when gov-
ernments and operators work collectively in this new operating environment characterised 
by shared responsibilities. In turn, my thesis responds to the need for greater understand-
ing of this environment in which there are multiple, active organisations in the develop-
ment of local content and correspondingly, its adoption.  
2.5.1 Local Procurement and Supply Chain Management 
Supply chain management and risk management are well observed in literature, although, 
from a business perspective, there appears to be a dearth of work focusing specifically on 
oil and gas operations. In a 2011 study on all extractive industries, Esteves & Barclay con-
tended that “there is a growing awareness among practitioners that procurement from lo-
cal SMEs can bring significant social and economic benefits to communities” (Esteves & 
Barclay, 2011, p. 206). This notion has been accepted for some time by academics and 
observers of resource industries. Whilst there have been a number of studies across mul-
tiple industries (Deloitte, 2004; Jenkins et al, 2007; Nelson, 2007; Ruffing, 2006; 
UNCTAD, 2001) discussing the growth in SME development programmes, these pro-
grammes were frequently between governments, support institutions and development 
agencies, and not industry or operators.  
 
The benefits for operators to increase engagement with the local economy can be wide 
ranging.  Esteves et al. (2011) note that “from a corporate perspective, local economic 
participation is seen as one means of maintaining a social licence to operate, as well as 
ensuring reliability of supply by having a supplier located nearby” (Esteves et al., 2011, p. 
233). This marks a movement away from the initial motivation, which was a need to com-
ply with formalised commitments (Esteves & Barclay, 2011), and towards a position where 
additional benefits are realised. Despite Esteves’ prominence in this area of research, the 
author rarely discusses any economic or financial benefits that may be accrued by opera-









cuss Shell Nigeria as a company that has responded to heightened community expecta-
tions and accordingly has introduced local procurement planning for the entire project 
lifecycle. 
 
Esteves et al. (2010) and Esteves & Vanclay (2009) indicated that operator attitudes to-
wards local procurement were continually evolving. Esteves & Barclay’s work proposed a 
movement away from compliance and towards an approach “motivated by the desire to 
establish and maintain enduring partnerships with local suppliers for mutual benefit” (Es-
teves & Barclay, 2011, p. 207), contrasting the conclusions of Tordo et. al. (2013) as 
noted in 2.4. Resultantly, Esteves & Barclay contended that some operators were being 
more proactive, giving preferential weightings to local suppliers in the bidding processes, 
allowing local suppliers to price match with international competitors, unbundling large 
contracts into smaller ones and contractual obligations with international oilfield service 
companies and EPC contractors (Engineering, Procurement, Construction) to procure lo-
cally themselves as well as supplier development initiatives (Esteves & Barclay, 2011); 
however, there are no examples provided by the authors of the aforementioned initiatives 
being implemented.    
 
In contrast, Mohammad’s (2009) study in oil and gas, like other works that preceded his, 
criticised operator procurement strategies for being disengaged from local suppliers, sug-
gesting that operators could be more proactive in delivering opportunities to the local 
economy. A primary reason for this appears to be the cautious nature of operators and 
their averse relations with supply-chain risk, which is defined as “the potential occurrence 
of an incident with inbound supply in which its outcomes result in a financial loss for the 
firm” (Zsidisin et al., 2008, p. 402–3). These risks are likely to be more pronounced in less 
developed operating environments. More recent literature reflects the notion that opera-
tors are more willing to engage than in the past and as such can play a part in reducing 
the risks of procuring from local suppliers. Östensson (2017) in a study on resource indus-
tries contended that companies increasingly engage with suppliers to assist in local ca-
pacity development, “The industry is usually prepared to participate in such efforts, pro-










Furthermore, the subject of local content development, either separate from other discus-
sions or as part of them, is insufficiently explored. The topic itself is in theory and practice, 
often detached from local content policy, with people responsible for local content devel-
opment, be it an operator, a government employee or a development agency, often being 
practitioners rather than policy experts. De Vita et. al. (2015) and Pegram et. al. (2018) 
are some of the few works that deliver a rigorous analysis of local content development 
and the mechanisms by which it takes place. Both Pegram et. al. (2018) and De Vita et. 
al. (2015) both provide evidence that operators are involved in local content development, 
either through the provision of in-house training (training by operator employees) and the 
development of links between operators and higher education.  
 
In summary, within the existing literature, there is an acceptance that the adoption of a 
more localised supply chain can deliver a number of benefits for operating companies, be 
it reduced logistics costs or increased social capital with local communities. Whilst there is 
some work that suggests operators are increasingly keen on nearshoring (the process of 
adopting a more localised supply chain), there is not a dearth of evidence to support this. 
As Östensson (2017) alludes to, multiple stakeholders are now concerning themselves 
with local content and its development, acknowledging that both the local economy and 
the operators stand to benefit. Despite the breadth of academic work on workforce man-
agement, I believe that only Pegram has delivered real insights into workforce localisation 
in oil and gas from the operator perspective. As Pegram’s work (2018, 2019) has been fo-
cused solely on the operator staff and their development, there remains a dearth of real 
insight concerning operator engagement with local suppliers, although I do acknowledge 
that operators show more commitment to personnel development than supplier develop-
ment.  
 
Acknowledging the key concepts discussed in this section, the study is situated within the 
globalisation-localisation nexus, with the research focusing on the movement towards lo-









focus, highlighting the traditionally isolated nature of oil and gas operations but also under-
lining the business case for operating more locally with regards to the workforce. The no-
tion that there are financial incentives for operating more locally is also a key concept, 
taken forward by this research. Pegram’s work is also based on the understanding that a 
localised oil and gas industry can be a vehicle for broader economic development.   
 
2.6 Literature Overview and Gaps 
 
Although studies have been conducted by many authors, local content adoption and de-
velopment in the oil and gas industry is still insufficiently explored, particularly with regards 
to what influences changes in operator uptake of local content, e.g. regulatory and market 
forces. This insufficient exploration is made more acute in light of the premise of this re-
search, namely that the operating environment is engendering greater commitment to lo-
cal content and its development, not only from operators but increasing involvement of the 
government and donor agencies too. Whilst some authors (Tordo et. al., 2013; Klueh et. 
al., 2007) have addressed only local content policy, other authors (Fryxell, 2004; Ngo-
asong, 2014) have only approached the issue from the perspective of the operators. In re-
sponding to the above, this thesis addresses the need for research which approaches the 
topic of local content adoption and development from a multi-stakeholder perspective, also 
reflecting the often unformalized or ad-hoc nature of the relationships and seeks to im-
prove understanding through the use of the political economy lens.  
 
The literature reviewed in this chapter demonstrates the progression of the dominant 
thought and trends concerning value creation in the oil and gas industry throughout the 
last century. The earlier studies remain applicable in the new operating environment and 
will form the building blocks for this research. Hirschman’s (1958) ‘linkages’ remain rele-
vant across all local content and value creation literature, while more recent literature has 
contributed observations for the effective delivery of local content (Tordo et. al., 2013, 
Klueh et. al., 2007, Mushemeza et. al., 2017). Efforts to characterise Norway’s experi-
ences as a model for successful resource governance highlight the effect of strong institu-









friendly institutions which follow the law and promote stable growth, act accountably, bu-
reaucratically and avoid corrupt behaviour are most likely to have effective local content 
mechanisms (Mehlum et al., 2006; Robinson et. al., 2006; Sachs, 2007).  
 
Existing literature also highlights the challenges of prescribing models, noting that the cir-
cumstances of any national oil and gas industry are unlikely to be identically replicated 
elsewhere in the world. Whilst the benefits of an administrative framework that fosters in-
stitutional capacity are clear, authors such as Asiago (2017) contend that transplanting an-
ything more than an administrative framework from a nation like Norway, to an underde-
veloped economy like Uganda, is unlikely to succeed. Thurber et. al. (2011) also contend 
that the notion of the prominent Norwegian Model and the separation of institutional func-
tions, may be counterproductive if existing institutional capacity is insufficient. As such, 
this research seeks to show that although local content benefits can accrue from adminis-
trative frameworks that may be transplanted from abroad, there are multiple variables that 
influence the development and adoption of local content, many of them more directly than 
institutional quality. Correspondingly, this thesis will investigate a wide range of factors 
that influence local content, including operator attitudes, local content policy, indigenous 
capacity and political economy factors.  
 
More precisely, there is a dearth of empirical research that looks at workforce localisation 
and nearshoring purely in the oil and gas industry; as highlighted by Kim et al., (2017), the 
majority of existing local content studies within extractive industries have focused on min-
ing which demands different human capacity and inputs, albeit linked by the concept of 
the resource curse. One reason for this seems to be the challenge of gaining access to 
secondary empirical data within the oil and gas sector (Harry, 2007). As a result, studies 
that assess the impact of oil and gas often utilise generalised means of analysis such as 
multipliers, input-output tables and GDP statistics (Tordo et al., 2013). Authors such as 
Kazzazi and Nouri (2012) have highlighted the need for more empirical works as this will 











I believe that addressing workforce localisation and procurement in the same study allows 
us to develop a more rounded understanding of operator attitudes towards local content 
as well as the effectiveness of policy interventions and other initiatives. Whilst individual 
studies on workforce localisation such as Pegram et. al. (2018), provide vital insights into 
that specific topic, for a more complete understanding of operator attitudes to local con-
tent, it is necessary to study both procurement and workforce localisation together. As 
such, this thesis delivers a robust study of local content by addressing procurement, work-
force localisation and local content development initiatives together and investigates the 
influencing factors.  
 
As I hypothesise, operators are more engaged with local content today than they were in 
the past. However, there is no study that proves, either by the use of empirical evidence or 
other data, that attitudes towards local content have changed. Such a finding would re-
quire a study to take data from the past and compare it with more recent data. I consider 
this to be another gap in existing literature and one which I address in this thesis.  
  
It is widely agreed that delivering an enduring positive socio-economic impact requires op-
erators to link their strategies with national local content objectives (Ayentimi et al. 2016; 
Hansen et al. 2014; Ngoasong, 2014). In general, this study responds to a prominent gap 
in the literature, namely, a lack of understanding of the factors that influence local content 
adoption and the mechanism by which local content development takes place in a multi-
stakeholder environment. As such, this research is designed to investigate the aforemen-
tioned lack of understanding and deliver insights that may inform future local content inter-
ventions and industry strategies. To do so, an institutionalist political economy framework 
provides the ideal lens to explore the practices of stakeholders and investigate what his-
torical and socio-economic factors influence activity around local content. 
 
In summary, this thesis is situated within existing literature, such as that written by Hirsch-
man, which highlights the importance of establishing linkages between the resource sector 









governance, I concur with academics such as Bourgouin and Haarstad (2013) and Mas-
sey and May (2005) who question the limitations of good governance prescriptions alone.  
 
Massey and May (2005) contend that World Bank’s failure to leverage oil for development 
in Chad, through restructuring, mechanisms to improve transparency and revenue man-
agement, is testament to the limitations of good governance prescriptions. Authors, such 
as Phillips et. al. (2015), believe that the Chadian example is testament to the influence of 
political economy factors, arguing that Chad’s post-colonial history, marked by factional-
ism, instability and violent conflict undermined the potential for governance reforms to pos-
itively influence the development trajectory. The authors contrast Chad’s political economy 
with that of Ghana, noting that “the Ghanaian polity is closer to a Weberian rational-legal 
ideal, presiding over a formally liberal market economy marked by respect for the rule of 
law, a history of democratic transitions of power, a stable parliamentary democracy, and a 
‘functioning’ civil society” (Phillips et. al. 2015, p. 3). In turn, their observations suggest 
that Ghana’s experience with oil is likely to be more positive. Chad experienced negative 
social and environment impacts, conflict, and severe economic mismanagement (Car-
mody, 2009). Meanwhile, a decade after first oil, Ghana has not experienced negative ef-
fects on the same scale, although it is arguable that the current level of oil production is 
not significant enough to engender resource curse symptoms or Dutch Disease. My thesis 
also draws heavily on more recent literature, notably that of Tordo et. al. (2013), Henisz et 
al. (2014) and Andrews & Playfoot (2015) in which the authors make important contribu-
tions concerning the positive impact of a movement towards localisation and understand-
ing the historic issue surrounds its development and adoption.  
 
2.7 Research Framework and Questions 
 
My research problem concerns the role of operators in adopting and developing local con-
tent which in turn is part of a series of interactions between the institutions of government 
and third parties, such as donor agencies. As such, I situate my research within institution-
alist political economy theory, a framework which broadly emphasises the role of historical 









contribute to institutionalist political economy theory by demonstrating how economic, po-
litical and societal factors interact and influence local content adoption and development.  
 
This branch of political economy theory is primarily concerned with the interaction of de-
cision-making units, such as firms, the state, and foreign states, and - through Austrian 
sociological contributions to institutionalism - individual actors. My study is characterised 
by multiple stakeholders, some MNCs, some individual actors seeking to earn a living 
from Uganda’s oil and gas industry, as such it is necessary to theorise that all stake-
holders are subject to institutional restraints. Interactions between stakeholders are not 
defined purely by the economic self-interest of the engaged parties. Instead we must 
observe, as North (1990) notes, the human devised constraints (institutions) that struc-
ture human interactions. The following section analyses the relevance of institutionalist 
theory to this study and concludes by presenting my research questions. 
2.7.1 The Role of the Political Economy Lens 
The nature of this thesis, exploring the roles and actions of stakeholders in a complex 
and regulated environment, lends itself to a political economy lens. Political economy 
analysis is concerned with the political and economic processes within a society and 
“assessing the distribution of power and wealth between different groups and individu-
als, and the processes that create, sustain and transform these relationships over time” 
(Collinson, 2003, p. 3.). Gabble (1995) suggested that there are a number of fundamen-
tal assumptions which exist within political economy studies. The first of these is that 
political and economic processes are interlinked and should be studied as an interre-
lated subject matter rather than as separate spheres, regardless of the fact that politics 
and economics remain analytically distinct. A second assumption is that an in-depth ap-
preciation of the political requires delivering explanatory weight to economic conditions 
and processes. The final assumption is that the political economy framework exists not 
only to help explain how a particular political-economic system works, but how it might 










Political economy theory emerged as a prominent informer of policy discourse in the lat-
ter half of the 20th century and can be seen as a fusion between the empirical nature of 
economic theory and the development of behavioural sciences (Ordeshook,1990). It 
represented a major change in mainstream thinking in economics as discourse has 
moved towards improving our understanding of the broad spectrum of intertwined politi-
cal, economic and societal factors and away from the principals of effective demand that 
underpinned the predominant Keynesian economics in the post-war era and the later 
Thatcher Revolution. As noted by Besley (2007), the emergence of political economy as 
a leading branch of social science is not solely based on a need for a greater under-
standing of contemporary economics but the desire to “generate new, policy-relevant 
insights” (Besley, 2007, p. 585). Furthermore, rather than the conventional economic 
debate around optimal market intervention, the political economy field of study is rele-
vant to a broader range of topics including institutional design, policy implementation 
and political settlements.  
 
The modern interpretation of the political economy lens represents a distinct and com-
peting approach to economics. Classical references to political economy, most notably 
through authors such as David Ricardo and Thomas Robert Malthus, were often deduc-
tive in a manner reminiscent of modern mathematical economics, as such the findings 
were more universal and lacked explanation of non-mathematical causality. Besley 
(2007) concurs, highlighting that some aspects of traditional political economy paid little 
attention to the selection of politicians and the institutional frameworks which supported 
them; instead, a more grounded approach is required for my research. My case study 
looking at local content adoption and development is more than purely an economic is-
sue. In this thesis, the role of institutions along with other political settlements, historical 
and societal factors will be considered as influences in Uganda’s local content story. 
 
As discussed in the literature review, many studies broadly concerning value creation 
are situated in the resource curse-good governance nexus (Strauss, 2000; Gylfason, 
2004; Mehlum et al., 2006; Humphreys et al. 2007), although more recent literature con-









to development studies as a whole (Dasand et. al., 2019). For my study, delivering more 
meaningful research findings requires a robust theoretical framework which allows for 
explanatory insights into the roles and actions of individuals and organisations in soci-
ety. As such, the institutionalist branch of political economy theory is broad enough to 
conceptualise the interactions of multiple stakeholders yet deliver a framework for de-
tailed engagement with research data. 
2.7.2 Institutionalist Political Economy  
Institutionalist political economy, also known as institutional political economy, refers to 
a body of political economy stemming from seminal works of institutionalists such 
as Veblen, Mises, Commons, Mitchell and Dewey. An institutionalist approach to politi-
cal economy does not reject the dominant neoliberal theory in its entirety but empha-
sises the importance of institutions as well as political and societal factors (Acemoglu & 
Robinson, 2012). Theorists, such as Elliot (1978), contend that institutionalism is reflec-
tive of the shift from laissez-faire capitalism to modern capitalism, a state in which insti-
tutions are major actors.  
 
In acknowledging the predominance of institutions, the political economy of institutional-
ism describes a system in which states represent a number of formal and informal insti-
tutions. Collectively these institutions, which in my case study are the Ugandan minis-
tries and departments broadly responsible for oil and gas and the sector’s development, 
define the rules of the game, whilst non-state organisations are the players of the game 
(Moon, 2007). However, in developing Moon’s contributions, I contend that institutions 
of government can also be influenced by industry players, such as oil companies or oil-
field service providers, and by multilateral / donor organisations, such as the World 
Bank, the IMF or the UK Department for International Development (DFID).  
 
Whilst the above characteristics of modern capitalism may not be applicable to all un-
derdeveloped states, some nations, like Ghana, are closer to a Weberian rational-legal 
ideal (largely defined by the characteristics of modern democracies) than a nation like 









strong bureaucratic tradition, albeit often undermined by President Museveni’s discre-
tion, and this bureaucratic tradition has been expanded to Uganda’s nascent oil and gas 
industry through the implementation of the Norwegian Model of resource administration. 
Secondly, local content itself is increasingly highly regulated, further enshrining the role 
of institutions. Resultantly it would be incorrect to view my case study through a prism of 
neoliberalism, under free market conditions and a weak state.  
 
The remainder of this section highlights the relevance of institutional political theory to 
this study but also underlines important differences with neoliberal theory and political 
settlement theory, both of which have used by other authors in similar studies (such as 
Hickey & Izama, 2017). More broadly, this work highlights that local content should be 
viewed through the prism of institutionalism and that leaving local content to free market 
mechanisms prescribed by neoliberalism is conducive to severe market inefficiencies. In 
this section, I discuss the application of institutional political economy to four features of 
this study. Firstly, I assess theory concerning the developmental state followed by (sec-
ondly) the application of ignorance, or information asymmetry (the notion that all parties 
are not perfectly informed), in causing market failures. Thirdly, I address the relevance 
of sociological concepts, embeddedness and isomorphism and their impacts on busi-
ness and individual behaviour. Finally, I discuss the application of institutional political 
economy theory to the context of underdeveloped and developing nations, with particu-
lar attention to Acemoglu & Robinson’s (2012) work on ‘inclusive’ and ‘extractive’ institu-
tions. 
 
2.7.2.1 The Developmental State and Local Content: The Rejection of Spontaneous 
Order  
 
Most importantly for this study, institutionalism rejects the neoliberal notion of spontane-
ous order, with academics suggesting that the developed capitalist markets of the mod-
ern day did not spontaneously emerge without state intervention. It can be argued that 
the IMF and World Bank structural adjustment programmes required a considerable 









that Hong Kong may be the only nation which became industrialised without substantial 
state involvement. Mazzucato’s (2011) work on entrepreneurial states delivers similar 
conclusions around interventionism, highlighting the role proactive and dynamic govern-
ance can play in creating opportunities in sectors where business has not realised its 
potential.  
 
Throughout this study, I assert that dynamic and proactive interventionism, consistent 
with a developmental state, is an integral factor in the timely development of a localised 
oil industry. By contrast, Hayek (1979), whose writings are considered critical to neolib-
eral theory, postulates that a central challenge of liberalism was to make the govern-
ment a servant to spontaneous order or free market conditions. As such, a critical con-
struct of neoliberalism is the rejection of dirigisme (a strong, directive state), resultantly, 
neoliberal prescriptions in Africa have centred on the role of laissez-faireism (Adino & 
Nebere, 2016; Harrison, 2013). Because of this, neoliberal theory, a construct which 
promotes free market mechanisms, is not consistent with the topic of local content and 
the highly regulated environment which is commonplace in nascent oil and gas indus-
tries.  
 
Like Chang (2001), Krugman’s (1992) critique of neoliberalism poses that dirigisme has 
been central to the success stories of the 20th century. He proposes that the experi-
ences of the “Four Tigers” have been refracted through the prism of neoliberalism, even 
though they were far from paragons of laissez-faire economies. Mkandawire (2001) 
notes that the general conclusion of ‘revisionist’ literature is that “market failure" is prom-
inent in development economics to the extent that it is still a problem that warrants gov-
ernment intervention; as "failures" differ in intensity, scope and location, a selective set 
of interventions is required. 
 
Mkandawire (2001) contends that the central role played by a "developmental state" in 
the process of development, notably across the African continent, is the most significant 









tionist principles within institutionalism respond to a realisation that laissez-faire eco-
nomics is not the panacea to development challenges. We can observe, primarily from 
prophetic examples throughout the Global South, that the adoption of neoliberal free 
market conditions (notably in the context of globalisation), has not brought the antici-
pated benefits for indigenous industry and people. It can be argued that this is because 
the neoliberal approach does not support and protect local people and their companies 
in the domestic economy, whilst providing unconstrained access to more developed 
MNCs; this is corroborated by Siddiqui (2012). Siddiqui (2012) takes the example of Ec-
uador, among others, suggesting that neoliberal resource policy meant that foreign oil 
companies profited instead of the host nation itself. The above criticism of neoliberal 
prescriptions in resource industries is reinforced by the notion that market failure can be 
more acute in underdeveloped economies.  
 
Institutionalist theory of political economy, characterised by elite and bureaucracy-led 
interventions and the creation of stronger institutions to foster economic and human de-
velopmental performance, lends itself to any discussion on local content and arguably 
depletable resource studies. The need for greater state intervention, not only regulation, 
is in part, owing to the examples of other oil rich states, predominantly of the 20th cen-
tury. These nations, such as Nigeria and Venezuela, allowed their nascent industries to 
develop in the absence of requisite interventions that may have seen greater economic 
benefit to the host nation. As such, it seems necessary to challenge the anti-dirigisme 
which is embedded in neoliberalism and accept an institutionalist approach and the 
more dynamic role that the state can play. Mkandawire (2001) points to the challenges 
that an interventionist state can address, including “human capital; possibilities of the 
state "crowding in" private investment; market imperfections and failures” (Mkandawire, 
2001, p. 293), and thus highlighting dirigisme’s role in correcting market failures. With 
regards to local content, it is clear that dynamic state intervention, beyond that of a 
purely regulatory role, can be utilised to expedite capacity development initiatives and 










In summary, a primary reason for choosing an institutionalist framework for this re-
search is that local content, its regulation and development interventions do not sit well 
within neoliberal theory of spontaneous order. The notion of the ‘developmental state’ 
breaks further from the neoliberal reliance on laissez-faire economics, characterised by 
strong state intervention, extensive regulation and planning; arguably features that are 
required to actualise Uganda’s local content objectives. Developmental state policies in 
the oil and gas industry largely resemble ISI (Import substitution industrialisation), regu-
lating to inhibit foreign imports in order to aid the development of indigenous capacity. 
As Andrews and Nwapi note, developmental state policies in the oil and gas sector em-
ployees a number of instruments “such as subsidies, protectionism, and creating coop-
erative relationships between business and financial institutions” (Andrews and Nwapi, 
2018, p. 55). This, in turn, bears resemblance to the East Asian examples of the devel-
opmental state, in which the states employed ISI to allow nascent manufacturing sec-
tors to develop. The authors contend that Uganda, along with Ghana and Mozambique 
to differing degrees, is regarded as a potential developmental state because of its adop-
tion of “LCPs and mechanisms with the objective of ensuring greater participation of 
their nationals in the sector” (Andrews and Nwapi, 2018, p. 50). Andrews and Nwapi 
come to similar conclusions in their discussion about Ghana; the authors contend 
Ghana has emerged as a petro-developmental state through its objective to use the oil 
industry to advance broader development objectives. State intervention to raise local 
content is particularly consistent with the Weberian notion that ideal interventions would 
revolve around a social good or positive societal impact (Johnson, 1982; Woo-Cumings, 
1999). Andrews and Nwapi (2018) claim that the implementation of LCPs often contra-
venes international trade rules on fair treatment, although the home governments of 
IOCs are unlikely to challenge host governments given the importance of resource in-
dustries to their development.  
 
2.7.2.2 Recognition of Ignorance as a Cause of Market Failure 
 
Like neoliberalism, institutionalism’s theoretical robustness is furthered by its ability to 









issue with the unachievable and unrealistic assumptions of their socialist counterparts, 
notably the ideal of omniscience. Their attention to the role of information and ignorance 
is of value for informing the causes of market failure; specifically to my study, this is the 
failure of the free market to bring about localisation. Information is important not only to 
people but to firms who require information about material and immaterial inputs, politics 
and business cycles. Hayek postulated the existence of less than ideal conditions, al-
lowing the researcher to determine to what extent the case study retains desirable at-
tributes, such as the extent to which institutional processes predominate over the dis-
cretionary power of the executive body.   
 
In this thesis, I investigate market failure in education and training, assessing the dis-
crepancy between industry requirements for human capital and the capacity of universi-
ties and colleges to tailor their offerings to students looking to join the industry. In such 
an example, we can apply notions of ignorance and information asymmetry in under-
standing why the market for education and training fails to align itself with industry 
needs. There are also further applications of ignorance to this study, such as under-
standing why local firms may struggle to provide goods and services which correspond 
with operator and industry requirements.  
 
2.7.2.3 Embeddedness and Isomorphism, Societal Factors Influencing Individual 
and Business Behaviour 
 
An institutionalist approach normally takes issue with the neoliberal view of human moti-
vation (Cullis & Jones, 1987; Chang, 1994a; Stretton & Orchard, 1994), specifically the 
Smithian notions that individuals are driven by economic self-interest and that alone. 
This indeed goes some way to explaining corrupt practices in nations like Uganda 
where institutional capacity is weak, however authors such as Khan (1996) suggests 
that corruption and clientelism is a perfectly rational outcome in primitive markets. In 
some cases, self-interest may refer to personal enrichment, but in other cases it repre-









the economy is not developed enough to yield tax revenues. It is clear that a more com-
plete understanding of elite action, including corruption, and the reasoning behind it re-
quires more detailed interpretation of the social, economic, political and other stake-
holder pressures on the individual, such as that provided by the institutional theory 
framework. 
 
Boettke & Storr (2004) noted that Weber is an important contributor to modern institu-
tionalism and much of his work on social phenomena and the meaning people attach to 
their own activity also informed the Austrian theorists, Hayek and Mises; “the Austrians 
share Weber's commitment to the method of Verstehen (i.e. understanding action from 
the actors perspective) and his conceptualisations of economy, society and polity and 
the relationship between them” (Boettke & Storr, 2004, p. 178). Correspondingly, the in-
stitutionalist approach rejects atomic individualism, a notion originally proposed by clas-
sical liberal, Smith, in favour of the notion of social embeddedness, the recognition that 
all economic activity depends upon the social context in which it takes place (Granovet-
ter, 1985).  
 
The concepts of embeddedness and isomorphism (the process of entities adopting simi-
lar positions) are both central parts of institutionalist thought, as both concepts aid 
praxeological discourse (i.e. understanding the reasoning for human action) on eco-
nomic activity and the effectiveness of state intervention. In this thesis, we can apply the 
ideas of coercive isomorphism (isomorphism induced by regulators) and mimetic iso-
morphism (induced by competitors) to the context of a highly regulated market, in which 
multiple oil operators utilise varying business models and attitudes towards local con-
tent. It may be the case that both forms of isomorphism can simultaneously influence 
operator adoption of local content.  
 
A more specific application of embeddedness, as noted by Fengru & Guitang (2019), 
may refer to the closeness of interpersonal relationships and social ties MNCs have es-









local content. Sardan (1999) speaks of the embeddedness of corruption and its preva-
lence in African societies. As such, it may be the case that in societies where corruption 
is prevalent, engaging in corruption, either as an individual or a business, may be seen 
as being embedded. Meanwhile, authors such as Bayart (1992) claim that corruption is 
not an impediment to business but allows transactions to take place despite the odds, 
greasing the proverbial wheels, sometimes of inefficient bureaucracy.  
 
In summary, one of the ways in which institutionalism differs from liberalism is through 
the central role attributed to sociology in institutional theory, a feature which is par-
ticualry important to my study. Misesian contributions to institutionalism centre on the 
axiom that individuals engage in conscious actions towards chosen goals and is situ-
ated within an understanding of political, economic and societal action. Attention to em-
beddedness and other social phenomenon is invaluable in providing the conceptual ba-
sis for interpreting how the stakeholders investigated in this research situate themselves 
and interact in Uganda’s political economy. Embeddedness, taken together with the 
concept of isomorphism, allows us to build a broad understanding of the factors that in-
fluence the economic practices of the stakeholders in my case study. With regards to 
isomorphism, we can theorise that IOCs and foreign firms in a host country are also in-
fluenced by external pressures brought about by governments and indigenous people. 
As Escobar and Vredenburg (2010) note in their study of IOCs and the adoption of sus-
tainable development goals, MNCs’ actions are influenced by external pressures (Clark-
son, 1995; Freeman, 1984) including governments (through regulations), industry 
(through standards and norms), competitors (through better business models) and con-
sumers (through loyalty). This notion is enshrined within the work of Mises (1949), who 
noted that actors may change their ideology or approach when convinced that said 
change will best serve their interest, be it altruistic or not. Indeed, both isomorphic pres-
sures and embeddedness are important parts of institutionalist theory which can be 
used to explain the practices of stakeholders, notably oil operators.  
 










In the latter part of the 20th century, traditional donor and multilateral organisations such 
as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund promoted neoliberal prescrip-
tions and free market reforms across Africa and the Global South. Resultantly, develop-
mental states, which are often consistent with institutional political economic theory, are 
a rarity on the African continent, with contemporary Ethiopia being the most obvious ex-
ception (Clapham, 2017), However, I believe that the institutional political economy lens 
is increasingly relevant as development economics has become more focused on the 
strength of institutions and their role in defining development outcomes.  
 
The case study for this thesis is even further removed from free market prescriptions in 
Africa. As discussed, Uganda’s oil industry is highly regulated and the government has 
sought to demonstrate a commitment to a robust administrative structure and legal 
framework; as Hickey and Izama (2020) note, Uganda has been praised for its adoption 
of the Norwegian Model. As such, it is sensible to conceptualise this study within a theo-
retical framework that emphasises the role of institutions in determining outcomes and 
understanding the actions of organisations and individuals. Consequentially, the type 
and quality of the institutions are of particular importance.  
 
Acemoglu & Robinson (2012) propose the existence of ‘inclusive’ and ‘extractive’ institu-
tions. Whilst inclusive institutions encourage participation and promote development, 
extractive institutions allow elites to rule and exploit the greater populace. Acemoglu & 
Robinson’s example of ‘les Grosses Legumes’, the sardonic Congolese nickname for 
Mobutu Sese Seko’s clique who governed at their discretion for decades, amassing 
great personal fortunes, delivers an important point of comparison for this study of 
neighbouring Uganda as it embarks on its resource governance journey. In the context 
of development studies, inclusive institutions can also be observed as ‘pockets of effec-
tiveness' (PoE), loosely defined as public organisations which deliver public services ef-
fectively in the context of largely ineffective government (Roll, 2014). Due to their effec-
tiveness, these institutions, be they organs of central government, local government or 
academic and vocational institutions can make an important contribution to develop-










The application of institutionalist theory in underdeveloped and developing nations pro-
vides a mechanism to evaluate why the factors relating to the political economy can be-
tray national objectives. Conceptualisations, such as that of extractive institutions go 
some way to delivering an in-depth understanding of a phenomenon which frequently 
puzzles outsiders, “namely why African governments simply do not implement the right 
policies to benefit from extractive FDI” (Hansen et al. 2014, p. 20). Hansen et al., in their 
study of three East African nations, note that “an important explanation of why local con-
tent policies and practices often fail to be implemented in the three countries is that they 
become mired in political processes in general and the ruling coalitions’ pursuit of power 
in particular” (Hansen et. al., 2014, p. 17). More specifically focusing on local content, 
Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2012) work reinforces the challenges of actualising inclusive 
local content, as extractive institutions can be a vehicle to provide political elites the op-
portunity to profit and to consolidate the support of powerful business elites and reward 
politically connected firms, broadly referred to as local content capture. According to 
Weimer et al. (2012) and Buur (2014), such practices are taking place in Mozambique, 
one of East Africa’s most hydrocarbon endowed nations, whereby elites close to 
Frelimo are positioning themselves to capture the local content market in services and 
linkages to an extent where it has blocked further development of the SME base. Con-
sequently, an institutionalist approach is not purely prescriptive of interventionism in a 
case study such as this, but it aims to deliver insights into why national objectives may 
not be best served when extractive institutions are present.  
 
This study also contends that, through the prism of institutional political economy, the 
notion of the developmental state can be consistent with the mechanisms required to 
increase or improve local content levels. Previous applications of the developmental 
state have sought to protect and develop nascent sectors, allowing them to grow and 
become internationally competitive. In a very similar manner, I believe that through reg-
ulation and proactive interventions, localisation objectives can be achieved. This thesis, 









that can occur if free market mechanisms are allowed to determine the trajectory of lo-
cal content. I also focus on the dynamic and proactive interventions of donor and devel-
opment agencies in Uganda; their successes in developing Ugandan content provide 
further credence to the relevance of interventionism and a developmental state ap-
proach to local content.  
 
Finally, other authors, such as Hickey et. al. (2015), use political settlement theory in 
similar political economy studies on Ugandan oil governance and I will also utilise this 
theory in a limit and specific way. Whilst most of this thesis focuses of business models, 
state administrative process, implementation of policy and relations between economic 
actors, on a number occasion Uganda’s President Museveni has demonstrated a will-
ingness to involve himself in policy design and negotiations. In these cases, political set-
tlement theory is useful to conceptualise Museveni’s actions and improve understanding 
of high-level power arrangements in Uganda’s oil industry. 
 
Political settlement theory (Kahn, 2010) argues that the distribution of power is im-
portant in understanding economic and political outcomes. The study acknowledges the 
role of underlying power arrangements, particularly when the executive body, along with 
other elites, displays a degree of discretionary power. Mohan et al. (2018) contend that 
the role of elites is often amplified when the topic in question involves international bar-
gaining between nation states. This notion is undoubtedly applicable to Uganda as we 
can observe that President Museveni has taken a leading role in negotiations with inter-
national operators. The application of political settlement theory revolves around the un-
derstanding of the type of power arrangement, which in turn informs a deductive ap-
proach into the role of elites in development. Kahn (2010) broadly classifies political set-
tlements according to two criteria, alignment with growth and implementation capabili-
ties. Uganda’s political settlement is characterised by an elite aligned with growth but 
waning implementation capabilities, a concept that will inform further discussion in this 









important role in this research; however, the decision to situate this thesis within institu-
tionalist political economy theory is due to the highly regulated environment which char-
acterised local content and the need for an interventionist state.  
 2.7.3 Research Questions 
Hypothesis: This thesis investigates whether a new environment for oil and gas operations 
has emerged, in which operators pursue localisation as a business model and not purely 
as a matter of compliance. In exploring whether local content is now an objective shared 
by operators and host governments alike, this thesis examines the mechanisms being uti-
lised to achieve localisation goals and asks what factors, if any, can be attributed to the 
realisation of this objective.  
 
In addressing my research hypothesis, I will address a number of questions to ascertain 
what constitutes this multi-stakeholder environment and how it is playing out in one of the 
world’s nascent hydrocarbon economies. The research questions are as follows: 
 
Question 1: Is there a new operating environment driving the development of a more local-
ised operating model and can we isolate a turning point for operators in the adoption of a 
localised business model?  
 
Question 2: What role are the leading stakeholders playing in local content development 
and adoption in Uganda and does the elaboration of this model differ between key corpo-
rations in the oil sector and other stakeholders in the local content landscape? 
 
Question 3: What role does the political economy of Uganda play in the realisation of local 
content objectives? 
 
These questions have been formed following extensive assessment of the existing litera-
ture, both theoretical and work relating to local content. They are built upon the work of 
authors such as Pegram et. al. (2018) and Andrews & Playfoot (2015) who deliver im-









literature is also present in the questions; question 1, for example, draws heavily on work 
around isomorphism, notably the impact of the oil price crash in bringing about changes in 
the way the oil and gas community operates. Question 3 draws both on institutional work, 
such as that on ‘inclusive’ and ‘exclusive’ institutions, but is also heavily influenced by 
Hirschman’s work which looked at the importance of creating linkages between the re-
source sector and the indigenous economy.  
 
By answering the above three research questions, we can also learn more about the suc-
cess of this multi-stakeholder environment and deliver lessons for other countries that fol-
low in Uganda’s footsteps. The below ancillary questions are answered throughout the 
thesis as this study’s empirical findings are presented.  
 
Question 4: How successful has this multi-stakeholder environment been in achieving the 
objectives of greater local content adoption and development? 
 
Question 5: What lessons does Uganda’s experience deliver for other countries’ attempt-
ing to develop local content and increase its adoption? 
2.7.4 Conclusion 
Whilst my research questions relate largely to the business model of operators, this thesis 
is focused on the interaction of multiple stakeholders in the development and adoption of 
local content. My research explores the processes taking place as Uganda’s oil industry 
transitions through the oil and gas lifecycle and, in theory, becomes more localised due to 
increasing market pressures and regulation. A considerable focus of this work is investi-
gating how the changing environment, both in terms of the market but also international 
relations in the case of donor agencies, influences the way in which stakeholders act and 















This study sought to explore a new landscape of local content adoption and development 
in the oil and gas industry and, through an abductive approach to case study research, ad-
dresses whether a multi-stakeholder environment is delivering greater localisation. This 
chapter considers the methodological choices and procedures required to undertake this 
research and analysis. It begins by underlining my theoretical approach to this research 
followed by an outline of my research design. Next, I present the process for fieldwork, the 
challenges of data acquisition, my positionality and ethical issues which were addressed. 
This writing will also introduce my case study and my field entry into the topic. In this 
chapter I also address definitional challenges, notably around the words ‘local’ and ‘con-
tent’.  
The fieldwork design was developed through a broad fact finding visit to Uganda in May 
and June 2018 which allowed me to obtain a great deal of grey literature. The visit ena-
bled me to test the feasibility of the study and gave me the opportunity to further my local 
network, identify additional relevant stakeholders and to understand more about the cur-
rent state of play in Uganda’s oil and gas sector. No one was formally addressed with re-
gards to the research project and all meetings and introductions were on the basis of my 
then role within the conference industry.  
3.2 Theoretical Approach 
 
My study aims to understand the political economy of institutions and corporations which 
requires a broader, structural comprehension of the topic as well as detailed agency-cen-
tred insights. By using both quantitative and qualitative research methods, it is possible to 
contribute to the field of knowledge through providing empirical evidence and insights into 
a particular development or phenomena, this is why I adopted a mixed methods approach. 
Traditionally, adopting a mixed methods design for conducting research has made it diffi-









Tashakkori, 2003). Authors in the 1960s and 1970s considered that qualitative and quanti-
tative approaches to research entailed differing philosophical and paradigmatic assump-
tions and this would therefore frame the research in ways that were not compatible with 
each other. I adopt a pragmatist research paradigm for this work as it advocates the use 
of a method and philosophy that attempt to fit together the insights provided by qualitative 
and quantitative research into a workable solution (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004), often 
seen as a middle ground between philosophical dogmatism and scepticism. As a result, it 
dismisses the traditional dualism (e.g. facts vs. values, subjectivism vs. objectivism, ration-
alism vs empiricism) and provides a ‘freer’ approach to problem solving.  
Pragmatism rejects the notion that epistemology and method are synonymous and instead 
focuses on the characteristics of inquiry and not on a set of metaphysical assumptions 
about ontology and epistemology. It has frequently been recognised as the appropriate 
paradigm for conducting mixed methods research (e.g. Howe, 1988; Tashakkori & Ted-
dlie, 1998; Patton, 2002; Maxcy, 2003; Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2003, 2006; 2009; Johnson 
& Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Onwuegbuzie & Johnson, 2006; Morgan, 2007; Denscombe, 2008; 
Scott and Briggs, 2009; Johnson & Gray, 2010; Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011) and sheds 
light on how elements of traditional approaches (positivism, interpretivism) can be mixed 
fruitfully (Hoshmand, 2003). As noted by Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, “the bottom line is that 
research approaches should be mixed in ways that offer the best opportunities for answer-
ing important research questions” (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p. 16) and this is what 
drew me towards the pragmatist paradigm.   
Furthermore, the pragmatist approach complements my research’s sequential explanatory 
design, allowing for the “possibility to work back and forth between qualitative data and 
quantitative data, which is often viewed as incompatible” (Tran, 2017, p. 75). This permits 
the researcher to utilise the deductive results from a quantitative approach to inform the 
inductive goals of a qualitative research phase, which is often referred to as an abductive 
process. As will be explained in further detail in the next section, I have adopted an abduc-
tive approach, drawing on data from the first questionnaire and interviews to inform the 









Pragmatism is also an appropriate paradigm for case study research. Creswell (2009), 
notes that pragmatism is based on the belief that theories can be both contextual and gen-
eralisable, rather than making research context-bound. This paradigm is particularly appli-
cable not only to my research, but across the field of development studies, as the re-
searcher should investigate the factors that “affect whether the knowledge we gain can be 
transferred to other settings” (Shannon-Baker, 2015, p. 4). Development studies is under-
pinned by the need to understand social, political and economic trends throughout the 
Global South, hence the need for transferability in research findings. Whilst transferability 
is associated as a strength of qualitative research (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), the pragmatist 
research paradigm’s transferability is strengthened through an abductive approach in 
mixed method research (MMR). Transferability of this study’s findings is also enhanced 
through its single case study design.  
3.3 Research Design: Case Study 
 
This research was comprised of a mixed methods approach in a sequential explanatory 
design, featuring two questionnaire and an interview phase utilising a single case study in 
delivering a detailed investigation into this multi-stakeholder environment and its impact on 
local content adoption and development.  
I elected to undertake this research through the lens of a case study (Uganda), as single 
case study research can help us deliver in-depth understanding of a particular phenome-
non or remarkable circumstance (Yin, 2013). The situation specific nature of the case 
study was once considered its downfall (Weick, 1969), because it is too situation-specific 
and, therefore, not appropriate for generalisation. However, in a revised work, Weick 
noted that the case study was a “better tool than first imagined” (Weick, 1979, p. 37), com-
menting that an understanding of the specific nature of the situation would enhance gener-
alisation. By embracing the contextual conditions of the case study and utilising analytical 
generalisations, it is possible to extract results and ideas of a more abstract level that are 
transferable from one context to another (Yin, 2013). In addition, Flyvbjerg (2006) believes 
that the in-depth nature of case study research is effective in delivering the opportunity to 









attuned with the aims of this thesis. In this work, the case study of Uganda allows us to in-
vestigate a new paradigm which I believe is playing out globally, and by paying particular 
attention to factors relating to Uganda’s political economy, it is possible to isolate transfer-
able aspects of this research.  
Whilst the questionnaires provide a measure of the attitudes and opinions of the respond-
ents, the interviews supplement the questionnaire data by providing additional in-depth in-
sights to enhance our knowledge of processes and situational understandings. The ques-
tionnaires were prepared and reviewed by the Open University Human Research Ethics 
committee and disseminated to potential respondents in April and September 2019. I vis-
ited Uganda for my fieldwork in June and July 2019. The two / three months between dis-
seminating the first questionnaire and visiting Uganda allowed time to analyse responses 
from the questionnaire and guide question development for the semi-structured interviews. 
The interview data, in turn, informed the development of the second questionnaire in Sep-
tember 2019.  
3.3.1 Quantitative Research Phase  
The first and last part of my research is formed around two questionnaires which delivered 
quantitative data in order to achieve an overall measure of the attitudes and opinions of 
the respondents. A major objective in the questionnaire design process is to reduce the 
possibility for error in participants’ responses (Lavrakas, 2008). In heeding the advice of 
Meadows (2004), the questionnaires were formulated around well-worded and jargon-free 
questions which provided the respondents with simple ordinal answers to choose from. 
The first questionnaire aimed to receive responses from 80 participants and succeeded in 
reaching 78, including chosen respondents representing relevant arms of the government, 
the national oil company (UNOC and its subsidiaries), private and international oil compa-
nies, international donor organisations, Ugandan enterprise, as well as a number of rele-
vant individuals who have been an integral part of policy development in Uganda. The first 
questionnaire was composed of 17 questions with respondents requested to answer on 
the Likert Scale (five-point scale, Strongly Agree, Agree, Neutral, Disagree and Strongly 









friendly parties within the industry two weeks before the main collection phase, providing 
the opportunity to make any adjustments if necessary.  
The second questionnaire targeted a smaller group of individuals, most of whom took part 
in the semi-structure interviews. 46 participants took part in the second questionnaire 
which consisted of seven ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ questions and a series of ranking/rating questions 
which requested participants to score each operator’s commitment to certain criteria. The 
criteria in the questionnaire reflected this study’s main component of local content, being 
employment, procurement and commitment to local content development (definition of lo-
cal content introduced in 3.12.2); the ranking was scored 1-5. The second questionnaire 
proved to be particularly useful in supplementing the interview data to create a complete 
picture of perspectives and consensus.  
The questionnaires were uploaded and disseminated from the online platform Jisc. Some 
authors note higher levels of sound responses when each question is placed on its own 
page as opposed to all questions being listed on one page (Vehovar, et. al., 2000; Tou-
rangeau, Couper, and Conrad, 2004), although other research did not find the same corre-
lations (Peytchev et al. 2006; Toepoel, et. al. 2008). I explored Jisc to understand which 
methods work better and elected to group questions depending on their context. As noted 
by De Bruijne and Wijnant (2014), it is realistic to assume that some respondents will take 
the questionnaire on their smart phone; as smart phones are vertically orientated, it is sen-
sible to list the Likert scale horizontally. The Jisc programme provided participants with the 
opportunity to switch between vertically and horizontally orientated Likert scales.  
 
De Bruijne and Wijnant (2014) contended that response rates are higher when the re-
spondent is invited to participate by text rather than email, although most people are un-
likely to want to receive unsolicited texts. Invitations to participate in both questionnaires 
were made across numerous platforms, including LinkedIn, WhatsApp, text message and 
email. Frequently WhatsApp proved to be more useful given the frequency at which the 
application is used in Uganda and the personalised nature of the contact. A number of the 
respondents came from my pre-established network, although I also used this network to 









open for around one month. The first questionnaire closed three weeks before my field-
work visit to Uganda and was analysed in order to inform and guide the qualitative re-
search process.  
3.3.2 Qualitative Research Phase  
In the qualitative research phase, the data being obtained cannot necessarily be quanti-
fied or examined in terms of amount or intensity, therefore the emphasis must be on peo-
ple, processes and situational understanding. Longhurst (2010) notes that talking with 
people is an excellent way to address gaps in knowledge whilst looking to understand mo-
tivations and complexing behaviours. The field trip to Uganda in 2019 was the main quali-
tative data collection phase and allowed me to continue my data collection in the form of 
face-to-face semi-structured interviews. The information collected through the first ques-
tionnaire provided limited experiential data, interpretations, and narratives about the devel-
opment of local content in Uganda, as such, the interview phase augmented understand-
ing in these key areas. Face-to-face meetings also provided the opportunity to develop 
mutual trust with the respondents, and potentially led to more openness and possibly 
more valid answers than an impersonal survey.  
As recognised by Stake (1995), it is important that the researcher must retain some de-
gree of flexibility during the interview process, allowing the interviewer to modify or even 
replace the original questions in mid-study. Participants frequently had a lot to say on the 
topic, resultantly I found that the conservations flowed more naturally, and I paid less at-
tention to the planned direction of interviews. As the interviews varied with regards to time, 
and although a number of questions were shared for ethics approval, some degree of im-
provisation was required. Resultantly, the interviews took a semi-structured design with a 
pre-defined and peer reviewed list of questions at the core; these questions were shared 
with the Open University Human Research Ethics Committee in May 2019. These inter-
views were undertaken with a smaller cross-section of stakeholders than the first ques-










The prepared interview questions have been included in the study’s appendices. While the 
questions were altered slightly for each interview, because some questions were context 
and job-role dependent, the prepared interview questions focused on topics including op-
erating models. stakeholder roles, Uganda’s political economy and local content out-
comes. Other questions were prepared specifically for people working in education, young 
professionals, and Ugandan supply chains. Interviews frequently started with a more gen-
eral question, such as “Can you characterise the role of the operators in the development 
of local content?” or “What factors have hindered the development of indigenous capac-
ity?” More specific prepared questions included “Do you believe that individual operator 
strategies have overlapped with other operators / oil field service providers in the coun-
try?” and “What is driving the involvement of NGOs, Development Agencies and Multilat-
eral Organisations?” The questions were designed to respond to this study’s research 
questions and reflected data collected in the first questionnaire. Many of the questions 
presented in the appendices then led to subsequent questions which weren’t prepared; 
the aim was to get the respondent to elaborate and provide as much information as possi-
ble. Several respondents even asked themselves questions during the interviews.  
 
Given the nature of the questions posed, addressing the role of relevant stakeholders in 
adopting and developing local content in Uganda’s oil industry, it was necessary to ensure 
that experiential data, interpretations and narratives were collected from a reflective cross-
section of stakeholders. Building on this, it was also important to take into account work on 
tautology (McCracken 1988), the interviewer must ask broad questions first in order to re-
duce the chances of writing up a tautology that simply reaffirms the interviewer’s own as-
sumptions. Although I endeavoured to conceal my own assumptions, it was clear that the 
respondents themselves already possessed strong opinions on the topic and were content 
to disagree with positively worded questions.  
 
The semi-structured interviews took place with a variety of stakeholders, from the civil ser-
vice, operating companies, oilfield service companies, donor agencies, academic institu-









participant and reflected their experience and involvement in the sector. Many of the indi-
viduals that I interviewed were senior representatives from both the public and private sec-
tor, so it was necessary to ensure that protocol was adhered to. When interviewing busi-
ness elites, Schoenberger (1991) asserted that corporate interviews are often a fine bal-
ance between the interviewer, who creates the agenda for the interview and is therefore 
generally in greater control, and the respondent who, in the case of elites, is often used to 
exerting control and authority over others. An important consideration highlighted by 
Schoenberger (1991) and corroborated by Aberbach & Rockman (2002), suggests that 
elite subjects prefer not to be asked closed questions. Schoenberger contends that “re-
spondents are likely to feel less frustrated if they are able to explain exactly what they 
mean in their own terms rather than trying to fit themselves into the terms of reference 
proposed by the researcher” (Schoenberger, 1991, p. 183); as such the interviewer should 
aim to achieve a conversational flow, providing open-ended questions followed up with 
closed-ended questions when clarity is required by the researcher. At all stages I endeav-
oured to conduct my interviews with Schoenberger’s conclusions in mind.  
 
3.3.2.1 Situatedness and Positioning in the Field 
 
All knowledge is situated knowledge, in that it is context specific (Berger & Luckmann, 
1966; Smith, 1974; Haraway, 1988; Harding, 1991; Bourdieu & Waquant 1992) and as 
such the researcher must act as a self-aware modest witness (Haraway, 1988). In ex-
panding on this notion, it is important to be aware that humans are fundamentally rela-
tional and their responses are socially situated; societal norms, workplace hierarchies and 
power structures all bear influence on the nature of context. Therefore, the researcher 
must be aware of the social influences (such as pressure to maintain the company line, to 
not talk pejoratively about partner organisations or more importantly, the Ugandan govern-
ment) on all respondents in order to enhance the rigour and validity of the research pro-
cess (Vannini, 2008). As such, I ensured that privacy was maximised during the interviews 
themselves and that the respondents were confident in their anonymity, this was important 
in obtaining valid and true data. It is also important to note that many observers agree that 









the truest sense. As such respondent data sets were not viewed as one unified entity, but 
instead a collection of fragmented responses.  
3.4 Research Participants and Recruitment Process 
 
Whilst a number of respondents came from existing networks, I used LinkedIn as well as 
formal processes to engage people to take part in the research. Organisations included 
the Ugandan state and relevant arms of government, donor organisation, major interna-
tional operators such as Total E&P and Tullow Oil, the Chinese national oil company, 
CNOOC, and lesser-known operators such as Oranto Petroleum. The study also engaged 
oilfield service companies, indigenous suppliers and academic and vocational institutions. 
The age range of participants varied greatly although I endeavoured to engage senior per-
sonnel where possible. Meanwhile, younger participants had greater capacity to discuss 
their experiences in education and training in Uganda as it was likely to have been more 
recent than elder respondents.  
 
The sampling strategy largely revolved around working with my pre-existing network, de-
veloped in the conference industry, as well as by introducing myself to selected individuals 
via LinkedIn. Contacts assisted me in sharing the questionnaires with people identified as 
appropriate to take part; some contacts also shared the questionnaire with people they 
considered appropriate. While most of the interviewees were among those who took part 
in the questionnaire and indicated they would like to take part in the interview process, 
others were introduced by existing contacts purely to take part in the interviews. A number 
of people who took part in this study had previously worked for oil companies or the gov-
ernment (or both) and have since become consultants as the industry in Uganda slowed 
down. In order to protect their identity, some have been labelled as ‘former employee’ as 
other ways of describing them may compromise their anonymity.  
 
3.5 Field Entry and the Selection of Study Areas 
 
The topic of local content first became of interest to me in 2015 when I began working for 









of localisation in the oil and gas industry all around the world. I joined the company during 
the oil price crash which started in 2014 and whilst working there the world saw oil prices 
fall significantly to a level not seen in decades. Whilst this had immediate consequences 
for our business, especially as many oil companies imposed bans on non-essential inter-
national travel (conferences being the prime example), after the industry’s shock had 
passed, we (the company) noticed a change in the way in which operators approached 
their involvement in the conferences. In the past, operators had seen the conference as 
an opportunity to improve the mechanisms by which they trained their staff, regardless of 
nationality, and improve the onboarding mechanism (the mechanism through which new 
employees acquire the necessary knowledge, skills, and behaviours in order to become 
effective organisational members and insiders), whilst government participation was spo-
radic. However, from 2015 and 2016, operators had a new interest, using the conference 
as a platform to advance broader local content objectives. It was clear to my colleagues 
and I, that the increased commitment of operators, along with the growing role of donor 
agencies and the increasing interest of governments had the ability to deliver a significant 
change in the effectiveness of local content development and adoption.  
Whilst the oil price crash of 2014 to 2016 impacted the oil industry globally, we believed 
that these events had the most profound effect in nascent hydrocarbon producing econo-
mies and frontier markets. In these nations, like Uganda, Tanzania, Mozambique and to a 
lesser extent Ghana, the prospect of developing a localised industry existed, whereby 
long-term operating costs would remain competitive in the context of an uncertain global 
oil price. Having run these conferences around the world, I was taken aback by the acces-
sibility and commitment of stakeholders in Uganda in particular. Upon deciding to pursue 
this topic further, I had no hesitation in choosing Uganda as the case study for this re-
search. I should add that I had also considered exploring this topic further in Mozambique 
but had been warned by colleagues in the industry that Mozambique does not offer the 
same transparent platform for undertaking research and, as a non-Portuguese speaker, I 
may encounter other challenges in translation. The geography of Uganda, notably its land-
locked state, also presents a unique challenge for oil and gas operators and their exten-









through the movement of maritime / offshore oil and gas assets (oil platform / floating pro-
duction storage and offloading (FPSO) unit) and their personnel, as could be the case with 
offshore hydrocarbon finds, such as those in Ghana or Mozambique. Instead, Uganda re-
quired significant infrastructure investments to extract and deliver the hydrocarbon prod-
ucts to market, which, in turn necessitates the utilisation of local content.   
My first visit to Uganda in May 2018 reaffirmed my belief that the commitment to local con-
tent and its development was genuine among the Ugandan government and stakeholders 
operating in-country, which, historically, had not been the case in a number of Sub-Sa-
haran resource endowed nations. Whilst the country represented a welcoming prospect 
for my study, a number of challenges had to be overcome before commencing the re-
search and undertaking fieldwork.  
3.6 Research Challenges 
 
Given the often-secretive nature of the oil industry and the lack of transparency normally 
associated with Sub-Saharan government dealings in the resource sector (Obi, 2007), I 
was aware that there may have been reservations around gaining access to key stake-
holders in Uganda. These concerns could concern difficulties scheduling interviews with 
potential respondents, the respondents’ trust in the researcher and whether respondents 
were happy to have their responses recorded and analysed. As noted by Tourangeau et 
al. (2000), a perception of sensitivity and divulging answers to a third party can easily lead 
to a low response rate or reluctance to be interviewed, or more importantly, dishonest and 
socially desirable responding (Zerbe and Paulhus, 1987). In order to overcome these chal-
lenges, I leaned heavily on my pre-established network and used their assistance to fur-
ther disseminate the first questionnaire to relevant stakeholders and reach new stakehold-
ers.  
 
Overall, there proved to be very few manifest challenges during the research process. 
Ugandans were very keen to take part in the research, as were international participants. 
In hindsight, pre-interview contact with the interviewees themselves (as opposed to setting 









relationship, which, in turn allowed for more honest responses. This was reinforced by one 
particular experience; I was invited to a conference / seminar sponsored by the African 
Development Bank whilst I was in Kampala; although the vast majority of attendees were 
keen to talk with me, a very small number of people were also suspicious and even physi-
cally moved to cut me out of conversations.  
 
According to Yin (2014), field procedures can be enhanced through the best possible 
preparation. I endeavoured to make use of this technology wherever possible as research 
highlights the physical challenges of undertaking qualitative study and the considerations 
of using an audio recorder (Ablo, 2016). One lesson identified from the visit to Uganda in 
May 2018 was the disturbance caused by the background noise of Kampala’s streets and 
its likely presence on the audio recording. Despite many of the offices I visited being many 
floors above street level, the sound of the traffic and general busyness of Kampala was 
definitely a distraction. In responding to this, many of my 2019 interviews took place inside 
a city centre hotel, either in an office or the hotel gardens, far away from street noise.  
 
3.7 Data Analysis 
 
All data was saved to an Open University drive and access reserved for the principal in-
vestigator.  
3.7.1 Questionnaire Analysis 
Data analysis refers to the sifting, assimilating, modelling and transforming of data col-
lected by the researcher. Before the analysis can begin, it is important that the data is in 
the right format for analysis. In this study, the Likert data was analysed on Jisc software 
and exported to Apple Numbers for further interrogation. In order to analyse the ordinal 
data received from the Likert questionnaire, it was necessary to undertake statistical test-
ing. As the data is ordinal, distribution free and non-parametric tests were relevant. Statis-
tical tests were carried out in order to ascertain P-values, analyse variances in partici-









Central tendency cannot be measured by the mean, only by median and mode as the dis-
tribution of values on the Likert scale are not compatible with each other (Boone & Boone, 
2012). Resultantly I assessed the trends using modal data to present descriptive statistics 
and inferential statistics for selected questions. The data was utilised as part of a pattern 
matching analysis as noted below.  
3.7.2 Interview Analysis 
Responses from the semi-structured interviews were transcribed using Temi software. 
The automated service made a fair attempt at transcribing the interviews, however, there 
were considerable errors and the process of correcting the transcriptions took over six 
weeks. It became clear that a mixture of strong accents and technical language made it 
difficult for the automated transcription service, with common words often exchanged in-
correctly, even for expletives. Transcribed interview data was then entered into NVivo soft-
ware. NVivo provides a place to organise, store and retrieve data, allowing the research to 
work efficiently, save time and rigorously back up findings with evidence. Specific re-
sponses and comments were extracted from the data and categorised according to the 
nature of the answers and used to address my research questions.  
Interviews are useful ways of accessing various stories and narratives through which peo-
ple describe their world and can be interpreted through a combination of literal, interpre-
tive and reflexive models (Mason 2002). I assessed the qualitative data through literal and 
interpretive methods, allowing me to read the data literally, as well as reading the tran-
scripts for what I think they meant (interpretive). Because of this, and as noted by Miller & 
Crabtree (1999), I endeavoured to be self-aware of any of my own biases and preconcep-
tions and where possible, consulted others to find alternative interpretations, particularly 
when using the interpretive method. As the process of reading through the data and inter-
preting the interviews and field notes continued throughout the project, my position ad-
justed when additional concepts, requiring of further exploration, emerged; this is what 
Parlett & Hamilton (1976) term ‘progressive focusing’.  
According to Yin (2014), pattern matching is the most desirable analytical method for case 









The analysis for this research focused on pattern matching in order to assess the validity 
of the theories and ideas hypothesised against the data acquired from the questionnaires 
and interviews. In the case of strong correlations between the theory and the data, there is 
a strong basis for valid inference. I believe I was able to objectively observe the workings 
of the case, whilst simultaneously recording developments in the case study but also ex-
amining its meaning. Throughout the analysis, this study referred to secondary data from 
grey literature, news articles and official records, which also required analysis for accu-
racy. The data obtained in the questionnaires and the interviews were also assessed in 
the context of the official statistics, publications and operator data. It is worth noting that 
some Government of Uganda statistics and those espoused by government officials were 
irregular and required substantial crosschecking.  
3.7.3 Coding Data 
When all the data had been collected, I undertook the process of coding interview re-
sponses and triangulating coded interview data with questionnaire data. The NVivo pro-
gramme allowed me to create specific codes which collated themes identified within the 
interview data. There were 24 codes created on the NVivo platform and they were simply 
named according to their content, such as “Operator attitudes towards local content” or 
“fronting” – the latter of which contained responses linked to the practice of fronting which 
is discussed in chapters six and seven. These codes contained responses from the inter-
view data, some more than others. The codes were eventually grouped around key 
themes, including education and the impact of the delayed development project, loosely 
allowing for research chapters to develop. Over time these themes developed and were 
narrowed down further to create the empirical chapters five, six and seven of this thesis.  
 
3.8 Ethical Considerations 
 
The ethical considerations for the researcher were mainly concerned with the conduct of 









count any ethical considerations and looked to respect confidentiality, privacy and con-
sent, among other concerns, as recommended by Dowling (2010). Due to the secrecy of 
the oil industry and the lack of transparency often associated with underdeveloped and 
developing nation government dealings in the resource sector, steps were taken to ensure 
the anonymity of participants at all stages of the research process. Some respondents 
wished to be named in research, however it was decided that consistency should be main-
tained throughout. Further details on obtaining valid consent are noted in the sections be-
low.   
 
Due to the nature of the study, no harm or risk came to those who participated in the 
questionnaires and the interviews. An ethics review was undertaken by the Open Univer-
sity Human Research Ethics Committee and received their approval. A further ethics re-
view was undertaken by the Makerere University School of Social Science Research Eth-
ics Committee and received their approval.  
3.9 Consent   
 
Valid consent was obtained through the dissemination of consent forms to interviewees 
and those undertaking the questionnaire in accordance with the Open University compli-
ance process. By gaining valid consent and avoiding any forms of deception, I guaranteed 
that no personal or professional harm came to those providing data for this study. The in-
formation sheets were disseminated with both the questionnaires and separately with the 
interviews (available in Appendices, Figures 2 and 3) and highlighted the aims and pur-
pose of the research as well as the reasoning for that particular participants involvement 
as a subject for the questionnaire or interview. Furthermore, the consent forms included 
information regarding the participants’ right to withdraw from the research at any given 
time and the proposed dissemination of the research findings. In the case that the re-
spondents wished to change their answers or to withdraw completely from the research, 
the form included contact details of the researcher and research supervisor so they could 









3.10 Confidentiality and Anonymity 
 
All data captured from the questionnaires was de-identified and analysed accordingly. For 
the purpose of the interviews, names of the respondent have not been publicised even 
when some respondents elected to share their name and role on the interview recording. 
The anonymity of the participants is naturally an ethical issue that must be approached 
properly but given the nature of the topic and the exploration of the role of various actors 
in the new operating environment, it is beneficial that some form of identification remains 
(i.e. by organisation subsector). Correspondingly, when appropriate, limited information 
concerning the respondents has been revealed in order to provide context to their re-
sponses and comments. Furthermore, I endeavoured to make sure that interviews took 
place where the confidentiality of the respondent was ensured.  
3.11 Risks for the Researcher 
 
I accepted that the risk profile for undertaking research in Uganda was greater than many 
other locations. Although Uganda has enjoyed relative stability in the past two decades, it 
is hard to ignore some of the unsavoury events that preceded this and the brutality of pre-
vious regimes. Although the ethnically charged sentiments that were realised during the 
previous regimes are perhaps dormant now, as a man of obvious European descent I was 
wary that I am indeed an outsider or Mzungu (Bantu word referring to people of European 
descent or colloquially a “traveller”) in Uganda. My research did not intend to take the form 
of activism and I endeavoured to ensure respondents were aware of my impartiality and 
my role as an observer of local content in Uganda. I found no challenges related to my 
personal safety.  
3.12 Definitional Challenges 
3.12.1 What is ‘Local’? 
Away from practical research considerations, defining what is meant by ‘local content’ was 
another challenge that needed to be overcome before commencing fieldwork. Existing re-
search, primarily concerning local content policy, has raised definitional challenges 









often used interchangeably. Mifsud-Bonnici (2013) believes that local content is normally 
perceived as content on a national level; Pegram et. al. concur, concluding that “when 
considering terms such as localisation and local content, this study showed that ‘local’ is 
largely perceived as meaning ‘national’, and is not restricted to locally affected communi-
ties” (Pegram et. al., 2018, p. 174). In this study, respondents used the term ‘local content’ 
interchangeably with ‘national content’, correspondingly this study will not seek to sepa-
rate the two terms.  
 
However, it should be noted that perspectives on what ‘local’ means can vary. People liv-
ing in proximity to extraction sites are often adversely affected by the environmental im-
pact of the industry. If these local communities are adversely affected but do not see their 
communities benefiting in terms of employment and demand for local goods and services, 
it is likely that citizens of the region will voice their disillusionment. In examining this, Cust 
and Viale (2016) point to the development of a subnational resource curse, the Niger 
Delta being the prime example. As such, the negative effects of the oil and gas industry 
(particularly the more tangible effects such as pollution and crime) are likely to be worse in 
the locality of production.  
 
It is important to note that definitions may differ due to organisational belonging and per-
spective. When Tordo et. al. (2013) discuss operator adoption of local content as part of 
CSR, it is largely concerned with enhancing relations within the community in which they 
operate; whilst, a national government is likely to encourage value added on a national 
scale. A prominent cause of governments’ interest in maximising value to the economy as 
a whole is that macroeconomic phenomenon such as the Dutch Disease (The Economist, 
1977) impact the economy as a whole and not just areas around the exploration site. Fail-
ing to address this may lead to a booming resource enclave and the decline of other in-
dustries outside the enclave. Taking the above discussion into account, my study will ad-
dress local content as a national objective, this is aligned with the Ugandan government’s 
definition and the use of the term ‘national content’.  









Further discussion must focus on the definition of ‘content’. Definitions of local content 
vary and across different industries it may be suitable to adopt different interpretations. As 
noted earlier, previous examinations of local content in the oil and gas industry have not 
chosen a robust definition which allows for accurate measurement and assessment. Fig-
ure 1 provides existing definitions.  
 
 
IPIECA, 2016, p. 8  “The local resources a project or business utilizes or develops 
along its value chain while invested in a host country.” 
Tordo et al., 2013, p. 1 “The extent to which the output of the extractive industry sector 
generates further benefits to the economy beyond the direct 
contribution of its value-added, as through links to other sec-
tors.”  
Eni, 2016d, p. 9 “Added value brought to a host nation (or region or locality) 
through workforce development, employment of local workforce; 
and training of local workforce; and investments in supplier de-
velopment ... and procuring supplies and services locally.”  
Oil and Gas IQ, 2010 “Local content is the development of skills, oil and gas technol-
ogy transfer, and use of local manpower and local manufactur-
ing” 
 
The above definitions are insufficient for a robust study into local content because they 
lack specificity and measurability. For this study and as discussed previously, I believe 
that the definition can be refined to focus on the core components of local content which 
will reduce ambiguity and challenges concerning measurability. These core components 
of local content are simply, ‘employing and procuring’ from the indigenous value chain. 
However, as this study looks at the commitment of stakeholders to local content, I also 
consider investments and the provision of technical support for local content development, 









broadly referred to as a ‘commitment’ to capacity development initiatives. Correspond-
ingly, the three key criteria utilised to measure operator and other stakeholder commit-
ment to local content are: indigenous employment and procurement, and commitment to 
local capacity development.  
 
In reinforcing the above, it should be noted that local content development initiatives, such 
as investing in supplier development, operator staff training, and broad-based local con-
tent development interventions, are not the final objectives but the vehicles to deliver 
greater local capacity, which, in turn should aid greater local content adoption. This refined 
definition provides a robust framework for measuring the value added to the indigenous 
economy. By focusing on these measurable, core components of local content, we can 
assess more accurately operator commitment to localisation as well as the roles and com-
mitment of other stakeholders in contributing to quantifiable and inclusive development 
agendas. Instead of the aforementioned definitions which have been used in existing pub-
lications, the context of this case study undoubtedly played a role in defining the terms ‘lo-
cal’ and ‘content’. The definitions chosen for this research reflect the stated desire of the 
Ugandan government, and many Ugandans, to use hydrocarbons resources as a vehicle 











4. Chapter 4: Context: Oil and Gas in Uganda 
 
This chapter provides background to the research, highlighting the development timeline of 
oil and gas in Uganda, but also providing an overview of Uganda’s local content story so 
far. Beyond historical and geographical context, this chapter focus on exploring the key 
stakeholders and their roles and remits in the industry. Section 4.3 explores Uganda’s po-
litical economy, whilst section 4.4 explores the stakeholders involved in Uganda’s oil indus-
try. As indicated by its inclusion in this study’s research questions, the political economy of 
Uganda has played a substantial role in determining the pace and direction Uganda’s oil 
industry and its local content story. Section 4.5 provides an overview of Uganda’s sector 
governance, notably around local content, highlighting the slow pace at which regulation 
and legislation have been developed and implemented. The chapter concludes by exploring 
indigenous capacity challenges and the labour and procurement demands of the project 
lifecycle, noting the findings of the Industrial Baseline Survey (2013). In providing the nec-
essary context for this research, this chapter relies heavily on existing literature and media 
publications in addition to data gathered during the fieldwork process.   
 
This chapter also demonstrates that whilst the Ugandan government have been successful 
in negotiating favourable revenue sharing agreements with operators, the growth of the in-
dustry, hand-in-hand with the development and utilisation of local content, has been less 
successful. The most visual manifestation of this notion is the sedate progression of the 
industry towards the development phase, but also, as this study explores, the tardy and 
poorly managed development of local content. Whilst the executive body performed effec-
tively in oil negotiations, developing an industry that works for the country requires a great 
deal of institutional capacity, a factor which this study believes has been inadequate.  
 
In the following sections I also introduce stakeholders related to the Ugandan state. While 
these stakeholders are discussed further in Chapter 7, they are also contextual factors when 
presenting findings concerning the attitudes, actions, and interactions of other international 
stakeholders. These international stakeholders, including the operators, oil field service 









five and six, along with this study’s research findings. As set out earlier in this work, this 
study sought to deliver an in-depth analysis of the oil companies, their engagement with 
local content and their motives.  
 
4.1 The History of Oil and Gas in Uganda 
The presence of oil and gas in Uganda was documented as early as 1925 (Wayland, 1925) 
noting seepages and the potential across Uganda’s five sedimentary basins. The first deep 
well was drilled in 1938 by the African – European Investment Company, during which hy-
drocarbons were encountered. Britain’s involvement in the Second World War slowed fur-
ther exploration; although a number of geological surveys were carried out in the 1940s and 
1950s. Independence was granted on the 9th of October 1962, however, this event did not 
serve as a catalyst for greater exploration. Little progress was made in the post-colonial era; 
Uganda’s first president, Milton Obote (prime minister (1962–70) and twice as president 
(1966–71, 1980–85)), saw his first premiership compromised by ethnic tensions, in turn 
creating political challenges, a lack of territorial consolidation and the existence of armed 
opposition to the government (De Kock & Sturman, 2012).  
Obote’s unsteady first premiership fell to Amin’s military coup in 1971, leading to a decade 
frequently characterised by shocking state brutality. Eventually, Amin was overthrown 
(1979) only for Obote to return until his government was toppled again (1985); amidst vying 
military and political groups, Yoweri Museveni, a bush fighter general with genuine political 
aspiration, and his National Resistance Movement came out on top. Museveni’s strong lead-
ership and ‘big tent’ politics restored relative stability to Uganda and the aforementioned 
challenges to Obote’s premierships were largely overcome. However, by the latter stages 
of the 20th century, big oil companies had become less interested in East Africa, due to 
limited commercially viable finds, and consequently Museveni had to ‘beg’ western oil com-
panies to restart exploration projects (Mwenda, 2020). Increasing exploration under Muse-
veni eventually led to the declaration of commercially viable oil and gas reserves in the 
Albertine Graben in 2006. An in-depth historical overview is provided in Figure 2, taken from 









A number of exploration companies had been operating in Uganda towards the latter part 
of the 20th century, with Hardman Oil and Gas and Heritage Resources being the most 
prominent in the early 2000s (Clarke, 2010). Following acquisitions by Tullow Oil and sub-
sequent farmdowns, three multinationals were licenced to develop the sector: Total E&P, 
Tullow Oil and the China National Overseas Oil Company (CNOOC), these companies con-
stitute a Joint Venture Partnership (JVP) and are referred to as the ‘operating partners’. 
More recently, Tullow’s involvement in Uganda appears to be coming to an end as the com-
pany has been attempting to further farmdown its remaining one third interest to Total E&P 
and CNOOC since 1st of January 2017. The aborted sale in 2019 would have left Tullow 
with an 11.76% interest in the upstream and pipeline, which would reduce to 10% when the 
Government of Uganda formally exercises its right to back-in. Other companies involved in 
exploration and production including Armour Energy of Australia and Oranto Oil and Gas of 
Nigeria, both companies are continuing to explore blocks in the Albertine Graben, neither 
company has a production licence, and both have a considerably smaller presence in 
Uganda than the operating partners.  
Uganda’s oil and gas industry has been beset by delays, with earlier documents noting that 
first oil may arrive before 2013 (Clarke, 2010). These delays have been further exposed by 
the pace at which Ghana and Kenya have moved from the discovery of commercially viable 
oil to production. The government’s non-approval or non-responsiveness to field-develop-
ment plans, which were first proposed by Tullow Oil in 2013, has prevented the industry 
from progressing to the development phase. In recent years a tax dispute between Tullow 
and the government over its proposed asset sale has contributed to the delay, with Muse-
veni refusing to provide any tax concessions to the operators which may aid a farmdown or 
sale and thus allow the industry to progress toward production.  
 
It was noted throughout the research that the approval of the field development project was 
not expected immediately following its presentation, noting various rounds of comments and 
amendments which may in turn take a number of years. However, the supposed non-re-
sponsiveness of the government to the development plans, coupled with the timeframe has 









tends that the Ugandan government has been keen to ensure the requisite institutional in-
frastructure, local capacity, and policy, legal, and regulatory framework for managing the 
sector are in place before moving forward with the development phase, noting the current 
challenges being faced in Ghana as a result of their absence.  
 
Uganda’s circumstances are further complicated by the landlocked nature of the country. 
The nation and its operators have had to consider numerous routes to export the oil, with 
the agreements being made for the EACOP (East African Crude Oil Pipeline), which will run 
from Kabaale in Uganda to the Chongoleani peninsular in Tanzania when complete (alt-
hough development is unlikely to start until 2021). Further challenges have been faced in 
the search for partners to construct and run Uganda’s proposed refinery in Hoima, as both 
Russian and Korean consortiums pulled out of the proposed projects after they were chosen 
as the winning and reserve bidders by the Ugandan government. Such factors also contrib-
ute in explaining the continued delay of the development project, a factor that has hindered, 
at least in the short term, the adoption of local content in Uganda’s oil and gas industry. 
Respondents, as we will see in later chapters, were more critical of the government’s role 
in the delayed development project and the timely implementation of a strategy to mandate 
and encourage local content adoption and development.  
 
 
The Early Efforts (Pre-1980) 
In 1925, Petroleum Potential of Uganda was documented by a Government Geologist 
E.J. Wayland, in the publication “Petroleum in Uganda”. The report documented existence 
of oil seepages along the shores of Lake Albert in on both Uganda and DRC sides. 
In 1936 -1956, the first shallow stratigraphic wells were drilled by the African – European 
Investment Company. The first deep well, Waki B-1 well was drilled in Butiaba, in 1938 
and encountered bitumen. Twenty (20) Shallow wells were drilled in Kibiro and Kibuku 
areas for geological correlation and these are documented by Harris et al 1956. Geolog-
ical surveys and Mines Department, during the 1940’s and 50’s established the presence 
of sedimentary sequences in the Albertine Graben (Memoirs of the Geological Survey, 
1959). 









The period 1945 – 1980 is referred to as the period of Limited Activity because of the 
Second World -War, change in policies of colonial masters where East Africa was zoned 
for Agriculture coupled with post-independence political uncertainties and instability in the 
Country. 
Consistent and modern efforts commenced in 1983 with the acquisition of 9,578-line 
km of aeromagnetic data that identified three depo centres along the entire length of the 
Graben and have been going on. 
Other achievements that have been made in this era are highlighted in the table below. 
1985 
Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act is enacted 
World Bank Credit to support to Petroleum Exploration Promotion 
1986 
Commencement of specialised training in petroleum aspects 
1990 
Cooperation Agreement between Uganda and DRC for Joint Exploration and Develop-
ment of Common fields signed 
1991 
A PSA between Fina Exploration Uganda b.v and Government signed. Fina takes the 
entire Albertine Graben 
Formation of Petroleum Exploration and Production Department; PEPD carried out 
ground geological and geophysical surveys in areas identified by the aeromagnetic data. 
Data acquired was used to Promote the Albertine Graben for investment 
1993 
Petroleum (Exploration and Production) (Conduct of Exploration Operations) Regulations, 
1993 came into force. 
1997 
Licensing of Exploration Area 3 (Semliki Basin), to Heritage Oil and Gas Limited (HERIT-
AGE) 
1998 










Hardman Resources and Energy Africa is licensed Exploration Area 2 (Northern Lake 
Albert Basin) 
2002 – 2004 
Drilling of Turaco wells by HERITAGE and ENERGY AFRICA, the first deep wells in the 
basin to encounter oil and gas. 
HERITAGE is licensed to Exploration Area 1(Pakwach basin). 
2005 
Exploration Area 5 (The Rhino Camp Basin) is licensed to Neptune Petroleum (Tower 
Resources). 
Drilling of Mputa-1 well by Hardman and Energy Africa in Kaiso-Tonya area. 
2006 
Hardman Petroleum Pty (now Tullow) makes the first commercial discovery well in Kayiso 
Tonya area. 
Hardman Petroleum Pty (now Tullow) signs an MOU with Government for an Early Pro-
duction Scheme (EPS) for oil production, Seniorping plant; and Thermal Power genera-
tion ~ 50-85MW. 
2007 
Dominion Petroleum is licensed to Exploration Area 4B. 
2008 
Cabinet approves the National Oil and Gas Policy; 
2010 – 2012 
Farm-out of Heritage oil and Gas to Tullow and Farm-in of Total E & P Uganda and 
CNOOC Uganda Limited 
Production License over Kingfisher issued 
2013 
Petroleum (Exploration, Development and Production) Act 2013 enacted 
In addition to Kingfisher, Total and Tullow submit applications for possible award of Pro-










A Memorandum of Understanding on Commercialisation was signed between Govern-
ment and Licensed oil companies which under pinned the three principles options of crude 
for export, refinery and crude for power. 
2015 
Appointment of the Board of Directors for the Petroleum Authority of Uganda 
Uganda had the first competitive licensing round for 6 blocks in the Albertine Graben, that 
culminated into the licencing of Armour Energy Limited (Australia) and Oranto Petroleum 
Limited (Nigeria) 
2016 
Six (6) Production Licenses issued to Tullow Uganda Operations Pty and three (3) Pro-
duction licences issued to Total E & P Uganda 
Appointment of Executive Director for the Petroleum Authority of Uganda 
Seven sets of Upstream and Midstream Petroleum Regulation issued 
The Hoima to Tanga Crude oil pipeline routing agreed 
2017 
Appointment of Directors for the Petroleum Authority of Uganda 
FEED for Upstream Facilities and also for EACOP were launched 
IGA for EACOP was signed between Uganda and Tanzania and foundation stone laid 
New exploration Licenses issued to Armour Energy Limited (Australia) and Oranto Petro-
leum Limited (Nigeria). 
 
4.2 The Geography of Uganda’s Oil Wealth 
 
The discovery of commercially quantities of oil has seen the growth of the industry and its 
promised wealth become somewhat of a national obsession, with many seeing it as the 
vehicle to deliver real development in this underdeveloped nation. The nation’s oil reserves 
are ranked fourth by size in Sub-Saharan Africa, behind Nigeria, Angola and South Sudan. 
The majority of the discovered reserves sit in the Hoima District and the neighbouring Buliisa 
District (as shown in Figure 3), primarily on the shores of Lake Albert. Hoima town is poised 
to become the economic hub for the oil industry in Uganda and potentially a hub for the 









consider the political and economic circumstances coupled with the state of conflict in Ni-
geria, South Sudan and Angola, it is not inconceivable that Hoima’s relative security could 
engender the development of an oil service hub supporting operations across East Africa 
or sub-Saharan Africa; however this notion has been greatly undermined by the lack of 
progress towards production.  
Hoima is already colloquially referred to as ‘Oil City’ after the discoveries under and on the 
shores of Lake Albert in 2006. Among other factors, the prospect of new jobs and prosperity 
have caused its population to grow dramatically from 27,930 in 2002, to 100,099 in 2014, a 
factor that has delivered a number of challenges to the local economy and state resources. 
Hoima will not only be the focal point for exploration and production, but also refining, pet-
rochemicals and Uganda’s distribution network as Uganda’s only refinery is planned to be 
constructed in the district (Albertine Graben Refinery). The refinery will be served by an 
enterprise district and new airport which is expected to be completed in 2021. The airport 
will support the development phase of upstream, midstream and downstream (refining ca-
pabilities) oil and gas. The second phase of construction, focused on the facilitation of pas-
sengers and boosting tourism and business, was expected to conclude in 2022, although 
reports vary. Prior to the opening of the airport and the development of other necessary 
infrastructure in Hoima, it seems appropriate that the oil industry remains based out of Kam-
pala, where international access is facilitated by the airport in Entebbe and in proximity to 











The location and consistency of Uganda’s crude oil provides some additional challenges. 
Currently, Uganda imports most of its petroleum products from Kenya and in 2015 con-
sumed around 20,000 BPD (U.S. Energy Information Administration, United States Depart-
ment of Energy, 2020), although some estimates suggest a figure closer to 35,000. At peak 
production, Uganda’s current discoveries have the capacity to deliver around 230,000 BPD 
(Energy Voice), although Hickey et. al. (2015) notes a more realistic figure of 100,000 BPD; 
this remains substantially more than the output of the proposed refinery in Kabaale / Hoima 
of 30,000 BPD (Andrews & Grant, 2020) and indigenous demand for petroleum products. 
Correspondingly, the requirement for a pipeline (EACOP), coupled with the waxy nature of 
Uganda’s crude, suggests a high cost of getting the crude product to the international mar-
ket.  
The proposed pipeline to the Tanzanian Port of Tanga will be 1445 kilometres long and is 
required to be heated as Uganda’s waxy crude solidifies at ambient temperature. The USD 
3.5 billion cost is a substantial investment which will see Uganda’s crude transported to the 
Indian Ocean along the world’s longest heated pipeline. According to ‘The East African’ 









(2017), Uganda will pay Tanzania USD 12.20 for every barrel flowing through the pipeline 
and upon arrival to the global oil market may command a spot price lower than many crudes 
owing to a lower API gravity range (The PAU claims Ugandan Crude has a broad API range 
of 17-31 degrees, with a low sulphur content). The waxy nature of this crude does not nec-
essarily mean that it is heavy (which is potentially less desirable than lighter crudes), how-
ever, the API range provided by the PAU is significantly below that of crude oil benchmarks 
WTI (39.6) and Brent (38.06) which will impact the price the crude commands. Whilst the 
relevant stakeholders still appear confident about the profitability of the oil production in 
Uganda, it is important to note that these fields were explored during a period of accelerated 
exploration activity in 2004-2008, at which time oil prices peaked at USD 147 per barrel 
(Anderson & Browne, 2011). Correspondingly, the profitability of Uganda’s oil may be easily 
compromised by spot price changes and greater project costs. 
4.3 Uganda’s Political Economy 
 
As Chapter 2 argued the political economy lens is an approach all too seldom used in stud-
ies of development economics and is “particularly fruitful from a macroeconomic perspec-
tive, identifying underlying political reasoning and barriers for economic development” (Kap-
pel & Never, 2017, p. 2). Analysis of Uganda’s political economy (Kelsall, 2013; Hickey et. 
al., 2015; Kappel & Never, 2017) provides a useful insight into how Ugandan state actors 
influence and effect other stakeholders, including operators, indigenous enterprises, donor 
organisations and vice-versa. Political settlement theory has been utilised by a number of 
authors, including Hickey & Izama (2017), in the context of Uganda, its oil endowment and 
revenue sharing negotiations. This lens focuses on the role of elites, primarily Museveni, 
who’s leadership and long-lived premiership is an integral factor in understanding oil and oil 
policy developments in Uganda. Whilst Museveni dominates discourse on Uganda’s politi-
cal economy, political settlement theory is not entirely compatible with this work’s focus on 
‘implementation’ and the governance of local content adoption and development. Corre-
spondingly, this study utilises the institutional lens, focusing on Uganda’s administrative ca-









Uganda’s history has shaped its present-day politics; given the conflict and upheaval that 
preceded Museveni’s presidency, the ‘big man’ nature of his leadership was arguably una-
voidable. Uganda’s political settlement is personalised in nature (Tangri & Mwenda, 2019; 
Wilkins & Vokes, 2018), with the elevated role of the executive body manifest in practice 
and in law. Increasingly academics note that power is being centralised, delivering greater 
discretionary power to the President and his technocrats, reinforced by the appointment of 
politically loyal ministers, such as Katureebe (Chief Justice) and Kasaija (Finance Minister) 
in 2015 (Bukenya & Hickey, 2019).  
After 35 years as president, Museveni, the once liberator and champion of ‘big tent’ politics, 
presides over a government and civil service which is increasingly unrepresentative of the 
Ugandan nation, with people from the western regions and the Banyakole (Museveni’s eth-
nic group) overly represented in positions of power and influence; as Hickey et al. (2015) 
note, Uganda has moved from a broad-based developmental coalition to a weak dominant 
party settlement. Museveni’s hold on power was further reinforced by a controversial elec-
tion victory in January 2021, which saw popular opposition leader Robert Kyagulanyi (also 
known as Bobi Wine) arrested on multiple occasions while campaigning (for exceeding 
gathering limits during the Covid-19 pandemic) and put under house arrest post-election; 
election week also saw the authorities switch off social media and eventually the internet.  
The personalisation of power under Museveni is furthered by co-optation and the promotion 
of those within his family to positions of political influence, including Uganda’s military (Bo-
tha, 2012). Among many other examples, including Museveni’s wife, Reuss and Titeca 
(2017) highlight the role of the President’s half-brother as a UPDF (Uganda People’s De-
fence Force) General and the promotion of Museveni’s son, Muhoozi Kainerugaba, to Half-
Colonel in 2008, in charge of Special Forces and responsible for providing security at 
Uganda's oil installations. In the 12 subsequent years, Kainerugaba has risen a further four 
ranks, being promoted to Lieutenant General in February 2019 at the age of 44 (Daily Mon-









The centralisation of decision making is reinforced by the centralised nature of public fi-
nances. Uganda’s political elites operate in a position of low domestic taxation and govern-
ment revenue, but considerable income from international aid. The centralised nature of 
decision making has been reinforced by the abolition of the local government tax in 2006 
(Kjær et. al. 2015), consolidating the primacy of central governance. However, as the Na-
tional Resistance Movement party (NRM) and Museveni’s popular support has waned, the 
government has also become more repressive and on occasion relies on the direct or indi-
rect display of its capacity for coercion (Golooba-Mutebi and Sjögren 2017).  
Kappel and Never (2017) describe a political economy characterised by favouritism and 
non-competitive clientelism, where political power is also a vehicle to gain economic power 
and influence. The authors claim that this rent-seeking activity is particularly prevalent in 
Uganda’s oil industry and other large infrastructure projects. A degree of concern is reflected 
by a number of authors, Kelsall (2013) talks of a strategy of ‘developmental patrimonialism’ 
rather than predatory forms patrimonialism, noting the imposed centralisation of rents by 
ruling elites with a view to enhancing their incomes in the long run, which, according to 
Hickey et. al. (2015), reflects the state of the political economy within Uganda’s oil and gas 
industry. As will be discussed at greater length in Chapter 7, the aforementioned non-com-
petitive clientelism is reducing the opportunity for inclusivity and broad participation in 
Uganda’s oil and gas industry. In reflecting the prominence of Museveni, his family member 
and associates in political and business matters related to oil and gas, some members of 
Uganda’s political opposition have taken to referring to the sector as ‘Museveni’s family 
business’.  
Despite efforts to separate the institutions responsible for the oil from politics, it is clear that 
Museveni’s influence over the sector’s development has been considerable. Museveni’s 
government was praised for the adoption of the Norwegian administrative model, however, 
it does appear that other state initiatives have undermined the model’s potential effective-
ness; Mbabazi notes that “the legislative bills governing the oil industry grant “authoritarian-
like” powers to the Minister responsible for oil, known as Clause 9” (Mbabazi, 2013, p. 22), 









Hickey et. al. (2015), focusing on the nature of contracts and agreements drawn up between 
the government and oil companies, contend that the executive body has represented the 
country well. Following two notable public sector scandals involving bribery which took place 
in 2013, President Museveni sought to cut out the middlemen, and according to Hickey et. 
al. (2015), played a leading role in negotiating with the operating partners. Despite previous 
examples of the abuses of discretional power in other nations, it appears that the national 
interest was well catered to in these discussions and as a result Uganda’s agreed share of 
the oil revenue is one of the highest in Africa; Mwenda (2020) notes that Uganda’s share of 
oil revenues is 78%, more than most mature oil producing economies and substantially 
more than nascent oil economies.  
Conversely, the growing tendency of Museveni to micromanage the industry represents a 
concerning political risk for operating companies (Patey, 2015). The author contends that 
“a quasi-authoritarian leader in a dysfunctional democracy could very well lead to further 
delays in the industry’s development; these delays have since materialised. Resultantly, an 
unpredictability remains for the oil industry in this hybrid governing system” (Patey, 2015, p. 
5) which is furthered by Museveni’s ‘hardliner’ governance of the sector, refusing to give tax 
concessions to the operators and ensuring the industry progresses on Ugandan terms. On 
one hand, whilst the President wants to ensure the best deal for the country and guarantee 
that Uganda is not being “cheated” by the operators, observers, including Mwenda (2020), 
believe that Museveni’s judgement and overall sectoral governance has been, and will 
prove to be, ineffective in actualising Uganda’s resource wealth.  
A further examination of the impact of Museveni on local content and its development will 
follow in Chapter 7, however, the above literature is important in contextualising the findings 
in all of the following chapters. One of the most important contextual factors is that, despite 
prophetic examples from across the world, Museveni possesses discretionary power in oil 
and gas governance which may engender unpredictable outcomes, notably the further de-
lay of the industry. The primacy of Museveni, his family and his ethnic group in positions of 
power within oil and gas also raises a number of questions, including the intended inclusivity 









However, this study primarily focuses on the role and effectiveness of the bureaucracy and 
its interaction with other stakeholders, hence the choosing of an institutional theoretical 
framework over a political settlement framework. The responsibility of implementing 
Uganda’s oil policy and achieving its local content aspiration falls to its bureaucrats, that is 
to say those responsible for the day-to-day operations of the state. Correspondingly, an 
understanding of Uganda’s institutional makeup is the primary factor in contextualising this 
study’s findings.  
Uganda inherited a number of bureaucratic traditions from the British, including a suppos-
edly neutral bureaucracy, administrative processes and legal restraints to prevent unconsti-
tutional activity, in turn, this inheritance provided a degree of institutional strength following 
independence. As noted by Lofchie (1972) and Miller (1975), Obote’s first premiership 
sought to ensure that civil servants were appointment on merit, at least this was the stated 
goal of the president, reinforcing the notion of a bureaucracy separated from politics. How-
ever, Amin’s successful coup brought an end to this notion of a non-politicised bureaucracy, 
as he and his regime favoured Muslims and northerners (Rollow, 1974) despite the Chris-
tians and Buganda (a Bantu kingdom and broad ethnic group from the west of Uganda; a 
group to which Museveni belongs) largely being the beneficiaries of western educations. It 
is seemingly the case that bureaucracy has never truly been separated from politics since, 
as a major feature of this research is the predominance of people from the west of Uganda 
in the civil service, among other respected professions.  
Uganda’s adoption of the Norwegian model is an important feature of the administration’s 
resource governance; however, it did not impact all institutions related the development of 
a localised oil and gas industry. There are a number of government institutions, removed 
from the Norwegian model, that are tasked to deliver a localised oil industry in Uganda, such 
as the Ministry of Education and Sport. The objective of developing a localised industry has 
stretch the capacity of many ministries, testing not only their institutional capacity but also 
inter-agency cooperation, particularly as the remit of developing Ugandan content falls 
within the mandates of multiple government ministries, institutions and agencies. Corre-









policies and achieving objectives, a notion that will be covered in greater detail in later chap-
ters. The institutions responsible for the development of the oil and gas industry, along with 
local content, are highlighted in section 4.4 below.  
4.4 Stakeholders in Uganda’s Local Content Story 
 
According to the National Oil and Gas Policy for Uganda (2008), local content is a strategic 
goal of the Ugandan state and has been since the industry’s inception in Uganda. This study 
recognises that there are a great number of stakeholders involved in the development of 
local content and its adoption in Uganda, many of whom are international organisations and 
agencies. Figure 4, taken from the OGP (National Oil and Gas Policy for Uganda), highlights 
the roles and remits of organisations in 2008 (before the responsibilities of oil governance - 
not including complimentary ministries such as Ministry of Education and Sport - were sep-
arated into three bodies by the introduction of the Norwegian Model); whilst noting a plethora 
of responsible organisations, the operating companies are the only non-Ugandan entity.  
 
 





- Carry out petroleum exploration promotion 
- Initiate petroleum legislation, Model PSA 
- Monitor oil companies’ compliance with existing laws, regulations and 
agreements. This includes compliance with national content require-
ments. 
Advisory Committee–
under the PSA (con-
sists of venture part-
ners &govt representa-
tives) 
- Consists of four members- two (2) appointed by government, and two 
(2) representing the oil company. The role of secretary of the committee 
is held by the Oil Company. 
- The committee is responsible for reviewing and approving the oil com-
panies’ annual work programmes and budgets, which include: planned 
activities relating to procurements, training and employment. 
Ministry of Education 
National Curriculum 
Development Centre 
The MoES is responsible for: 
- Promoting the development of education and training programmes in 
order to 









National Council for 
Higher Education 
create requisite national human resource expertise for the oil and gas 
sector 
on a sustainable basis; 
- Reviewing, expanding and approving the education curricula in the 
country 
with a view of producing the workforce required for oil and gas activities 
nationally. 
- Promoting relevant research and studies in collaboration with the Min-
istry 
responsible for oil and gas, and any other relevant institutions. 
District Local Govern-
ments 
- Mobilize and dialogue with communities. 
- Contribute to holding the different players accountable with regard to 
oil 
and gas issues; 
- Participate in getting the voices of the poor into designing, monitoring 
and implementation of programmes in the oil and gas sector. 
Ministry of Trade, In-
dustry and Coopera-
tives (MoTIC) 
- To formulate and support strategies, plans and programs that promote 
and ensure the expansion and diversification of trade, sustainable in-
dustrialization and preservation of other tradable national products, to 
generate wealth for poverty eradication and benefit the country socially 
and economically. 
Universities and other 
educational institutions 
- These are required to come up with and offer relevant university pro-
grammes/ courses to equip Ugandans with relevant skills to participate 
in the oil and gas sector. 
Ministry of Agriculture 
and Animal Industry 
- Build capacity/train Ugandan farmers to ensure that they meet interna-
tional standards on the quality of food products required for supply to 
International Oil Companies (IOCs) 
Ministry of Internal Af-
fairs/ Immigration Of-
fice 
- Clear expatriates to enter the country and issue work permits/special 
passes 
Public Procurement 
and Disposal Authority 
(PPDA) 
- Carry out procurement audits to ensure that International Oil Compa-
nies (IOCs) comply with the procurement requirements agreed upon in 
the contracts/ stipulated in the law. 
Association of Ugan-
dan Oil and Gas Ser-
vice Providers (AU-
GOS) 
- This brings together interested Ugandan service providers and suppli-
ers of goods to sensitize them on requirements and help lobby for inclu-









Oil companies - These are required to comply with existing laws, regulations and agree-
ments on national content requirements. 
Source: NOGP (2008), PSAs and Interviews with respective stakeholders 
The current scenario, which also sees responsibilities of oil governance split in accordance 
with the Norwegian Model, presents a more complex picture, with multiple external stake-
holders and a greater division of responsibility within the Ugandan government. The creation 
of additional institutions, replacing the PEPD (The Petroleum Exploration and Production 
Department), reflects the adoption of the Norwegian model, separating the commercial in-
terests of Uganda, from regulatory and political objectives, a move which Museveni’s gov-
ernment is often lauded for, despite the lack of progress towards actualising a producing oil 
industry (Hickey & Izama, 2020). The PEPD was superseded by the MEMD (Ministry of 
Mines and Mineral Development, within which sits the Petroleum Directorate); the new ad-
ministrative model also saw the creation of the PAU (Petroleum Authority Uganda) and 
UNOC (Uganda National Oil Company), all of whom play a role in local content, including 
employing local people themselves.  
Hickey & Izama (2019) note that falling staff numbers of the PD (Petroleum Directorate)2 
and the growing size of the PAU and UNOC, representing the implementation of the new 
legal framework and the inevitable shift in focus from regulation to commercial interests. 
However, Hickey and Izama (2019) suggest that the PD is downsizing too soon, as the 
department struggles to deliver on its mandates, including the regulation of downstream 
interests and, more broadly, to oversee further exploration project across Uganda’s five 
sedimentary basins. In 2019, the PD employed less than 17 operational staff.  
In addition to the above, this research also notes responsibilities and mandate of the Minis-
try of Gender, Labour and Social Development, particularly in matters related to upskilling 




2 MEMD Annual Report, June 2019: 33 Employees within PD, more than half of which are non-operational staff including six cleaners, 









of the various institutions in developing local capacity, notably between the Ministry of Ed-
ucation and Sport and the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development, but also the 
Ministry of Trade, Industry and Cooperatives. Whilst the new ministries created by the adop-
tion of the Norwegian model have benefited from substantial donor support, not only finan-
cially, other ministries have been less fortunate; notably the Ministry of Education and Sport 
whose achievements have been questionable, particularly prior to the recent provision (by 
a donor organisation) of technical expertise.  
As the industry developed, we can see the addition of new international stakeholders, all of 
whom have an interest in local capacity. Beyond those noted in Figure 4, whose roles and 
responsibilities are mandated, the local content landscape in Uganda is incomplete without 
recognising the role of donor organisations, international oilfield service providers and EPC 
contractors. The presence of multilateral organisations and donors predates the discovery 
of commercially viable oil reserves in Uganda, a notable development being Uganda’s par-
ticipation in the IMF (International Monetary Fund) Economic Recovery Programme in 1987 
following Museveni’s commitments to substantially economic changes. Nowadays, whilst 
Uganda’s education system, as a whole, is greatly reliant on donor aid, the role of donor 
agencies in upgrading institutions and skilling Ugandans for the oil and gas industry is 
equally pronounced. And whilst oilfield service companies and EPC contractors have not 
been involved greatly to date, as the largest employers of local content during the forthcom-
ing development and production phase, these organisations are vitally important in guiding 
the direction of local content development and its future adoption.  
 
4.5 The Governance of Local Content in Uganda 
 
Despite the adoption of the aforementioned Norwegian model, a feature that is likely to 
improve administrative performance, it is widely believed that the Ugandan state has moved 
slowly to implement a strategy to actualise local content objectives. Most prominently, re-
spondents contended that the Ugandan government has been slow to put legislation and 
regulations in place to govern local content and its development. Whilst Production Sharing 









not until 2016 that the government introduced the National Content Regulations; this was 
consolidated in 2020 by the National Local Content Bill.  
 
Whilst the Norwegian model has created new bodies with new remits for the governance of 
oil and gas resources in Uganda, the implementation of the model represents a tool which, 
in theory, reduces opportunities for extra-legal activities, including the involvement of the 
executive body, placing power in the hands of the bureaucracy and not the President. This 
is particularly important in light of prophetic examples, notably on the African continent, 
where presidents and prime ministers have utilised national resources for private or political 
gain, such as Mobutu Sese Seko in the DRC or Sani Abacha in Nigeria. In Uganda, the 
Norwegian model provides UNOC with the remit of pursuing Uganda’s commercial objec-
tives, the PAU with regulatory authority and the MEMD with a planning / policy remit, theo-
retically placing these functions beyond the influence of East Africa’s longest serving leader.  
 
Whilst positive in theory, the model is complex in its structure (compared with a singular 
institution which holds all remits) and places substantial pressure on the bureaucracy. The 
model requires a significant level of institutional capacity; it requires civil servants across 
three government bodies to be competent and that these three bodies are well-managed 
and coordinated. The model also demands non-technical capabilities such those that en-
gender successful communication between these three separate bodies. In the past, Mu-
seveni has also demonstrated ability to penetrate seemingly independent institutions; in 
2011 he coerced the governor of the Bank of Uganda to release USD 741 million for the 
purchase of Russian fighter planes without parliament’s approval, even promising future oil 
revenue as collateral (De Kock and Sturman 2012). 
 
It is interesting to note that Production Sharing Agreements from 2012 largely share the 
same, ambiguous three paragraphs on local procurement as those from 2001, with no ref-
erence to supplementary documents which may provide greater stipulation, demonstrating 
little intention to utilise the PSA to mandate greater local content. This is compounded by a 









ploy foreign nationals to the extent that suitably qualified and experienced Ugandan nation-
als cannot be found to fill a position” (Production Sharing Agreements, Uganda, 2001, 2004, 
2012). The absence of any real legalisation until 2013 reinforces the lack of willingness or 
incapacity to mandate local content during the exploration phase; this may have been a 
strategy to encourage greater exploration or potentially a missed opportunity. It may well be 
the case that more recent PSAs have greater consideration for local content, although these 
have not been made available to this study.  
 
According to the PAU, the Petroleum (Exploration, Development and Production) Act and 
the Petroleum (Refining, Conversion, Transmission and Midstream Storage) Act 2013, man-
dates that oil and gas operators must conduct training, employ and transfer technology to 
the country. It also imposes that operators must demonstrate preference for Ugandan man-
ufactured goods and services. However, interview participants and commentators alike note 
that this legalisation was never meant to make complete local content provisions. The 2016 
National Content Regulations complemented the 2013 Act but made more complete provi-
sions. Uganda’s local content framework, enshrined in legalisation, regulation and PSAs 
was considered by many respondents in this study to be comprehensive, with the expected 
inclusion of provisions for employment, training of staff, training of government staff, pro-
curement, technology transfer and reporting. However, the comprehensive nature of the 
provisions is undermined by ongoing challenges in implementation and monitoring, remits 
of the MEMD and PAU respectively (Ssekika, 2020). With the introduction of the National 
Local Content Bill in 2020, it appears that all the aforementioned measures are designed to 
work in tandem, each new measure supposedly minimising loopholes.  
 
 
Petroleum Exploration, Development and Production Act, 2013 (henceforth PEDP Act) 
Petroleum Refining, Conversion, Transmission and Midstream Storage Act, 2013 
(henceforth PRCTMS Act) 
Petroleum Exploration, Development and Production Regulations, 2016 
Petroleum Exploration, Development and Production National Content Regulations 
2016 









Petroleum Refining, Conversion, Transmission and Midstream Storage Regulations 
2016 
Petroleum Refining, Conversion, Transmission and Midstream Storage National Con-
tent Regulations, 2016 
National Local Content Bill, 2020 
 
4.6 Indigenous Capacity Challenges 
 
Uganda is a well-positioned case study for this research as the nation possessed almost no 
human or industrial competences relevant to the hydrocarbon industry when commercial 
quantities of oil were found, perhaps with the exception of a number of geologists and civil 
servants who were educated in the 1980s (Polus & Tycholiz (2017). Whilst mandating local 
content adoption has been integral to the creation of linkages into the wider economy in the 
past, it is only useful in the presence of indigenous suppliers and local people who have the 
requisite competencies to service the industry. Achieving the requisite level of indigenous 
capacity, both human and enterprise-level, is a fundamental challenge in actualising the 
localisation objectives. Raising indigenous capacity is traditionally considered a responsi-
bility of the state and state institutions, however, respondents in this study questioned gov-
ernment activity to develop local capacity; further analysis of this takes place in Chapter 7.  
 
As in many nascent hydrocarbon nations, local enterprise in Uganda has, predominantly, 
only participated in the supply of lower value contracts, such as transport, logistics, food 
supply, clearing and forwarding, crane hire, waste management, lifting, camp management, 
road construction and security among others. High value contracts for specialised goods 
and services have mostly been awarded to foreign companies. Beyond the heightened, 
often technical, requirements of high value contracts, local companies are further disadvan-
taged as tenders are often configured in very large bid lots which, due to their size, have 
additional complications. Resultantly, local suppliers struggle, largely due to inadequate fi-
nancial resources that are required for bid bond guarantees, working capital, purchase of 









use of international procurement and tender procedures which are complex and require high 
levels of organisation and management capacity. 
 
Substantial discourse took place during the exploration phase, highlighted by the Ugandan 
media, which notes the challenges experienced by operators working with local suppliers 
and the supposed grievances of locals when their businesses are overlooked for contracts. 
Ssekika (2013) noted an area of contention relating to Tullow’s rejection of a local catering 
company in 2013. It was reported that Tullow did not renew a contract with an indigenous 
catering firm which had serviced the industry for a number of years and, instead, favoured 
a foreign supplier. However, in the absence of regulation and the ring-fencing of certain 
services, it was contended by many that Tullow was not in breach of any law or PSA 
clauses. Whilst camp services such as catering are not normally considered a specialised 
input beyond the capacity of indigenous suppliers, Tullow’s choice of foreign supplier re-
flected the need for more extensive camp management services, reportedly running the 
camp to the standards of a 4-star hotel. The contracting of ‘4-star hotel’ camp management 
services is more than an indulgence; in 2012 and 2013 it was highlighted that two French 
nationals had died from Malaria as a result of inadequate mosquito prevention in camps 
managed by local companies (Ssekika, 2013). Indigenous capacity challenges were further 
reinforced when a waste-disposal subcontractor of Tullow elected to dump truckloads of 
waste at Kisimo village instead of transporting it to its intended destination at the Nakason-
gola waste disposal facility. 
 
Human capacity challenges and the development of future oil and gas workers has been an 
equally contentious topic across Uganda. The development of human competencies reflects 
the nature of the academic and vocational courses available to students and young profes-
sional. As such, considerable emphasis is placed on the role of the government, academic 
and vocational institutions and other stakeholders in guiding and ensuring learning path-
ways correspond with industry requirements. Throughout Uganda’s local content story, in-
ternational stakeholders, and many Ugandans, have expressed concern about courses be-









issues regarding accreditation; these factors feature frequently in the following research 
chapters.   
 
4.7 Local Content Demand Throughout the Oil and Gas Lifecycle 
 
Inputs, both human and goods and services, into the oil and gas industry are not consistent 
through the project lifecycle. As we can see from Figure 6, the period of most substantial 
demand for inputs and particularly inputs that can be provided locally, is during the devel-
opment phase. Simply put, the development phase is the period when vast construction 
works will take place, the inputs required are less specialised in nature than other stages of 
the project and the demand for skilled and semi-skilled labour, such as welders and scaf-
folders is high. In Uganda, whilst exploration is continuing at some sites, the main project is 
approaching the development phase subject to the approval of the field development plans 
and FID (Final Investment Decision). It is important to note that Uganda’s development 
phase is likely to last longer that of Ghana, owing the construction of the EACOP pipeline 
and a proposed refinery, thus prolonging opportunities for both Ugandans and Ugandan 
enterprise to benefit from the industry’s peak activity. The demands of the project lifecycle, 











4.7.1 The Industrial Baseline Survey 
In 2013, the operating partners commissioned and published the Industrial Baseline Survey 
(IBS) which highlighted future demand for goods, services and personnel for their develop-
ment project. It is important to remember that, depending on the success of Oranto and 
Armour in their exploration phases, there may be future development projects in the Alber-
tine region; although future projects would benefit from the infrastructure created in this first 
development project. The findings of the document broadly reflect the graphic in Figure 6, 
highlighting that local people and businesses have the greatest opportunity to benefit during 
the development phase. The IBS has been very influential in Uganda, the figures have been 
repeated by officials and stakeholders across the industry, although a number of respond-
ents believe that the IBS may have overstated the industry’s future requirements. Despite 
challenges to the accuracy of the IBS’s figures, the report’s findings provide useful context 
for this study’s research.  
 
With regards to demand for labour, the report (Hamman, 2013) came to the following con-
clusions: 
Figure 6. Example Oil and Gas Project Lifecycle and Associated Demand for Lo-










• The Lake Albert Basin Development projects will generate thousands of direct jobs 
in Uganda, with a peak of about 13,000 workers in the construction phase and a 
plateau at 3,000 people in the operation phase 
• Out of total manpower required, 15% are engineers & managers, 60% are techni-
cians and craftsmen and 25% are people without any educational background (‘un-
skilled’) 
• Education should focus on civil construction, electrical and mechanical fields  
• Beyond direct jobs that will be created on site, Oil & Gas activity will also have a 
potential to generate 100,000 to 150,000 indirect and induced jobs  
• Out of total newly created jobs, 80% will be short-term for the peak of construction 
and will have to be transferred  
 
The following graphs illustrates these findings.  
 
 
Figure 7. Demand for Labour Throughout Uganda’s Project Lifecycle (Source: In-












The report is less precise when discussing the demand for supply, however it is clear that 
it follows the same pattern noted above. One sector where local companies are more 
likely to have capacity to service the oil industry is transportation, the following graph illus-
trates the demand for these services. It is important to note that some suppliers may only 
Figure 8. Demand for Labour Throughout Uganda’s Project Lifecycle by Labour Cat-
egory (Source: Industrial Baseline Survey, Hamman, 2013) 
Figure 9. Demand for Labour Throughout Uganda’s Project Lifecycle by Qual-









find their services relevant during a small timeframe of the project lifecycle, most likely 




Figure 10, among other things, highlights the project development phase taking place from 
2015, something that clearly has not materialised. Despite the aforementioned potential 
inaccuracies, the report, as noted in this study’s data, has informed a number of targets 
for local capacity development and qualification requirements. A number of the findings 
have also informed interventions, such as the creation of an enterprise enhancement cen-
tre, a void which has been filled by the Stanbic Bank Business Incubator and the need for 
a vocational education centre, despite UPIK (Uganda Petroleum Institute Kigumba) al-
ready being operational at the time of the report. Most importantly for my study into local 
content adoption and development in Uganda, the report provides context of Uganda’s 
project lifecycle and a useful timeline of proposed input requirements.  
4.8 Conclusion 
The context of Uganda’s nascent oil and gas industry provides an ideal case study to test 
my hypothesis. As discussed, Uganda’s geography necessitates operators to engage with 
local content to a level that could be avoidable in a purely offshore operation. With off-
Figure 10. Demand for Transportation Services Throughout Uganda’s Project Lifecy-









shore finds, like Ghana, a floating production storage and offloading (FPSO) unit can by-
pass a number of supply chain inputs. However, Uganda’s oil industry requires considera-
ble investments into all parts of the industry’s lifecycle, including the building of a sizeable, 
heated pipeline to take the oil to the Indian Ocean and the global marketplace. As such, 
there are numerous opportunities for operators to employ local people and contract local 
companies in Uganda. However, the capacity of Ugandan workers and companies to take 
advantage of the hugely lucrative industry is hindered by a dearth of existing or legacy ca-
pabilities and as will be discussed in the next chapter, varying levels of operator commit-











Chapter 5: The multi-stakeholder environment, assessing the attitudes and effects 
of international participants on local content 
 
This chapter investigates the role international stakeholders play in the development of lo-
cal content and its adoption in Uganda. I argue that local content development and its 
adoption is not consistent with the business models of all operators in Uganda. It is clear 
that the business models of CNOOC and Total E&P are in conflict with the timely adoption 
of local content in line with government expectations. Meanwhile Tullow Oil, the smaller 
British operator, which has gradually farmed down its stake in Uganda, demonstrated 
greater commitment to local content development and adoption, suggesting that operating 
more locally is a key component of Tullow’s business model. Uganda’s only ‘African Oper-
ator’, Oranto Petroleum, was also perceived to be particularly willing to employ local peo-
ple and contract Ugandan suppliers, leading respondents to suggest that an African com-
pany is naturally more inclined to favour Ugandan capabilities than Western or Chinese 
firms.  
 
The chapter also argues that the development of local content in Uganda has been hin-
dered by the absence of oilfield service companies and EPC contractors, the largest em-
ployers of local people during the development and production phase, as permanent, on-
the-ground players in Uganda’s industry. Whilst oilfield service companies and EPC con-
tractors have been largely unable to positively impact the development of local content, it 
is clear that donor and development organisations are increasingly aligning their interven-
tions with the requirement to develop Ugandan skills and capabilities for the oil and gas 
industry. Donors’ interventions have become increasingly relevant and despite the re-
ported ineffectiveness of some historical programmes, have filled a void in expertise and 
funding without, as some people suggest, subtly representing non-indigenous business 
and creating opportunities through elite level relationships.  
 










Uganda’s context as an underdeveloped nation, with little indigenous capacity in resource 
industries, necessitated the involvement of copious international partners in order to ex-
plore and produce oil. In contrast to Uganda’s continental neighbours in West Africa, such 
as Angola and Nigeria, whose exploration started many decades ago, Uganda’s oil indus-
try has attracted a broader array of stakeholders, all of whom, to varying degrees, are con-
cerned with the local content and its development. Beyond the conventional discourse 
around the role of operating companies3 and the government4 in local content and its de-
velopment, the data obtained highlights a multi-stakeholder environment involving donor 
organisations, development agencies5 and to a lesser extent, future contracting and oil-
field service companies6. The presence of multiple groups of international stakeholders in 
Uganda’s oil industry is undeniable and their contribution to local content varies from or-
ganisation to organisation, although it is possible to observe trends within these stake-
holder groups. This chapter explores not only operator commitment to local content and its 
development, but also investigates the roles of the aforementioned international stake-
holders. Moreover, the research also assesses whether this multi-stakeholder environ-
ment is delivering on local content objectives.  
 
It was apparent during my research that local content and its development in Uganda has 
clearly been analysed and scrutinised in considerable detail beyond the confines of the 
boardrooms and offices of Kampala; it has become an issue that, even those beyond the 
oil industry, have become sensitised to. This chapter’s primary finding is that, despite the 
benefits associated with a localised business model, operators in Uganda have not univer-
sally adopted a localised approach to the employment and contracting of Ugandan nation-
als and companies, instead operators display varying levels of commitment. Respondents 
believe that the variance in operator commitment is defined by the company’s own internal 
influences including the operator’s corporate makeup (state or shareholder ownership) 




3 Tullow Oil, Total E&P, CNOOC Ltd (The Operating Partners) and newcomers Oranto Petroleum and Armour Energy 
4 The Government of Uganda through the Petroleum Authority Uganda, the Ministry of Mines and Mineral Development, the Ugandan National Oil Company, the Ministry of Educa-
tion Sport and other arms of government 
5 Including but not limited to The World Bank, DFID, GIZ, Enabel, AfDB. Often referred to as the Development Partners 









deeper to explore operator led local content development and adoption, highlighting the 
localised business model adopted by Uganda’s only African based operator (exploration 
and production group), Oranto Petroleum7. Oranto Petroleum, a younger company without 
entrenched operating practices or a tendency to prefer non-African staffing, demonstrates 
exceptionally high levels of local employment and contracting. Interview participants con-
tend that this data underline that provenance can play a major role in understanding how 
individuals and companies view and regard the capability of Ugandans. Because of 
Oranto’s relatively recent entry into Uganda’s oil sector, its lack of a production licence 
and its comparatively small size, it is discussed separately from the other operators in this 
chapter. 
 
A further finding of this chapter relates to the benevolent and altruistic nature of multilat-
eral organisations and donor agencies. In reflecting institutionalist political economic the-
ory which states that individuals and actors are not only motivated by self-interest but also 
by concepts such as morality and benevolence, this study found that there was no evi-
dence that development agencies subversively represent oilfield service companies and 
suppliers from their own country. Instead, the majority of respondents noted the im-
portance of their interventions in developing Ugandan content and their role in champion-
ing market-based processes. The data infer that foreign service companies and contrac-
tors registered on the National Suppliers’ Database are commonly Chinese, French or 
British, reflecting the nationality of the international operating partners in Uganda and not 
the development partners (donor / development agencies). The evidence suggests that 
the development agencies play an important role in the provision of technical expertise 
and funding in a country severely lacking both.  
 
An additional finding presented in this chapter is the disproportionate effect that business 
uncertainty has on local content through the intermittent involvement of oilfield service 
companies and EPC (engineering, procurement, construction) contractors. Oilfield service 













have never been able to truly establish themselves. This has reduced their capacity to em-
ploy Ugandans and to play a role in its development in line with their own requirements. In 
highlighting the above findings, this chapter will triangulate the interview data, question-
naire data with published and provided figures from government and industry.  
 
This chapter addresses my second research question, assessing what roles the leading 
stakeholders are playing in local content development and adoption in Uganda, notably 
looking at the attitudes and roles adopted by the operator community. In reflecting the 
topic posed by my second research question, this chapter also explores the differences 
that exist within the operator community, as well as the donor community, with regards to 
local content. Using a mixture of qualitative and quantitative data, as well as existing litera-
ture, I seek to provide an understanding of why operators approach local content in differ-
ent ways. Similar comparisons are made concerning the donor community, looking at the 
re-emergence of the western donors and their relevance in this case study.  
 
5.2 The Role of the Operator in Local Content and its Development 
 
Operators are an employer of local people and contractors of local content, who have tra-
ditionally not been mandated to operate in a localised manner. However, as discussed in 
earlier chapters, there is a growing consensus that operators, as socially aware actors, 
should look to maximise value to the host nation, moving away from the notion of being 
purely extractive institutions. This narrative was voiced very strongly within the interviews 
of this research; Ugandan respondents expressed considerable concern about the future 
of their resources, keen that they and their fellow countrymen would be able to benefit. 
Whilst there might be a growing acceptance in western literature (Tordo et. al. 2013) that 
operating locally is more ethical and even potentially financially rewarding, this does not 
necessarily mean that it has been universally accepted or is being adopted.  
 
A recurring feature throughout the data is the notion that the operating partners do not 
share the same attitude towards local content. The data infer that Tullow Oil has adopted 









demonstrating favour towards Uganda businesses where possible. However, the same 
cannot be said for the two remaining operating partners, with data suggesting that Total 
E&P is risk-averse in its engagement with Ugandan capabilities, noting rigid hiring proce-
dures and preference for an existing global supply chain. Meanwhile, CNOOC possesses 
conflicting objectives; as a Chinese SOE it is mandated to deliver employment and con-
tract opportunities for Chinese individuals and companies. Broadly speaking, we can ob-
serve that different operators, with different corporate structures, and experience respond 
differently to external pressures.   
 
The aforementioned findings reflect consensus across questionnaire, interview and sec-
ondary data. Questionnaire respondents were asked to rate each of the companies in-
volved in exploration and production in Uganda according to their commitment to certain 
aspects of local content. Respondents answered on a scale 1-5, ‘1’ being not committed 
at all and ‘5’ being totally committed. For the purposes of comparison between operating 
companies, responses have been aggregated. In Figure 11 we can observe that, across 
all indicators, CNOOC are clearly perceived to be less active than the two other operating 
partners, Total E&P and Tullow Oil. The results reinforce the notion that Tullow Oil was, 
and continues to be, the most committed of the operating partners to local content, achiev-
ing higher aggregated questionnaire results than any other company across all three com-
ponents of local content. Ackah and Mohammed (2018) note similar sentiments across 
Ghana, where Tullow’s operations progressed considerably quicker than in Uganda, with 











In noting Tullow’s superiority in the above data, respondents contended that Tullow Oil’s 
farmdown of its operations in Uganda to Total E&P and CNOOC represents a considera-
ble loss to the nation’s local content aspirations, leaving Uganda’s development project 
with two operational partners. The notion that Tullow Oil was the most committed to oper-
ating locally was strongly reinforced throughout the semi-structured interviews, with many 
participants highlighting Tullow’s adoption of local content as a benchmark in the industry. 
A former Total employee noted the impact of Tullow leaving the market, 
 









“The exit of company like Tullow, given the precedent it set, it was a blow (…) To me per-
sonally, I didn't, I wasn't working for Tullow. I was working for another operator, but it was 
a blow” (23 June 2019) 
 
Meanwhile, although this study is isolated to Uganda, one senior government representa-
tive was keen to highlight Tullow Oil’s reputation as a committed local operator across the 
African continent.  
 
“In terms of in Africa, Tullow has created a big growth in developing local content. They 
are spot-on with money; they are on the table” (19 June 2019) 
 
In the following two subsections we can observe that published data and that provided by 
the PAU is largely in alignment with the questionnaire results in Figure 11. Some of the 
data used comes from the OAG report of 2015, which is valuable for comparison as it is 
the last year that all three operating partners were fully operational in Uganda. Over the 
following years we can observe substantial staff downsizing and a reduction in overall pro-
curement, the cause of which will be discussed further in Chapter 6. The 2015 data is also 
particularly relevant as a result of Tullow’s farmdown, leading many respondents to dis-
cuss Tullow in the past tense. 
5.2.1 Operator Employment  
The data in Figure 11 infer that Tullow’s commitment to local content is most apparent in 
its employment of Ugandans (aggregated result of 3.97 out of 5), this is supported by the 
published data in Figure 12. Interview participants also unanimously agreed with this sen-
timent and spoke fondly of Tullow’s employment of Ugandans; an operator employee 
commented, 
 
“It's on record Tullow were the most paying company in this country. All people in worked 
in Tullow can testify. There's no company that beating Tullow when it came to salaries, 
when it came to training, when it came to promotion, because that'll help think like 75% 










Figures 12 and 13 highlight the employment of Ugandan nationals against expatriates. 
Prior to the oil price crash and the end of the exploration period, the OAG report shows 
that Tullow operated with a vastly more localised workforce than the remaining operating 
partners. Importantly, Ugandans were also well represented in management and senior 
management positions, earning substantial salaries and benefiting from exposure to 
greater responsibility, an intangible but valuable addition to local content.   
 
The area of most significant disparity between the operators is shown in Figure 14. We 
can observe that CNOOC and Total’s local staff salaries only counted for a small percent-
age of the overall expenditure on staff wages (17% and 24% respectively in 2014), whilst 
84% of Tullow’s salaries went to Ugandan nationals. At CNOOC, 71% of the workforce re-
ceived 17% of the overall remuneration, a similar ratio can be observed within Total. The 
calculation below in Figure 14 demonstrates that at CNOOC and Total, expatriate wages 
per individual were more than 10 times that of nationals; this salary gap was noted by re-










Average salary per employee (UGX): Nationals and Expatriates 
Figure 13: Management by Operator (OAG Report, 2015) 
Figure 12. Operator Employment 2012-2014 (OAG Report, 2015) 









CNOOC: Nationals 3,641,708.87 – Expatriates 41,746,185.83* 
Total E&P: Nationals 5,125,207.15 – Expatriates 55,357,925.97 
Tullow Oil: Nationals 11,622560.49 – Expatriates 38,121,941.62 
5.2.2 Operator Procurement 
When considering the three most prominent companies in the industry, CNOOC, Total 
E&P and Tullow Oil, respondents were most critical of CNOOC’s contracting policy and 
responded most positively towards Tullow Oil’s. As we can see from Figure 15, it was 
strongly believed that CNOOC demonstrates a preference for Chinese service companies.  
 
 
81% of participants agreed that ‘CNOOC demonstrates a preference towards Chinese 
service companies’ whilst 19% responded to the contrary. 
69% of participants agreed that ‘Total E&P demonstrates a preference towards French 
service companies’ whilst 31% responded to the contrary. 
34.9% of participants agreed that ‘Tullow Oil demonstrates a preference towards British 
service companies’ whilst 65.1% responded to the contrary. 
 
The following data (Figure 16) from the OAG Report allows us to triangulate these find-
ings, although it fails to show the considerable disparity noted in Figure 15. It is worth not-
ing that Figure 15 asks respondents to comment on service companies whilst Figure 16 
shows overall procurement. A further challenge when comparing procurement data is that 
if overall procurement by company is at vastly different levels, it is difficult to accurately 
compare commitments. In the years following 2013, Tullow’s overall procurement drops 
hugely following the non-approval of its field development plans. When taking into account 
the overall procurement in Figure 16, it appears that there is no outright ‘best performer’. 
Despite CNOOC’s local procurement as a percent of total procurement being greater than 
Tullow and Total, it is, in part, attributed to fronting (discussed later in the thesis).  
 











However, it is important to recognise that a true comparison would require data which is 
not available as specific inputs are required at different stages of the project lifecycle and 
as is inferred by the above data, operators are not necessarily undertaking the same activ-
ities at the same time. For example, whilst indigenous construction capacity may exist in 
Uganda, operators have tended to require foreign contractors to undertake seismic sur-
veys; the above data does not provide us with such a breakdown. An item of contention 
throughout the interview process was that Total and CNOOC were rejecting local suppli-
ers used by Tullow, Hardman and Heritage in favour of foreign companies, despite these 
suppliers supposedly having the requisite expertise, this cannot be identified in Figure 16.  
 
More recent data does reflect the notion that Tullow is more likely to procure from local 
suppliers, particularly in the absence of considerable activity in the industry. As we can 
Figure 16. Operator Spending on Local Goods and Services between 2010 – 2013 










see from Figure 17, when Tullow’s overall procurement was reduced to less that USD 3 
million a year, at a maintenance level, the proportion of contracts awarded to local compa-
nies rose greatly. Logic suggests less costly inputs may be less technically advanced and 
more readily available in a nascent oil and gas industry. Data provided by the PAU for 
2018 shows that when overall procurement (all three operators) was down to USD 
14,364,196, only 33% of contracts were awarded to Ugandan suppliers, Tullow spent USD 
1,600,000, a slight fall from 2017 when 96% of contract value was awarded to local com-
panies, suggesting that Total and CNOOC have not been able to localise procurement re-
lated to the maintenance of their in-country operations. 
 
 
The notion that Tullow procures more from local business is not contradicted by the data, 
however ample data is not available for a clear comparison. In comparing Tullow’s pro-
curement data in Uganda with other operations, it is possible to note that data from 
Uganda is fairly consistent with other operations in Ghana and Kenya. In 2018, in Ghana, 
Tullow spent USD 251,300,000 with local suppliers, representing 29% of the total spend, 
whilst in Kenya, in 2018, where total procurement was USD 100,000,000, 37% of Tullow’s 
overall supplier spend was with Kenyan businesses (shown in Figure 18). The lack of data 
from fellow operators in other countries renders it hard to compare whether Tullow’s local 
procurement commitment is market leading globally. Analysis from Ackah and Mohammed 
(2018) appears to show that Tullow’s proportional spend was higher than operating part-
ner Eni in Ghana in 2016, although only a graph is provided without figure specific data. In 
putting these figures into context, an interesting reference point is noted by Olsen (2013), 
who commented that the highest industry-wide, operational, local procurement achieved is 
Figure 17. Procurement Data for 2017, Petroleum Authority Uganda, National Con-









74% in Norway in 1994, although it would be unrealistic to assume this can be achieved in 





It was also proposed that CNOOC’s procurement data may be distorted, suggesting that 
fronting may be the explanation as to why there is a CNOOC disparity between damning 
interview and questionnaire data and the local procurement data from Figure 16. Fronting, 
the process of establishing Ugandan companies in order to conceal the origins of goods or 
services produced by a foreign supplier, is a familiar practice in many underdeveloped or 
nascent hydrocarbon nations; literature notes its existence in Ghana (Ablo, 2015) and Ni-
geria (Nwapi, 2015b). A former operator employee and senior industry figure made the fol-
lowing comments to support this notion, 
 
“Like I say on the background, the Chinese have got now all these other smaller Chinese 
companies registering in Uganda, I can't vouch for them saying those are typically Ugan-
dan businesses because I know for a fact that money is not going to stay here”. (17 June 
2019) 
 
Although some reports do indicate that fronting is taking place in Uganda, evidence is un-
surprisingly limited; one reports notes, “a source within the Ministry of Energy indicates 
that some international actors, aware of the inefficiencies of local firms, are registering 










their own companies locally, fronting Ugandans as ‘conduits’” (Oil in Uganda, Dec, 2013).  
Questionnaire data supports this notion, 48.9% of respondents believed that fronting is be-
ing practised in Uganda (33.3% disagreed), whilst several interview respondents sug-
gested that Chinese service companies and contractors were responsible for the fronting 
process. This is turn accounts for some of the scepticism as to the procurement processes 
of CNOOC in Uganda, with many respondents contending that the published figures may 
misrepresent the truth.  
5.2.3 Operator Led Staff Development and Job Role Localisation 
In following on from the previous sections, Tullow’s success in localising managerial posi-
tions can largely be attributed to a commitment to training, onboarding and accelerated 
programme which allowed employees to advance towards managerial positions. It was 
proposed to interview participants that Tullow began operating in Uganda prior to the other 
operating partners, allowing more time for job role localisation. However, respondents 
contended that CNOOC and Total have now been in the Ugandan oil for almost a decade 
and are still yet to achieve the same degree of job role localisation (local employment ac-
count for only 77% of the operator workforce in 2018, substantially below 94% of Tullow in 
2014). 
 
A considerable proportion of Tullow’s Ugandan staff who took part in this research had 
worked in Tullow’s head office in London (and continue to be posted to London in 2020) 
as well as other, more advanced operational sites. In line with Tullow’s global capacity-
building policy, Ugandan employees were seconded to countries at more advanced 
stages of production to enable their staff to gain the critical experience required to execute 
tasks at higher levels of management (OAG Report, 2015, p. 26). As a whole, the com-
pany boasted 55% African employees across the whole business in 2019, growing annu-
ally from 49% in 2015, ensuring accurate representation from its countries of operation 
(Tullow Oil Annual Report, 2019). This notion that Tullow’s contribution to personal devel-
opment was far greater than that of their operating partners was frequently proffered 
throughout the interview process and was attributed to the development of a more local-










"CNOOC took some people (to China) but not to work there, just two weeks training, three 
weeks training, Total had graduate trainees took them to France for training, one year and 
they came back. Now the difference between the Total, CNOOC and Tullow is that Tullow 
took some guys as graduates, trained them and also paid them and they were staying in 
London office, so doing the work that was the difference. These ones take them training 















Figure 19 supports the above quote, Tullow invested more into staff training and commit-
ment to longer training programmes, although it is worth noting that Total’s spend in-
creased and surpassed Tullow in 2014 as Tullow’s business commitments in Uganda de-
creased. Even in the absence of Tullow’s 2014 data, the operator delivered substantially 
more training which lasted for more than six months. An OAG report noted that CNOOC 
claimed unforeseen circumstances for the under-utilisation of funds. Alarmingly the report 
also found that the PEPD (Petroleum Exploration and Production Department8) had also 
not followed up with the oil companies to ascertain the reasons for not utilising their train-
ing budgets as planned. The short-term nature of these trainings was considered a con-
cern, only 1% of Total’s trainings lasted over six months, 5% of CNOOC’s and 20% of 
Tullow’s.  
 
The above data are corroborated by questionnaire data from this research and were 
strongly reinforced during the interview process. Respondents largely refuted the notion 
that ‘All operators are equally committed to local content development’, with 46.6% either 
disagreeing or strongly disagreeing, and 32% agreeing or strongly agreeing. Interview 
data was substantially less divided with the vast majority of respondents praising Tullow’s 
commitment to developing its employees; this may, however, be as a result of the positive 
wording used in the survey question. Most interview respondents, including CNOOC staff, 
were very critical of CNOOC’s commitment to its own employees’ development. A telling 
quote was delivered by a senior government employee concerning CNOOC’s commitment 
to training, 
 
“In Uganda here, you have to squeeze them to put money on the table. (In reference to 















Whilst the size of the investment in training and upskilling is one factor, interview respond-
ents reinforced the value of accredited training and HSE certification in empowering Ugan-
dans employees to further their careers. A former operator employee (non-Tullow) noted 
the role certification within the training process, a factor which permitted the Ugandans to 
take up integral positions at Tullow. Seemingly, these opportunities have been less forth-
coming at Total and CNOOC, 
 
“But if I can put this to you, how come same positions that are being contested, how come 
Tullow had these local people in the same positions? Why? Tullow had a company the 
British Lloyds, to offer them training, certification, they were taking their staff for these cer-
tifications” (20 June 2019) 
 
A similar narrative can be observed from scholarship data (OAG Report, 2015): between 
2012-2014, Tullow sponsored 51 students for Master’s Degrees in the UK; Total spon-
sored nine for Master’s Degrees and gave them pre-employment contracts, whilst 
CNOOC sponsored 70 TVET students in Uganda, three students for Masters, and two at 
undergraduate level. It is worth noting that the TVET graduates themselves would be un-
likely to take on roles within an operator without an academic degree to accompany it, as 
such it could be assumed that CNOOC’s 70 TVET scholarships were never meant to sup-
port the education of future CNOOC employees. Between 2012-2014, Tullow also commit-
ted more funds to the training of government staff than the other operators, although 
Tullow’s trend is downwards and Total’s upwards. It was noted by the OAG report that: 
 
“TUOP (Tullow Oil) also cited scaled down activities in 2014 as a reason for reduced ex-
penditure on training of government personnel. This is in contradiction to TEP whose ac-
tivities had also been scaled down, but still committed more funds to training government 
employees. No explanation was given for the reduced budget and expenditure by CNOOC 
for training of government personnel in 2014, yet their activities had increased” (OAG, 










The extensive OAG data from 2012-2014 support the perception that Tullow was more 
committed to developing local content, notably before the delay and oil price crash as will 
be discussed further in Chapter 6. Respondents believed that the oil price crash and de-
layed development project had a profound impact on operators’ willingness to invest local 
content development as the operators see their planning horizon, the ability of an organi-
sation to plan into the future, greatly reduced. This notion is reinforced when we compare 
the investment in local content development and compare them with PAU provided data 
from 2018. The PAU data noted that the all operators collectively spent USD 439,962 on 
‘Local Content Development’ as a whole in 2018, a huge reduction from 2012-2014. How-
ever, as will be discussed in Chapter 6, the falling spend does not necessitate a reduction 
in effectiveness.  
5.2.4 Operator Intervention in Ugandan Education and Training 
An unfortunate reality of Uganda’s education system, and that of many nascent hydrocar-
bon economies, and even some more developed oil producers (Fakeeh, 2009), is that oil 
and gas courses, both university and vocational, are poorly aligned to industry require-
ment. Survey and interview responses suggest that operators have been involved in the 
development of indigenous oil and gas / TVET courses. However, respondents shared 
varying perspectives on whether operator involvement has been adequate, given it is the 
industry that defines its own capability requirements. According to the survey data, only 
17.1% of respondents strongly disagreed or disagreed that ‘Operators have played a lead-
ing role in developing local competences (human and supplier)’, whilst 55.3% strongly 
agreed or agreed. A more focused question, which by its nature excludes internal training, 
returned further evidence to suggest that operators have played a leading role in indige-
nous education development. 46.7% of respondents strongly agreed or agreed that ‘Oper-
ators have pooled resources (in clusters) to train / up-skill nationals and raise local capac-
ity for education and training’, whilst only 24% disagreed.  
 
Interview data was more mixed. A number of respondents were dismissive of the operator 
involvement in broad-based local content development and specifically curricula develop-









Uganda’s many academic and vocational institutions. However, many interview partici-
pants contended that operators, originally Tullow and more recently Total and by exten-
sion CNOOC too, have gone beyond the traditional remit of oil and gas companies in or-
der to direct and address the development of requisite skills. It was frequently noted that 
Tullow attempted to influence the direction of UPIK’s curriculum around the years of its in-
ception, although, it is widely reported that this guidance was not heeded, as a university 
lecturer commented, 
 
“So Tullow, he complained to UPIK and they should just train people in the skills of weld-
ing and so on and so forth. Not about oil and gas drilling operation. So that collision has 
arisen around skills also”. (19 June 2019) 
 
As will be discussed in Chapter 7, operator involvement in curriculum development and 
the capacity development of institutions has been severely hindered in recent years by the 
poorly functioning sector skills council. Respondents were keen to point out that the gov-
ernment and academic institutions have been very culpable for failures in education, with 
a number of experts highlighting that the delivery of reports such as the Industrial Baseline 
Survey (2013) and the Capacity Needs Analysis (2016) should have provided the required 
direction for Ugandan institutions. Applying an Austrian contribution to institutionalism, 
namely that people and organisations are not perfectly informed, the failure of the market 
for education to align itself with the industry can largely be attributed to the ignorance of 
the institutions and governance, rather than purely operator inactivity.  
 
Away from the formalised channels of engagement, there was a perception that operators 
did not seek to interact or engage with students at Ugandan institutions. An operator em-
ployee noted the interaction between operators and institutions; his comments mirror a 
considerable number of young professionals in Uganda, 
 
“Most of these operators will come interact with students because they are after some-
thing, maybe a licence or something. While I was at school, we had a lot of Total people 









was more coming for the presentation, let's say a particular subject and then just, you 
know, they will take you through the presentation on geophysics and take you through 
what happens at the sites but not in way to say that, you know, hey, this is a skill, you 
need this particular skill. But they didn't put it out there. Just share a few slides, maybe 
one or two days and that's it.” (23 June 2019) 
 
As a result of the lack of alignment between the industry and the tertiary education system 
in Uganda, a number of participants suggested that operators circumvented Ugandan in-
stitutions through the vehicle of international scholarships. Following the GoU attempts to 
push aspects of local content to CSR (which is non-recoverable, discussed later in the 
chapter) any investment in indigenous institutions and curricula development is unlikely to 
be tax recoverable against future earnings in the way that scholarship and other conven-
tional, largely internal, local content development is. This provides further incentives to by-
pass indigenous institutions in favour of established international universities in the UK, 
China, France and Australia. One Ugandan commented on their experience as a student 
in China, having been sponsored by CNOOC, 
 
“Training is based in China and when you go back to China to be training really a bit of 
language barrier and what I've seen all operators send that to employees for training in 
their respective countries. They can divert you. Maybe you go to this country. So for me, 
training’s the main factor, but wherever it has its disadvantage, it's limits people to learn 
more because maybe language barrier or environmental influence.” (23 June 2019) 
 
In building on these remarks, commentators including Andrews and Playfoot (2015) have 
highlighted the lost opportunity of taking promising students abroad to study, as funds 
could have also been channelled into local academic institutions and creating additional 
in-country value. As recognised in my personal work, working towards the creation of a 
centre of excellence in-country, delivers long term opportunities for education and training, 
in many cases at a fraction of the cost of cherrypicking students and diverting them to in-









ships for capacity development, between established international institutions and local in-
stitutions, and often requires significant support from external partners. In this study, as 
will be discussed further in this chapter (and Chapter 6 and 7), creating exceptional institu-
tions, be they vocational or academic, has been reliant on foreign intervention. A promi-
nent example of this being the Uganda Petroleum Institute, Kigumba which has benefited 
greatly from the support of donors via the Employment and Skills for Eastern Africa Pro-
gramme (E4D/SOGA - discussed further in section 7 of this chapter and Chapter 6 and 7). 
 
My work at Getenergy demonstrated that operators can play a more dynamic role in de-
veloping capacity in indigenous education and training. In Ghana, operators, including 
Tullow and Eni have supported programmes such as the Getenergy Field Ready project 
which addresses curriculum challenges and puts young professionals through an intensive 
employability programme whilst also upgrading an existing Ghanaian institution. One rea-
son as to why this specific project has not been implemented in Uganda is objections from 
Total, notably one expatriate manager who has since moved to another country of opera-
tion.  
5.2.5 Operator Involvement in Supplier Development 
As the oil industry defines its own standards, it might be expected that there is a degree of 
collaboration between operators and nascent suppliers. This study found that there are 
fewer initiatives to support the development of nascent suppliers than there are to support 
local skills development in Uganda, mirroring the dearth of literature on SME development 
for the oil and gas industry. An industry leader concurred, noting that there has been a 
dearth of initiatives to aid local companies from all sources, 
 
“Private companies, small companies are coming up. it has been up to them to find fi-
nance, it has been a challenge to some of them, yeah it has been themselves. There has 
not been so many initiatives coming in to develop these companies and some which are 









With the exceptions of the Stanbic Bank Business Incubator, a project run out of the CSR 
arm of one of Africa’s largest banks, and government investment in the Kabaale Industrial 
Park (financed by a loan from by UK Export Finance and yet to be completed), no signifi-
cant interventions were mentioned during the interview progress. Sen (2018) concurred, 
noting that there are limited capability development interventions and supplier credit-facili-
tation initiatives in place across the stakeholder community in Uganda. The operators’ lim-
ited role in this area is perhaps best reinforced by the Industrial Baseline Survey docu-
ment, which highlights three limited and fairly passive, actions to support local companies. 
In summary, these actions are, (1) greater communication between oil and gas companies 
and Ugandan industry, (2) creation of an Industry Enhancement Centre 9 and (3) support-
ing the Ugandan education system (Hamman, 2013, p. 22).  
Most respondents contended that operators had not sought to involve themselves greatly 
in local enterprise development, token examples include Tullow’s establishment of an en-
terprise development centre in Hoima, providing business development advisory services 
to local SMEs. There are also reports of channels for operators to advise and guide local 
enterprise, such as the establishment a local farmers’ development initiative through a lo-
cal NGO (Traidlinks). However, the OAG Report (2015) infers that there have been no 
measurable outcomes from this. Despite the meagre nature of contributions, interview par-
ticipants almost universally believed that operators should not be doing more. Instead, the 
burden of developing local SME capacity must lie with the companies themselves and the 
Ugandan government. A Ugandan operator employee made the following comments to 
this end,   
 
“It's the role of government to ensure that Ugandans are ready to tap the gains from oil 
and gas industry and the suppliers themselves. Because when you sit as the operator, the 















Whilst other initiatives might be going under the radar, it is very clear from the data ob-
tained that operators do not readily seek to involve themselves in the development of local 
enterprise. As will be discussed further in Chapter 7, it was noted that the GoU has also 
failed to deliver leadership in this area, a factor that has been exacerbated by the decision 
to delay the field development project, sending many local suppliers into liquidation. 
 
5.3 Explanations for Divergence in Operator Attitudes 
 
A number of explanations were proffered during the semi-structured interviews to explain 
these findings, namely why operators display varying attitudes and commitments to local 
content and its development in Uganda. In acknowledging the varying commitments of the 
operators to local content, respondents pointed to the provenance, history and factors re-
lating to structure and ownership of the companies. In turn, it was noted that these factors 
engender different corporate objectives, beyond purely making profit, different business 
models and varying relationships with local content. These include the desire to retain 
control in the hands of trusted non-indigenous managers, aversion to risk in the supply 
chain and in the recruitment process, as well as objectives divergent with local content 
such as the perennial goal that Chinese SEOs will deliver jobs for Chinese nationals. 
Some respondents also noted racist or xenophobic bias and how this affects the utilisation 
of Ugandan capabilities. Whilst Chapter 6 focuses more on the evolving external pres-
sures that I believe have largely arisen during and since the oil price crash, below we can 
observe largely internal pressures which have historically guided and continue to influence 
operator attitudes towards local content.  
5.3.1 Conflicting Objectives of Chinese NOCs 
According to Spornberger & Amineh (2016) and Ma (2007), the international expansion of 
Chinese NOCs, with its roots in the 1999 “Go Out” policy (Wu, 2018), is consistent with 
the requirement to continue to provide work for the millions of Chinese people in their em-
ployment. Ma highlighted that “with more than three million staff to employ, the NOCs 









provide the NOCs with not only new reserves, but also work opportunities for their employ-
ees, not to mention more contracts for the large Chinese petroleum services industry cov-
ering engineering, drilling, and other oilfield services as well as manufacturing” (Ma, 2007, 
p. 41). Many experts concur, Meidan (2016) summarises the role of the Chinese NOC as 
an instrument of governance, noting its role as a strategic asset in ensuring oil supply, tax-
able revenue and employment for its citizens.  
 
The findings of this research are consistent with the academic consensus that an objective 
of Chinese NOCs is to provide employment for Chinese people and as such, is therefore 
in conflict with interests of local content development in Uganda. Within this research, it 
was perceived that CNOOC possesses a negative orientation towards local content and 
respondents attributed this to two causal factors: the desire to maintain control over the 
operations and prejudice against Ugandans. It was believed that CNOOC possesses a de-
sire to ensure that Chinese employees remain in control of their Ugandan operations and 
their investments. This, coupled with a lack of belief in the capabilities of Ugandans and 
Ugandan business, was seen as main causes for the company’s lack of commitment to 
local content. In reaffirming this, respondents noted that CNOOC is devoid of Ugandan 
management staff, apart from one Ugandan manager whose responsibilities are report-
edly limited; data from 2014 shows no Ugandan senior managers, whilst there were five 
expatriates and that there were six Ugandans in middle management whilst there were 57 
expatriates. One operator employee made the following comments, reflecting the notion 
above, 
 
“For every head of department, there is one of them in charge of everything and it is one 
of them (Chinese), commercial, logistics, national content, control and supply, freight and 
forwarding, and materials, all those section managers are also Chinese. The directors and 
the head of department is also Chinese, the logistics supervisor is Chinese, if you are very 
lucky you will find a Ugandan as an officer, then a private driver for them. The top position 










The lack of commitment to localise management positions is seemingly reinforced by 
CNOOC’s involvement in local content development. As discussed in 2.3, whilst Tullow, 
and Total to a lesser extent, sponsored a good number of young Ugandans to undertake 
Master’s degrees between 2012-2014 (51 and nine respectively), CNOOC elected to 
sponsor 70 Ugandans to undertake TVET courses in Uganda. This data suggest that 
Tullow and Total intended that these highly educated Ugandans would have the capacity 
to transition into senior technical and management roles within the company. Meanwhile, 
CNOOC’s commitment to TVET education, albeit very important for broad-based capacity 
development for the wider industry in that the courses are accredited, suggests that the 
operator’s succession planning is less likely to involve Ugandan personnel.  
 
To some respondents, the use of expatriate labour in some particular managerial positions 
is indicative of a predisposition which excludes local content, especially when Uganda 
possesses managerial capabilities in these area in other industries, notably finance and 
logistics. A former CNOOC employee and current operator employee made the following 
comments, 
 
“We would have the Chinese head of finance department. Why? Because in Uganda we 
have banks, we are finance students who are working. We have human resource. We 
have personnel that are being managed but you find the head is being managed by a Chi-
nese, French, Chinese or French over even things which are totally local. So this one 
make me feel there is a strategy of maximising control". (18 June 2019) 
 
Explanations for this were broad, but largely centred on the notions that locals were not 
trusted by the Chinese NOC and as such, maintaining Chinese personnel in charge of op-
erations would ensure the venture’s success; a former operator employee concurred,  
 
“We go as the business, this is our money. We need to get it back. So, it has to go with 
our people. We give them jobs, we pay them high, then we bring them back. Because if it 











Equally, a number of respondents believed that CNOOC management displayed   
elements of negative prejudice towards Ugandans. Interview participants were keen to 
share their stories and opinions about Chinese CNOOC employees and their attitudes in 
Uganda. It was highlighted that there had been improper conduct towards Ugandans at 
both CNOOC and Total, however, only expatriates at Total were cautioned. Another oper-
ator employee highlighted a Chinese manager’s comments concerning a woman’s place 
in the oil and gas industry, the respondent noted, 
 
"He kind of said it in an arrogant way that woman can't be drillers, he is Chinese. When 
you come to Total, women are the drillers”. (23 June 2019) 
 
There was also clear narrative, in more informal parts of the interviews that Ugandans 
found some of their Chinese colleagues’ habits to be unusual. In turn, this may have led to 
respondents providing more emotive responses when discussing Chinese participation in 
Uganda. However, the frequency of these negative remarks raises questions about the 
potential for harmonious working relations, especially when taking into account the num-
ber of CNOOC employees and former employees who took part in this study. A number of 
respondents contended that negative employment experiences helped CNOOC take ad-
vantage of regulatory loopholes in order to maintain its expatriate staffing. One former em-
ployee highlighted the strategies used, noting that unhappy staff will leave the company 
which reinforces the need to maintain Chinese staff, 
 
“It's like it's a game. I think it's a game of money. So, what they do, Chinese, they employ 
you after five years of them ‘Ugandising’ the company. Instead of recruiting Ugandans to 
take over the position over expats, they drain the salary, they increase with $4 on your sal-
ary annually. So, you get bored. Then (name removed) walks out. So, when (name re-
moved) walks out, now we are going to recruit new people. So, these people need to be 
trained by our expatriates here. So, there is a game they play and it's totally different from 










This research is consistent with the aforementioned literature on Chinese SEOs (Ma, 
2007; Meidan, 2016) in that the data highlight that CNOOC has sought to protect manage-
rial and senior officer level roles in order to deliver employment opportunity to Chinese na-
tionals. One would suggest that the large body of roles occupied by Ugandans within 
CNOOC, frequently menial in nature and poorly paid, is unlikely to be attractive to Chinese 
nationals. As such, within the business model, there would exist an optimum level of 
Ugandan nationals and Chinese expatriates.  
 
Whilst respondents highlighted maintaining control and racial prejudice as the primary ex-
planations for the lack of opportunity afforded to Ugandans at CNOOC, it is seemingly true 
that many respondents did not consider that CNOOC is also tasked with delivering em-
ployment for Chinese citizens. Nevertheless, the data obtained in this research is con-
sistent with the established consensus that an objective of the international expansion of 
Chinese NOCs is to create further employment opportunities for Chinese nationals. The 
same can also be applied to procurement, as noted by Ma (2007), Chinese NOCs look to 
provide business and employment for NOC subsidiaries and other SOEs. This was cor-
roborated by my research with respondents suggesting that CNOOC has not sought to lo-
calise procurement.  
5.3.2 The Inflexibility of IOCs  
Authors including Andrews and Playfoot (2015), Kalyuzhnova (2008) and Luong (2010) 
have recognised that IOCs have not traditionally been aligned with local content objec-
tives, preferring to procure goods and services from established, international suppliers. 
This narrative is consistent with the data received in this study as respondents’ criticism of 
Total E&P corresponds largely to the traditional paradigm of international oil and gas oper-
ations. The data infer that Total E&P, as an established IOC, has entrenched ways of op-
erating, most notably in areas of the recruitment, onboarding and procurement. 
 
A recurring theme throughout the interviews was that the larger operators, Total and 









level, as is broadly supported by Wheeler et. al.’s (2002) appraisal of Shell’s local commit-
ment in Ogoniland. As such, smaller companies like Tullow and Hardman, (According to 
Annual Reports, in 2018 Tullow employed 990 staff, approximately 17 times less than 
CNOOC and 100 times less than Total) may find it easier to adjust procurement mecha-
nisms in order to satisfy demand for greater local content. Respondents noted that Total 
E&P had been unwavering and operated in Uganda as if it were a business unit of a 
global business rather than a localised operation. As listed in Figure 17, only 26% of To-
tal’s procurement in 2017 Uganda went to Ugandan companies, demonstrating little pro-
gress away from international and established suppliers and maintaining a similar level of 
local procurement to 2012. It was noted that Total, and to a lesser extent, CNOOC, have 
demonstrated a lack of confidence in local suppliers, even when they have been con-
tracted by the operators and exploration companies that preceded them. One former oper-
ator employee noted,  
 
“I was surprised that a company like Mineral Services Limited (MSL) are up in arms. Even 
now they (Total E&P) will give a contract to another company, because I'm told that, I 
need to get facts right here (…) I'm told that they're going to be kicked out because they 
do not prequalify, that's a huge investment. Remember? They invested a lot, but it's quite 
tricky to find that someone like them, who has been in the industry since the inception that 
was way back and started with Hardman, Heritage and Tullow”. (26 June 2019) 
 
In developing this point, a number of respondents strongly contended that the newer oper-
ators, Total E&P and CNOOC, had introduced new higher standards for their suppliers, a 
factor that made it more difficult for local suppliers to compete with their international 
counterparts. Respondents were keen to observe whether Total elected to choose an ap-
proved Ugandan producer of firetrucks or an established French company, noting this 
would be a further litmus test, as the Ugandan Civil Aviation Authority has approved and 
procured these locally produced firetrucks. However, since the interview phase of the re-
search, all calls for tenders have been postponed and as such there is no indication as to 









Respondents also highlighted Total’s approach to recruitment and onboarding, claiming 
that the operator did not seek to expedite the onboarding process to fast-track Ugandans 
into the company, seemingly a more challenging prospect in a major corporation (Belzil & 
Bognanno, 2004). One former operator employee noted, 
“The French and Total, as I said, they been in the business for long, so they have their 
own standards that they follow. So actually, that one was giving the government a hard 
time, because they would tell them this is what we want, this is how we do things. Even if 
they have a person on a training, it would take according to their system that they are fol-
lowing, you either enter as a graduate trainee and then you go through the graduate pro-
gram and you are not earning lot of money”. (24 June 2019) 
  
This inflexibility was also perceived by a number of respondents who highlighted the com-
pany’s unwillingness to react sympathetically to recent strikes in Kampala. The strike con-
cerned issues of pay, benefits, training, leadership, communication and career develop-
ment. Interview participants claimed that Total refused to increase wages. This was rein-
forced by the media outlet, New Vision. The publication also quotes that “employees also 
demanded for a signed declaration stating the deadline by which all national staff should 
know their training and career development path.  (…) But to date there has been no sal-
ary enhancement and no communication on training and career development, according 
to statement circulated by the employees” (Odyek, New Vision, 2017, Uganda).  
 
As with CNOOC, respondents were universally critical that more concessions had not 
been made in favour of local employees and businesses. The frustration was very evident 
throughout the interview process, and despite Total’s recent role in the E4D/SOGA pro-
ject, participants also delivered a number of sweeping remarks regarding the ‘French ap-
proach’ to business, being an approach that seemingly cared little for local people. How-
ever, greater analysis shows that rather than a national characteristic, Total’s slow adop-
tion of Ugandan content is a reflection on the business’s size and established operating 
procedures.  









Explanations provided for Tullow’s primacy in areas of local content were often quite sim-
plistic in nature. A great number of respondents contended that it was no surprise that a 
British company was most forthcoming, referencing that British and American firms, were 
more forward-thinking and demonstrated greater understanding of the business environ-
ment. More critically aware responses noted factors such as Tullow’s size, being consider-
ably smaller and potentially more responsive to change than the other two operating part-
ners as well as its orientation towards nascent resource nations on the African continent, 
which, in turn, has defined its commitment to local content. It is generally accepted that 
smaller businesses can be more adaptive when required (Kuratko et. al., 2001), however, 
as some respondents suggest, Tullow’s commitment to local content is linked to the appli-
cation of a business model which is pre-emptive of stakeholder pressures.  
 
I contend that Tullow is more aware of the expectations of local people and governments 
in frontier hydrocarbon nations primarily because Tullow’s portfolio is itself defined by its 
focus on frontier nations, such as Uganda, Ghana, Kenya, Namibia and Guyana. As Tordo 
et. al. (2013) noted, many public officials in nations with recently discovered hydrocarbon 
resources were (and are) anxious to obtain the greatest benefits for their economies; the 
authors’ work being particularly relevant to a discussion about Tullow, considering the op-
erator’s growing portfolio and development projects in frontier nations around 2013. Corre-
spondingly, it appears that Tullow’s business model takes into account the apprehensions 
of indigenous stakeholders in nascent oil economies in which Tullow operates; apprehen-
sions that are rightly heightened by the numerous nations that succumbed to the resource 
curse the 20th century. Despite not being a paradigm of a localised operator, as proven by 
a number of media publications (including in Uganda as noted in Chapter 4), a Tullow an-
nual report highlights this awareness of indigenous expectations, it was noted that “insuffi-
cient Local Content expenditure and focus may jeopardize our license to operate” (Tullow, 
Annual Report, 2013, p. 45).  
 
It is also clear from Tullow’s annual reports that the company is keen to progress and pro-
mote its proportion of ‘African’ staff reflecting Tullow’s countries of operation and as is 









stakeholders’; it is worth noting that ‘stakeholder engagement’ forms a major part of the 
company’s online presence. Correspondingly, Tullow’s attitude towards local content is 
more consistent with a localised business model and actualising benefits, including better 
community relations, lower salary costs, shorter supply chain, reduced inventory costs and 
lower logistics costs etc (Andrews & Playfoot, 2015; Steckel et. Al., 2004). 
 
5.4 Contributions to Local Content Development Through Corporate Social Respon-
sibility Projects 
 
A telling factor in understanding operator commitment to local content development is the 
willingness to engage in activities beyond recoverable spending. Whilst some aspects of 
CSR in Uganda are unlikely to influence local content and its development, such as 
Tullow’s funding of the new health facility in Buliisa, other non-tax-recoverable aspects of 
CSR such as funding for a wide range of academic establishments can be beneficial for 
localisation objectives. Whilst there is not a huge amount of published information on 
these CSR projects which aided local capacity development, respondents spoke exten-
sively on the topic, noting Tullow’s readiness to undertake CSR projects and the other op-
erators’ unwillingness.  
  
Academic literature on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in oil and gas can reflect a 
broad range of social and economic interventions. CSR can be proactive in that a firm 
may seek to achieve a range of business objectives through CSR activities; CSR activities 
are often attributed to improving a firm’s reputation, fostering customer trust and contrib-
uting to development of the firm’s important intangible resources (Branco & Rodrigues, 
2006; Orlitzky et al. 2003) and resultantly are seen as a vehicle to advance a company’s 
own objectives. Equally, CSR can be reactive, responding to pressures from political and 
societal groups. Taking the Weberian construct of embeddedness (1922) at its most 
broad, CSR provides operators the opportunity to become more embedded in Uganda’s 
society through engaging in the alleviation of challenges in the wider community. Away 









content development often overlap in Uganda according to this study’s respondents. One 
respondent noted, 
 
“In some cases, they overlap, of course, there are some time it is clear cut CSR, maybe 
construction of health, cars and stuff. That’s CSR, really not skilling. Right. But if you're 
training technicians but in that area around the region, is that CSR or is that national con-
tent”. (20 June 2019) 
 
As in the preceding sections, respondents were eager to criticise CNOOC’s involvement in 
Uganda's oil industry, in this case noting an unwillingness to engage in CSR activities, in-
cluding those that may and may not benefit local content development. This is in line with 
existing research, Wu (2019) highlights that Chinese oil companies are reactive in that 
their CSR commitments are satisfied more frequently when indigenous groups are cohe-
sive and unified and the presence of a regulatory framework which is upholding on inclu-
sive policies regarding civil society, competitiveness and decentralisation. Meanwhile, re-
spondents believed that Tullow Oil was unquestionably the most committed to its social 
responsibilities. One local consultant and former senior operator employee noted the fol-
lowing, 
 
“Initially, Tullow actually did more CSR than national content before all these legislations 
come to play and still then did a lot of CSR too. “It’s the good thing to do, let's do these 
things” (…) you know, CNOOC tried to get away with a little bit of school repairs” (26 June 
2019) 
 
The respondent claims that following the Industrial Baseline Survey (2014), the oil compa-
nies moved towards implementing strategies that might help actualise the objectives out-
lined in the report. Concurrently, the regulator tried to push some activities to CSR rather 
than local content which was not recoverable against future earnings. This meant that by 
2014, CSR was consuming a substantial proportion of Tullow’s expenditure which in turn 










The logic for assessing commitment to CSR in Uganda is that, in some cases, broad 
based initiatives to increase local capacity (including those mentioned in 2.4 and 2.5), 
have fallen outside of recoverable operator costs. Tullow’s award-winning CSR project 
(East African CSR Awards 2010) in Kaiso-Tonya was recognised in part for its commit-
ment to the 'supply of schooling and school construction material and capacity building of 
education stakeholders’. The notion presented by many of the respondents was that 
Tullow’s contribution to localisation extends beyond mandated requirements and tax-re-
coverable spending, meanwhile, CNOOC and Total E&P’s inactivity in this area is seem-
ingly indicative of the companies’ operating models. A lack of published data does suggest 
that Tullow’s non-recoverable CSR / capacity development activities were slightly over-
stated in the interview data received, however it is clear from the overriding narrative in 
this research that Tullow’s involvement in this area was substantially greater than fellow 
operators.  
    
5.5 The ‘African’ Operator  
 
The study also looked to address the role and attitudes of the new companies entering the 
market (Oranto Petroleum and Armour Energy), as well as the original operators who pre-
ceded and were acquired, or whose stake was acquired by Tullow Oil (Heritage Oil and 
Hardman Resources). Given the time elapsed, respondents found it difficult to speak with 
confidence about the latter two companies. Hard data are also difficult to find from the ear-
lier exploration years when Heritage and Hardman were the only E&P / operators, Kjær 
(2013) and Hansen et al. (2014) using estimates from the Ministry of Energy and Mineral 
Development’s 2011 report, noted that the share of national content during the phase of 
exploration is presumably low, probably around 15% (MEMD Report, 2011, p. 6).  
 
Many respondents were keen to discuss Oranto Petroleum’s position in Uganda’s oil and 
gas industry, as a company with ‘African’ origins (Nigerian based), comparisons were 
made with the ‘western’ or ‘white’ and / or Chinese companies operating in Uganda. It was 
widely remarked by participants that Oranto has adopted a localised business model 









capable of supporting an almost fully localised operator. An operator employee com-
mented on the attitude of an African company operating in Uganda, 
 
“If they are local African companies, I see them being more interesting because for them 
they know Ugandan company can do work. So, they will give it. They know Ugandan per-
sonnel can do this work. So, they give him a job”. (26 June 2019) 
 
The narrative that African companies would be more inclusive and employ a business 
model that is more conducive to local participation was frequently proffered throughout the 
semi-structured interviews and is reflected by the questionnaire data. Responses were fo-
cused around positive attitudes towards the ability of local people to carry out the work fre-
quently contracted to foreign individuals and companies. In observing a manifestation of 
this, one respondent reported that all but one of Oranto Petroleum’s employees in 
Uganda, are Ugandan nationals, whilst one senior manager is Nigerian. Although Oranto 
Petroleum in Uganda is currently a company of less than 20 permanent employees, the 
company has demonstrated that it is confident in the ability of Ugandans to undertake the 
running of the business. A representative of Oranto Petroleum made the following com-
ment to this end,  
 
“For example, in Oranto, the human resource, we are a hundred percent nationals. Only 
one guy who is on top and he's the general manager for external investments from Nige-
ria" 
(…) 
“Oil companies would appreciate it if you Ugandan companies are prepared (…) Most 
contracts are 100% Ugandans. In fact, I was writing my annual report the last year, I give 
out 99% contracts of contracts to Ugandans (…) When we want some services, for exam-
ple, that data interpretation and systemic data capture, seismic survey we had to go out. 
We look for all companies, for companies which can do the service are not here, so we 
have to skip to London for the data interpretation. Then we went to Oman to get AMC to 










In developing this notion that an operator with African origins adopts local content more 
readily than a Western or Chinese firm, the respondent continues to make comparisons 
between employment experiences at CNOOC and Oranto Petroleum, 
 
“I don't know why they (CNOOC) thought I can't do anything. So then when I crossed to 
(moved to) Oranto, I sit with them on the same page. I plan for Oranto as they're planning 
for CNOOC. I have executed the impact assessment. I have executed systemic offshore 
survey, which is even more sensitive than what they have done. And but still they tend to 
create that Ugandans not able” (21 June 2019) 
 
The respondent contended not only that Ugandans had the required capabilities, but also 
that Oranto Petroleum was benefiting from lower “risk allowances and house allowances”. 
Oranto Petroleum, albeit small in comparison to the other operators, employs a greater 
proportion of nationals in its own workforce and contracts a greater proportion of work to 
local service providers than any other operator in Uganda (approximately 99% of contract 
numbers awarded to Ugandan companies). A number of Ugandan respondents contend 
that a telling factor in the capability of Ugandans is that Oranto functions in the absence of 
foreign experts and experienced Western or Chinese managers, instead the company re-
lies on local capabilities.  
 
Questionnaire data did not concur entirely with the sentiments expressed throughout the 
interviews, however, this may be as a result of a smaller number of informed respondents 
concerning Oranto Petroleum and Armour Energy10. The questionnaire data highlight that 
Oranto and Armour Energy have been less impactful with regards to local content devel-
opment, reflecting the size of the firm but also the finance available for developing local 
capacity. Whilst respondents within Oranto Petroleum were content to talk about the com-
pany, the same cannot be said for Armour Energy. The company’s representatives in 




10 Questionnaire response for Oranto Petroleum and Armour Energy were substantially less than others, largely as a result of these companies being smaller and newer to the 
market. There was a greater variety of response, with number of respondents selected ‘1’ not committed at all when responding to questions regarding Oranto, these responses 









noted that Armour Energy has been difficult to work with, not only on local content mat-
ters, a factor that surely would influence respondents’ ability to accurately comment on 
their commitment to local content.  
 
5.6 Intermittent Involvement of International Oilfield Service Providers and Engi-
neering, Procurement, Construction Contractors 
 
The protracted nature of Uganda’s progression towards first oil has meant that the estab-
lished oilfield service companies, normally a major employer in international oil and gas, 
have only been involved intermittently and have, to date, only been awarded short term 
contracts. Oilfield service companies may seek to involve themselves throughout the pro-
ject lifecycle as many of the world’s largest service companies have turnkey solutions and 
commercial offerings from the exploration phase through to decommissioning. However, 
the inactivity in Uganda’s industry has made it difficult for existing oilfield service providers 
from the exploration phase to remain in the country and for other companies, new to 
Uganda, to establish themselves in search of lucrative contracts during the development 
phase. Anecdotally, on starting this research, the Chairman and CEO of a major oilfield 
service company personally connected me to his staff in Uganda to take part in my study, 
however upon the commencement on my fieldwork, he informed me that the company had 
re-evaluated business objectives and could no longer participate in the research. As such, 
oilfield service companies have not been a permanent employer of technical staff, nor 
been able to permanently involve themselves in local content development. Likewise, the 
ongoing stalemate of the development project has created an uncertain business environ-
ment for EPC contractors who would be a major employer leading up to full operational 
capacity, across upstream and midstream. A senior government employee commented on 
the nature of effect of short-term contracts on local content development,  
 
“Contractors, they bring onboard and interface a lot with the local workers and when they 
come here but they're always on timelines. So, if you don't compel them, they won’t have 









they can cope and then afterwards they go. We had some example here, there was a drill-
ing companies from Poland, PGNiG. They used to come here but they would not train, we 
tried to push them but of course they come here, the assignment is drilling a well for 
maybe maximum two months, if there is another well, you move to move to another well 
like that and once there's no work, most of them will go. Their workers will come on the ro-
tation” 
 
Given the fleeting nature of these assignments and uncertainty on whether there will be 
future contracts, these companies have largely been unable to commit to the further de-
velopment of their local employees, with the exception of the fortunate few who have been 
taken abroad to operational projects. As was noted by a number of respondents, the point 
at which the assignment ends is often the point at which additional training should start, 
however, this has not commonly occurred. The ongoing wait for the development project 
to restart has further reduced the influence of the oilfield service companies, with respond-
ents even noticing physical manifestations of their reduced presence. A respondent noted 
how the uncertain business environment has influenced their in-country presence and up-
take of commercial real estate, 
 
“Given that they have like no contracts right now, even like their main offices shifted from 
where they used to be, from the big bases, like for Schlumberger, if you went to their pre-
vious offices, you find like that the place has been turned in like some agricultural office 
(the office has now been rented to another organisation, focusing on agriculture)” (26 
June 2019) 
 
This very same business uncertainty has meant that the EPC contractors, a major em-
ployer during the development stage, have not established themselves in Uganda. One 
operator respondent commented, 
 
“The EPC contractors have never been on the ground and that’s one of the issues that 









the largest employer so one of the challenges for capacity building was them not being in 
place.” (19 June 2019) 
 
Throughout the interview process, a number of respondents did note a few positive excep-
tions to the above trends. It was highlighted that a contractor acted diligently with regards 
to employing local content on their return to Uganda, seeking out locals whom they 
worked with in the mid-2000s and rehiring them. It was also remarked that a number of 
Ugandans had been taken overseas, particularly to the Middle East, where they have 
been able to continue their work and development. Whether these workers will one day 
return to work in Ugandan oil and gas is debatable, however, to many respondents, the 
continued employment and development of their countrymen was seen as a positive out-
come.  
 
On the whole, the lack of oilfield service companies and EPC contractors present in 
Uganda has reduced the influence these organisations can have on local content develop-
ment in line with the contractors’ own future requirements. However, a representative from 
a development agency leading public sector capacity initiatives in Uganda noted that the 
potential EPC contractors, notably CB&I, had been willing to engage and advise on the 
development of local competencies, 
 
“They were extremely helpful in both, giving us so much information about what types of 
job roles were required and, what types of qualifications and training would be appropriate 
for those people because they have experience all the way around Africa. And in many 
other parts of the world, they done it all before.” (11 August 2019) 
 
Despite a number of positive comments shared by a number of respondents, it is clear 
that the uncertainty around the progress of the development project has prevented both 
international oilfield service companies and EPC contractors from establishing a perma-
nent commitment to business in Uganda. By extension, their role in employing, educating 









gests very little fault can be attributed these companies, as the slow progression of the in-
dustry, the uncertainty of the business climate and the reduced planning horizon cannot 
be considered a productive environment for these firms to engage in. Factors relating to 
the impact of the delayed development project and the political economy will be discussed 
further in Chapter 7. 
 
5.7 Multilateral Organisations, Donor and Development Agencies - Motives, Objec-
tives and Alignment within Institutionalist Theory 
 
Whilst some people may be suspicious of the role of foreign actors in resource rich na-
tions, as discussed throughout this thesis, institutionalist political economic theory sug-
gests that actors are not always motivated by self-interest (Hodgson & Jiang, 2007). This 
research has found no evidence that donor and development agencies are pursuing ob-
jectives that are not aligned with the Ugandan government, instead, these organisations 
are filling a void in funding and expertise and have been a positive influence on the devel-
opment of Ugandan capacity. This is in stark contrast to the theories present in classical 
liberalism which would assume that donor and development agencies are involving them-
selves in foreign economies in order to pursue their own nation’s objectives, which may be 
in conflict with the priorities of the recipient nation itself.  
 
In existing literature, the notion that donor and development aid is used as a vehicle to 
generate business opportunities for foreign contractors is most frequently levelled at the 
Chinese state. China, like Brazil, India, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, has now spent billions in 
underdeveloped nations, financing the building of roads, dams, bridges, railways, airports, 
seaports, and electricity grids (Dreher et. al., 2017). Like elsewhere in the world, in 
Uganda we can observe Chinese aid funding Chinese contractors to build Ugandan roads 
and other hardware. There is also a common narrative that Chinese aid provides China 
with “preferential access to a block of natural resources” (Brautigam et. al, 2010, p. 21) 









Brautigam highlights that aid has allowed Chinese “contractors to sign construction con-
tracts in Africa worth $40 billion in 2008” (Ministry of Commerce, 2009) (Brautigam et. al, 
2010, p. 21).  
 
Conversely, there is very little literature suggesting the same motives among the ‘tradi-
tional’, DAC (Development Assistance Committee - OECD) donor community, although 
there are a number of academics who recognise the role of networks, and by extension 
donor networks, in creating market-entry opportunities in overseas countries (Holmlund & 
Kock, 1998; Lin & Zhang, 2005). In the context of local content development in Uganda’s 
oil and gas, this study found no evidence that western donor organisations had subver-
sively opened or softened the market for non-indigenous firms.   
 
Multilateral organisations, non-governmental organisations, development and donor agen-
cies such as The World Bank, GIZ and DFID have become increasingly engaged in the 
process of developing indigenous capacity in the 21st century and Uganda has been no 
exception to this trend. This movement reflects an acceptance that greater international 
interventionism was required to correct market failures, acknowledging that prescriptions 
of laissez-faire economics in developing countries were not always appropriate. Feeney 
(1998) notes that consideration for ‘local people’ became an increasingly important part of 
the development aid narrative following the end of the Cold War. It was seen as a vehicle 
to remedy past mistakes and increase the effectiveness of major aid financed develop-
ment projects; although it is more difficult to pinpoint the start of local content development 
as a development aid objective in oil and gas. More broadly, these organisations share the 
raison d’être of promoting development and have increasingly seen local content, across 
many industries, as a vehicle to achieve said objectives (Hansen et. al. 2016).  
 
Most respondents supported the notion that multilateral development agency involvement 
in Uganda had been in line with published objectives and agreed remits. A respondent 










“I think what the World Bank is trying to do is part of the World Bank mission which, as I 
understand it, is partly to encourage economic and social development in the developing 
world. So I think what World Bank is trying to do there is wholly consistent through helping 
to provide people with training and development opportunities, which in itself a good thing, 
but also is that local content instead available for the development of the oil and gas in-
dustry that will be will be to benefit of Uganda as a whole. And by the same token, I think 
the same thing applies to, for example, Enabel, DFID, and all of the other organisations 
from multilateral organisations from different countries who can also contribute to that pro-
cess”. (11 July 2019) 
 
The data suggest that while multilateral development agencies have positively influenced 
the development of local content in Uganda, the extent to which is still debated; the follow-
ing discussion and Chapter 6 will attempt to deliver greater micro-analysis. In contrast to 
the generally positive sentiment shared in the questionnaire results, there was a small 
body of respondents from the semi-structured interviews who questioned whether the mo-
tives of development or donor agencies in Uganda were purely altruistic. In its broadest 
sense, a senior representative from a donor organisation agreed with the notion that de-
velopment corporations are not truly altruistic in their entirety, noting that development cor-
porations start in the assumption that their investment is aligned with its own nation’s for-
eign objectives,  
 
“Development corporations start in that assumption. All the rest is not true. Of course, they 
say no, but it is in relative, this always, I mean if you see the French, Germans, the British, 
Americans everywhere, they look indeed at it as an investment in a country and there's 
nothing wrong with it. The development corporation is one of the tools of foreign affairs”. 
(19 June 2019) 
 
However, a small group of participants, all of whom were Ugandan, believed that multilat-
eral development agencies are much more closely aligned to subversive goals than stated 










“It's usually because you want to have your hand in the paper, because each of those or-
ganisations represents countries. So for example GIZ, you know, supporting the industry, 
it’s just a small window for German companies to participate. Same thing with UK or wher-
ever”. (25 June 2019) 
Other respondents were aware of the criticism of donor and development agencies but 
noted that there is a lack of evidence to support this notion at this stage of Uganda’s oil 
and gas story. One technical expert in government employment commented that he had 
not seen any evidence of this relationship, taking the Norwegian Agency for Development 
Cooperation’s (NORAD) involvement as an example. The notion that Norwegian firms 
may benefit from the prominent role of Norwegian development aid is considered within 
NORAD evaluation documents, highlighting the political risk of being seen to provide ad-
vice that could favour Norwegian firms, and that this could also damage the reputation of 
the companies themselves. Following an incident in Bolivia in 2006, it was noted that a 
‘firewall’ was made to separate development aid from Norwegian commercial interests 
(Evaluation of Norway’s Oil for Development Program, 2013). The respondent noted,  
“I really don't think because we don't have any Norwegian companies, none. Not even a 
service provider. So if that was there, maybe in the long term, but if to was you would see 
some Norwegian company, at least a service provider or companies pursuing licenses, 
cause all around the licenses we have had, we tried to like influence them but they haven't 
expressed interest”. (24 June 2019) 
 
In line with the above, the majority of interview participants were appreciative of the role of 
the development partners in Uganda and noted no evidence that these organisations had 
worked to open the market to foreign contractors and suppliers. As noted by a respondent 
from the international development community, it is not wrong to assume that Ugandan 
objectives for a successful, localised oil industry, acting as a vehicle for national develop-
ment, are aligned with objectives of donor foreign policy. However, more relevant ques-









5.7.1 Perceptions of Multilateral Organisation and Donor, Development Agencies as 
a Positive Contributor to Local Content Development in Uganda 
The Ugandan state’s reliance on foreign aid extends beyond local content development in 
oil and gas. Nalugo (2012) noted that 25% of Uganda’s total budget comes from foreign 
donors. As such, it should come as no great surprise that donors are an important player 
in Uganda’s national development, particularly through education and SME development.  
Respondents delivered an almost unanimous verdict in answering question 2.11 of the 
first questionnaire. 72.4% of respondents either ‘strongly agreed’ or ‘agreed’ with the 
statement “NGOs, Development Agencies and Multilateral Organisations (e.g. The World 
Bank, NORAD, GIZ, DFID) have played an integral role in the development of local con-
tent and capability”, whilst only 9.2% ‘strongly disagreed’ or ‘disagreed’. 
 
This notion that donor and development agencies have been integral players is largely 
supported by data from the interviews, the vast majority of whom believed that their role 
had been a positive one. A number of Ugandans noted the donor commitment to areas 
that are traditionally associated with economic participation (involving local people in the 
decision-making process and ownership of the industry) and not purely local content de-
velopment. One explanation for this, as will be discussed in Chapter 6, is that there has 
been greater donor involvement in local content development in recent years and seem-
ingly less ‘sensitisation’ and ‘empowerment’ initiatives as a decade ago. The first comment 
was made by a senior technical state employee,  
 









“Some of the activities actually in to like sensitising the masses in terms of their rights, in 
terms of what they should they expect, in terms of what they should demand for. And I 
think some, they also helped that demand for a share when to come to jobs, a demand for 
like a share in terms of how many locals are employed” (27 June 2019) 
 
A former operator employee concurs, noting how development aid can empower a com-
munity with skills, whilst oil companies will only invest in you if they see potential.  
 
“For them, they (The donor / development agencies) are basically more in the community, 
you know, empowerment. Those ones come and empower community. But for the oil 
companies themselves, they empower a person that they see with the potential they will 
have to invest in you so that they keep you around there” (22 June 2019) 
 
Within these comments, there is a clear impression that the involvement of multilateral or-
ganisations has been based on the premise of empowering Ugandans through local par-
ticipation. However, further examples from the interview data suggests that a number of 
Ugandans see local content development as an extension of past attempts to represent or 
‘empower’ the people. Recent examples of the projects being implemented, such as that 
by Enabel, GIZ and The World Bank focus on, what a number of respondents referred to 
as ’empowerment’, through skilling and SME development. One operator employee noted,  
 
“In the long run, they are empowering Ugandans to remain with their thing, to work with 
their oil. Cause when they train people in welding and fabrication piping and others it 
means, after five years, these trainees will have all the expertise to do what they're sup-
posed to do in the country. So the Norwegians will leave (appears to be broadly referenc-
ing western donors in general). So even if they are doing it, I think they're doing it to en-
sure Ugandans gain for oil and gas” (20 June 2019) 
 
Respondents were also keen to talk about the involvement of NORAD, although NORAD’s 









stitutional capacity (NORAD, Annual Report, 2018, 2019) and not direct involvement in lo-
cal content development. Participants highlighted the guidance and technical assistance 
of the Norwegian development agency in creating Uganda’s administrative framework and 
local content policy. It was more commonly accepted that the area of greatest contribution 
to local content development is around skilling workers to work across the oil and gas 
value chain, along with SME development. Prior to 2015, there were a considerable num-
ber of investments and initiatives aimed at skilling Ugandans across all industries, Figure 
21 highlights these investments. However, it was generally considered that more recent 
donor and development agency intervention has provided Ugandan institutions with 
greater technical guidance and physical tools to achieve the accreditation required by the 
oil industry. 
Figure 21. Role of Partners (2015) Source: The World Bank Project Appraisal 
Development partner Budget Nature & status of intervention 
Arab Bank for Economic De-
velopment in Africa (BADEA) 
US $5 Million Nakaseke Technical Institute  
African Development Bank US $10.4 Million Rehabilitation of Jinja Vocational Training Institute, 
Madera Technical Institute, Rukungiri Technical In-
stitute, Dokolo, Kabasanda. In-service training 
through its support to Jinja VTI  
Belgium (through BTC) EUR 8 Mil-
lion 
Abilonino & Mulago and new project in Albertine Re-
gion scheduled for FY 15/16 
European Union (EU)  Supports a large CSO support program, focusing on 
Skills Development 
ILO  Manages a project on child labour with clear links to 
Skilling Uganda  
Islamic Development Bank US $13.5 Million Uganda Technical College Elgon, Uganda Tech-
nical College Lira, and National Teachers College 
Unyama 










Figure 21. Role of Partners (2015) Source: The World Bank Project Appraisal 
Development partner Budget Nature & status of intervention 
Korean International Corpora-
tion Agency (KOICA) 
US $4 Million Construction and equipment of new Technical Insti-
tute at Nakawa-Ntinda  
Kuwait Fund US $12 Million Tororo, Kalongo, Kibatsi, and Ahmed Seguya Me-
morial Technical Institutes  
Netherlands (through ICCO & 
partners) 
 Support to skills training in agriculture & agribusi-
ness Northern Uganda (ongoing since May 2013 to 
October 2016) 
OPEC US $ 24 Million Construction of nine new Technical Institutes in the 
districts of Namutumba, Nakasongola, Yumbe, 
Hoima, Lwengo, Mukono, Amuria, Kamuli, and Pa-
der  
SAUDI Fund US $12 Million Construction of five new Technical Institutes in the 
districts of Adjumani, Bukedea, Kiboga, Lyantonde, 
and Kyenjojo 
South-Korean Government 
(implemented by African De-
velopment Bank) 
US $25 Million Kiryandongo, Iganga, Nyakatale, Mubende, and 
Arua Technical Institutes  
World Bank US $ 25 Million Support to three BTVET institutes under the Alber-
tine Region Sustainable Development Project  
World Bank US $ 12 Million Support a national Hotel and Tourism Training Insti-
tute (HTTI) at Jinja under the Competitiveness and 
Enterprise Development Project (CEDP) (P130471). 
World Bank US $1.5 Million US $1.5m grant from DFID aimed to support the 
Uganda Petroleum Institute Kigumba (UPIK) 
IFC (The International Fi-
nance Corporation) 
 Financed Africa Schools Uganda program that sup-
ports over 500 private schools, with heavy empha-
sis on secondary and vocational/tertiary institutions, 
to access advisory services for improving school op-










Whilst these investments and interventions have been numerous, the effectiveness of the 
donor interventions and investments have been criticised in the past. A leading figure in 
Uganda’s private education system provided further commentary, suggesting that these 
involvements have not always been well calculated,   
 
“I do not believe that all of the investments that they make abroad are necessarily well cal-
culated strategies to help those economies grow or overcome certain challenges”. (19 
June 2019) 
 
This criticism was also in evidence during an interview with a representative of a Chinese 
company in Uganda who was unimpressed by the broad array of Western aid and devel-
opment interventions. In reflecting China’s predominance in the provision of development 
hardware (Dreher et. al., 2017), the respondent noted the tangible results of Chinese state 
involvement in Uganda but criticised the effectiveness of western development aid and 
NGOs, broadly reflecting the Chinese reservations on traditional OECD DAC donors 
(Dreher et. al. 2019). 
 
“…they come with loads and loads of money, but you know, they live in luxury places, 
drive the most expensive car. They put little budget for the money and then when the go-
ing back to Europe they say we did this and this and this. It's like just so sad. Even like the 
religions, when you go to very poor, very poor place, you see the most like the greatest, 
the greatest building is the church”. (17 June 2019) 
 
A number of interview respondents concurred with the previous criticisms, suggesting that 
much of the earlier involvement of the donor and development agencies lacked a clear 
strategy. It was believed that the GIZ implemented Employment for Sustainable Develop-
ment in Africa (E4D/SOGA) programme has overcome previous challenges, delivering a 
new degree of relevancy, partially as a result of expanding the nexus of interaction be-










“The consultations were there but to be sincere, I don't think they have involved a lot of 
IOCs (in reference to previous interventions). The people that have been involved, GIZ, as 
I said in the curriculum, now when the GIZ brought in the programme, we had the chance 
to interact direct to IOCs and ask them exactly what they lack, local in both, suppliers and 
worker and this they were able to give the gaps they were finding in Uganda and where 
they were lacking and GIZ took that to provoke those to see where to invest more.” (11 
July 2019) 
 
In 2010 it was claimed that there was a lack of urgency and coordination in the collective 
donor approach on oil and gas governance issues in Uganda (Global Witness, 2010) 
which resulted in numerous projects overlapping. In 2012, donor interventions were further 
disrupted as most EU donors suspended aid to Uganda after allegations of embezzlement 
by the Prime Minister’s office (Van Alstine et. al. 2014). In this present study, the overall 
reflections on the involvement of development agencies are positive, which is supported 
by a broad base of factual reports and media publications on the progression of develop-
ment agencies in the latter part of the 2010s (Skilling Uganda, BTVET Strategy Plan, 
2012; British Council, 2019). The World Bank’s funding and guidance through the Ministry 
of Education and Sport and the Private Sector Foundation Uganda, among other vehicles, 
appears to have been instrumental in delivering the required directional change in voca-
tional education. Meanwhile, the focused nature of the GIZ programme and Enabel’s work 
is delivering tangible results in line with operator and the wider industry’s requirements. In 
the case of GIZ, the E4D/SOGA programme is unique in that it is supposedly delivering for 
the oil and gas industry at the direct result of a request of Total E&P and in consultation 
with the operators as well as through broader mediums such as the SafeWayRightWay 
coalition (a road safety initiative funded by Total, Tullow, GIZ and The World Bank). The 
E4D/SOGA project across East Africa is also partially funded by Tullow, further reinforcing 
the project’s connection to oil industry objectives. A representative from a development 
agency commented, 
 
“I think that program of GIZ, it will be much more direct. Cause they go to direct request 










Donor-operator coordination has been a considerable factor in the success of the 
E4D/SOGA project. The 2019 April quarterly report by the MEMD of GIZ’s Employment 
and Skills for Eastern Africa (E4D/SOGA) project provided some noteworthy results. The 
Skills and Capacity for Organizational Productivity and Employment has trained 1,245 
people in the Albertine region, with a further 191 students receiving international certifica-
tions, 200 students placed in industry placements and 415 students placed into decent 
jobs. Although progress was halted due to allegations of fraud in March 2019. Among 
other initiatives, the programme has also seen 50 welders trained to American Welders 
Society 2G and 4G levels as of April 2019, and a further 150 to be trained. A report of the 
E4D/SOGA project is included in Chapter 6. 
 
The role of the donor community became more relevant in recent years as interventions 
have increasingly aligned with operator and industry requirements. Meanwhile, the notion 
that these development agencies are subversively softening the market for non-indige-
nous companies, thus far, is unfounded despite a number of respondents contending that 
there are ulterior motives for their involvement. Instead, Ugandan powers, in their consid-
erably less than omniscient state, require development agencies to fill a void in expertise 





The myriad stakeholders participating in Uganda’s oil and gas industry and involving 
themselves in capacity development projects represents numerous opportunities to de-
velop local content in line with industry requirements and enhance its adoption. The pri-
mary finding of this chapter is that, despite the benefits associated with operating locally, 
operators do not approach local content with the same degree of commitment. This lack of 









and CNOOC, all of whom, display differing attitudes towards local content, although To-
tal’s request to and involvement in the E4D/SOGA project demonstrates somewhat of a 
change of direction with regards to its commitment to broad-based local development.  
 
Respondents point to factors relating to the corporate makeup, size and history of the op-
erators in explaining why local content is approached with varying degrees of commit-
ment. In turn, explanations supported the notion that the Chinese government desires to 
deliver employment for Chinese nationals through CNOOC and its subsidiaries and suppli-
ers. Meanwhile, Total E&P, as a risk-averse and sizeable IOC, demonstrated preference 
for an established international supply chain as well as rigid procedure for recruiting and 
onboarding staff. This, in turn was very much in contrast with Tullow Oil, a modestly sized 
company focusing on prospects on the African continent, and Oranto Petroleum, an Afri-
can operator, with a positive attitude towards local employment and procurement. To 
many respondents, Tullow Oil’s farmdown and departure from the industry represents a 
considerable loss to Uganda’s localisation objectives, particularly as the remaining operat-
ing partners have demonstrated, to varying degrees, that local content does not reflect the 
core principles of their business models. Meanwhile, the entry of Oranto Petroleum into 
the industry goes further to highlight the shortfalls of the operating partners as the com-
pany has achieved, albeit on a small scale, a degree of localisation seemingly inconceiva-
ble to Total E&P and CNOOC in Uganda.   
 
This study found that development agencies are considered to be an important player in 
upskilling Ugandans, notably the GIZ E4D/SOGA project, The World Bank project and that 
of Enabel. As explored further in Chapter 6 and 7, donor interventions have proved useful 
as the market itself has failed to develop and deliver requisite competencies, both human 
and supplier; spontaneous order has indeed been insufficient. The data show little evi-
dence that development agencies are softening the market for non-indigenous suppliers 
through their interventions in local content development in Uganda or that they are subver-
sively representing foreign business. For example, respondents noted little evidence that 









volvement in the development of the regulatory framework and other aspect of local con-
tent. Instead, respondents believed that approved suppliers more commonly reflect the 
nationalities of the operating companies. As such, the data suggest that multilateral devel-
opment agencies have filled a void in expertise and funding and resultantly have been a 
vitally important player in moving towards localisation objectives. 
 
Whilst foreign governments have had a positive impact on local content development, this 
chapter demonstrates one of the ways in which Ugandan state policy is hindering local 
content development and adoption; the data demonstrated that Ugandan management of 
the sector has engendered an uncertain business environment which has had a profound 
effect on local employment, contracting and capacity development. This is notably impact-
ing the feasibility and willingness of EPC contractors and oilfield service companies to ap-
ply themselves to long term local content development strategies, as well as short term in-
country employment. The breakdown of the farmdown agreement between Tullow Oil and 
the other operating partners due to tax disputes with the government in August 2019 did 
not bode well for an improved business environment for the major contracting firms; how-
ever, as of August 2020, it does look like a sale is near to being agreed.  
 
This research also allows us to understand the obstacles to the adoption and progression 
of local content and its development in Uganda. Whilst this chapter provides us with de-
tails of the objectives and roles that these international stakeholders are playing in the de-
velopment of local content, the following chapter will observe trends and assess the extent 
to which external factors influence adoption and interventions. More precisely, Chapter 6 
will explore how fluctuations in the oil price and other factors have influenced the trajectory 
of local content in Uganda and whether operating companies have changed their business 
model as a result of the price shock of the 2014 crash and the resulting increased rele-










Chapter 6: Impacts of the Oil Price Crash on International Stakeholder Commit-
ments to Local Content in Uganda 
 
This chapter investigates how the oil price crash in 2014/2015 impacted and continue to 
impact upon local capacity development by non-indigenous actors and operator adoption 
of local content. The data obtained in this research, coupled with published data, reject the 
hypothesis that operators have become substantially more localised since the oil price 
crash; instead, we can observe incremental movements towards a more localised indus-
try. My research indicates that following the oil price crash operators adopted a short-term 
cost reduction strategy which involved greatly reducing expatriate staffing and a significant 
reduction in local content development spending. In the longer run we observe greater job 
role localisation, as many Ugandans have taken on roles previously occupied by expatri-
ates, as well as the nearshoring (localising) of maintenance level contracts and the in-
creasing involvement of operators in broad-based local content development initiatives, 
often led and funded by donor / development agencies.  
 
Whilst it is not linked (directly for certain) to the falling oil price, this chapter argues that 
donor and development agencies have taken an integral role in the development of local 
capacity for the oil and gas industry in Uganda, filling a void in funding and technical ex-
pertise left by operators as well as the Ugandan government. In this chapter I show that 
donor contributions to broad-based local content development, such as World Bank pro-
jects to upgrade Ugandan vocational institutions to deliver accredited skills for the oil in-
dustry, have become increasingly important in actualising the goal of increasing local con-
tent adoption.  
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
For many people working in and observing the oil and gas industry, the 2014 oil price 
crash represented a turning point, particularly with regards to local content. As we can ob-
serve from Figure 22, there was a substantial drop in the price of Brent Crude (along with 









20 months was 75.8% from USD 115.19 to USD 27.88. If revenues from the sale of crude 
products and by extension refined products were going to remain at levels half of that pre-
viously experienced, it was clear that the business model of the operating community 
would have to adjust in order to internalise the new market prices. A frequently proffered 
narrative in the industry at the time (Andrews et. al. 2016) reflected the need for operators 
to adopt more cost-effective models of operation, particularly in less mature or frontier hy-
drocarbon markets. For many people this meant ‘localisation’, employing a greater propor-
tion of local people and procuring from a more economically viable local supply chain ra-
ther than continuing to contract established suppliers from elsewhere in the world, often 
referred to as nearshoring. The notion that operators may all be working towards a more 
localised industry reflects the concept of isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), which is 




Prior to commencing this study, my experience in the oil and gas industry, globally, was 
the catalyst for testing what appeared to be a valid hypothesis; namely, are oil and gas op-
erators in Uganda becoming more localised in the wake of the 2014 oil price crash? Whilst 
there were partial corrections in 2016 and the years following, driven not so much by sup-









ply and demand but threats of sanctions and conflict in the Middle East, Brent Crude aver-
aged 38.23% below the June 2014 spot price in the years 2016-2019, before falling further 
in 2020. It can be deduced from the data that lower oil prices exert two main pressures on 
operators, firstly in reference to lower operator revenues but, secondly, increased pres-
sure from the Ugandan government as future fiscal linkages are reduced and the need to 
develop backward linkages increased. The data obtained in this study reinforces the no-
tion that the oil price crash has intensified the need to develop local competences in line 
with operator requirements and that operating more locally has greater cost efficiencies. In 
turn, the study’s findings infer that the external pressures related to lower oil prices have 
not been enough to engender the abandonment of the conflicting objectives discussed in 
Chapter 5, such as CNOOC’s mandate to deliver jobs and business for Chinese people 
and companies. Resultantly, we can observe incremental movements towards a more lo-
calised industry in Uganda.  
 
Firstly, this chapter explores the cost-efficiencies of operating locally, drawing from exist-
ing literature but also reflecting on the opinions and perspectives obtained in this research. 
Pegram’s (2018) Ghana study highlighted the cost-effective nature of adopting a localised 
business model, and this notion was reinforced by this study’s respondents who con-
tended that operating with a more localised approach represents a more cost-efficient 
business model in Uganda. It was noted that Ugandans are likely to have lower salary de-
mands than their international counterparts and that local suppliers are also likely to repre-
sent a more cost-effective procurement option, thereby allowing operators to reduce pro-
ject expenditure on employment and contracting.   
 
An important feature of this research, as explored in this chapter, is the growing relevancy 
of donor and development agency interventions in developing Ugandan content for the oil 
and gas industry. The data infer that, whilst the oil price crash saw operators reduce their 
spending on local content development, it has engendered greater cooperation between 
stakeholders, notably around the development of future capacity and primarily around do-









interventions is favouring the development of employable skills and responds to the indus-
try’s requirement for good technical capabilities within the workforce. Whilst many donor 
interventions are ongoing, the increasing emphasis on accreditation within capacity devel-
opment and stakeholder cooperation is already responsible for delivering improved devel-
opment outcomes for Uganda’s oil and gas industry.   
 
With regards to the operator community, in taking into account the cost considerations of a 
more localised business model, this chapters assesses the impact of the oil price crash on 
operator employment, procurement and local content development. However, the chapter 
only addresses the operating partners, CNOOC, Total and Tullow, as Oranto Petroleum 
and Armour Energy only began exploration in Uganda after the oil price crash. Oranto and 
Armour Energy remain minor industry players and correspondingly, are unlikely to induce 
any form of mimetic isomorphism. This analysis looks to isolate the impact of the oil price 
crash in light of the non-responsiveness of the government to field development plans and 
the introduction of the National Content Regulation. In doing so, this chapter references a 
plethora of data, notably that published by the PAU and OAG, provided by the PAU, multi-
lateral development organisations, interview data and survey data. This broad spectrum of 
data has allowed for in-depth analysis of the trajectory of local content and its develop-
ment in Uganda. 
 
This chapter primarily addresses my first research question. The question asks whether oil 
companies are operating differently to what was deemed to exist in the previous paradigm 
of non-compliance, discussed in the literature review, and seeks to understand whether 
there is a reason for this difference. This chapter delivers insights on the extent to which 
operators are moving away from non-compliance, exploring differences between compa-
nies, and assesses the oil price crash as the aforementioned reason for the changing 
models. Question 2, concerning the roles of stakeholders in development and adopting lo-
cal content, is also addressed later in this chapter as I further explore the important role 










6.2 The Cost Considerations of Localisation 
 
In this study, the vast majority of respondents contended that localisation brings benefits 
to operators, international oil-field service companies, EPC contractors and the nation 
alike. In the case of operators, an approach that favours Ugandan labour, contractors and 
suppliers was deemed to be a more cost-efficient way of operating. More generally, litera-
ture supports the notion that utilising local capacity is a more cost-efficient business 
model. Andrews & Playfoot (2015) and Pegram (2018) emphasise the benefits of a local-
ised workforce, whilst, a number of academics, including Pegram, also contend that job 
role localisation in certain, very specialised positions, can be a more costly procedure than 
retaining an expatriate (Pegram, 2018; Pegram et. al., 2018). 
6.2.1 The Cost Considerations of Workforce Localisation 
Authors such as Dickmann et al. (2017), Fayol-Song (2013), Hickey (2017), Kobrin (1988) 
and Speers & Henchy (2016) have highlighted that job role localisation can reduce operator 
costs. These academics note that in addition to salary demands, expatriate labour can re-
quire further compensation such as housing, private drivers, medical cover, travel, school-
ing for children and security; all of which are consistent with the requirements of expatriate 
labour in Uganda. However, beyond oil and gas, there is a greater body of literature on 
localisation, in which authors note that expatriate labour can both be cheaper and more 
expensive than indigenous labour, depending on level of development and the nature of the 
local labour market. For example, Forstenlechner (2008), Mellahi (2007) and Rees et al., 
(2007) discuss Emiratisation in the UAE, noting both the cost of upskilling Emirati labour, 
the cultural challenges around Emirati employment, but also, in a number of cases, higher 
salary demands than their expatriate counterparts. Emiratisation itself has been requiring of 
substantial government intervention in order to overcome challenges in the labour market, 
encouraging nationals to take up roles previously occupied by expatriates, primarily in fi-
nance and the oil and gas industry (Al-Qubaisi, 2012). 
The context of Uganda’s national development and its largely informal, imperfectly aligned 









suggests that Ugandan labour commands lower salaries than those from the UK, France, 
China or other nations with substantial human capacity in oil and gas. The data obtained 
in this research reinforces this notion, with respondents frequently highlighting the benefits 
of employing Ugandans instead of expatriates, noting primarily the comparatively low sal-
ary demands of Ugandan employees and, to a lesser extent, the value of recruiting indi-
viduals with local knowledge and language skills. A government representative agreed 
with the premise, commenting on the collective interest in employing locals to save costs, 
“We see also the oil companies, both international oil companies and the national oil com-
panies, they do have interests because here it makes sense. If you really can afford to 
employ locals, the cost of doing business really goes down because you assumed that the 
way how you pay expatriates is not the same way you should pay in locals.” (27 June 
2019) 
 
The broad sentiments expressed throughout this interview process reflects the data col-
lected in the first questionnaire. Only 4% of respondents ‘strongly disagreed’ or ‘disagreed’ 
with the statement “Employing nationals and procuring from local suppliers represents a 
cost-efficient way of operating in Uganda”, whilst 88% ‘strongly agreed’ or ‘agreed’. Alt-
hough not a perfect science, as different positions demand different salaries, salary data 
from 2014 also infer that a more localised operator can reduce employment costs. Below 
(Figure 23) we can observe that the operator with the most localised workforce, Tullow, 
benefits from the lowest salary per employee, whilst maintaining a higher average salary 




Operator % Local 
Workforce 





CNOOC 71% 14,794,238.71 3,641,708.87 41,746,185.83 
Total E&P 77% 16,555,406.64 5,125,207.15 55,357,925.97 










Tullow 94% 13,115,483.37 11,622560.49 38,121,941.62 
Interview participants noted that the salary differences are exacerbated in well-remuner-
ated management positions which, particularly within Total and CNOOC, are largely occu-
pied by non-Ugandans. However, localising these roles requires time and the substantial 
investment by employers. Pegram (2018), in his study on job role localisation in Ghana, 
highlights that the investment required in achieving local competence in some roles, pri-
marily advanced and specialised roles such as ‘Exploration Manager’ is greater than the 
cost of continued expatriate employment. Pegram also notes considerations of risk, in that 
if a company invests in the ongoing training of an employee, there is no guarantee that 
this employee will remain at the company; the author writes, “certain roles may be 
deemed too high risk to localise by an O&G company, and others require significantly 
more investment in education, training and development” (Pegram, 2018, p. 176). The no-
tion that planned job role localisation is not always cost-effective is supported by a number 
of respondents in this study, a representative of an association of academic and voca-
tional institutions commented, 
“It is more costly for the operator to raise the local capacity than hire a few specialists from 
abroad or automate. You would rather employ machines to be more profitable. Or if that’s 
not an option, employ an international expert for that job rather than taking the path of 
raising local capacity,” 
(…) 
“Now then, for the less specialised jobs. I think that's where we can now speak in terms of 
raising local capacity. And there is potentially saving on the side of the investor to make 
because the labour is abandoned. It is available and it is trainable.” (18 June 2019) 
 
Apart from a number of very specialist roles, the data infer that workforce localisation 
should represent a business objective to a cost-conscious operator community and this is 
broadly reinforced by the aggregated salary data. Although, as discussed in Chapter 5, 
not all business objectives are linked purely to cost.  









Unfortunately, there is no metric for assessing whether local suppliers are more cost-effi-
cient than their international counterparts as there is no guarantee that local companies 
can compete on price and local suppliers may have offerings that differ in quality from the 
international competitors. In some countries, the UAE included, it is very possible that a 
local supplier may not be able to compete on price with international suppliers, perhaps 
most notably from the Indian subcontinent. However, in Uganda, given the relatively low 
cost of labour and many raw materials, respondents were confident that local suppliers of-
ten represent a more cost-efficient option than their international competitors. It is also im-
portant to remember that there may be benefits beyond a lower contract price. Steckel et. 
al. (2004) among other academics, propose a number of commonly occurring benefits of a 
localised or shorter supply chain, including reduced inventory costs, lower logistics costs, 
lower duties, taxes and faster response times as well as shelter from exchange rate fluctu-
ations. Assuming that local companies meet industry standards, respondents believed that 
it would be in the interest of the operators to favour local suppliers.  
6.2.3 The Challenges and Cost-Considerations of Succession Planning and Opera-
tor-led Local Content Development 
As noted earlier and explored by Pegram (2018), there is a substantial financial risk when 
operators undertake succession planning and invest in education and training. Both 
broad-based local content development and operator staff training can present chal-
lenges, despite the latter being tax recoverable again future earnings. Funding for educa-
tion and training is likely to be ineffective unless the academic and vocational capacity is 
present to provide students with the requisite skills and certifications. In turn, this explains 
why most scholarships between 2010-2014 involved sending students to Europe or Aus-
tralia to further their studies or to Trinidad and Tobago for certifications and on-the-job ex-
perience. With regards to broad-based local content development, an area in which there 
has traditionally been little input from operators and also beyond recoverable spending, 
any investment will need to be accompanied by the knowledge that realistic outcomes will 
benefit the business. This, once again, is reliant on academic and vocational capacity, as 
well as the competence of the project implementors, to ensure that the investment returns 










Succession planning and future staff development requires a degree of commitment from 
the employee or future employee in order to minimise risks for both sides. In the case of 
scholarships, even if the courses selected for the students are aligned with industry re-
quirements, operators may wish to take precautions to ensure that the company benefits 
from the investment; this is why Total signed pre-employment contracts with the students 
that were selected for scholarships. On the other hand, Tullow did not offer pre-employ-
ment contracts, but the company provided many more scholarships which widens the tal-
ent pool and acknowledges a degree of attrition. Whilst the end goal might be a fully capa-
ble local employee, who is cheaper than an expatriate, with fewer maintenance expenses 
and can enhance community relations, the process of reaching this objective is not always 
straightforward. Operating spending on its own staff development is tax recoverable, but 
there is an opportunity cost, notably the time away from their daily duties and the risk that 
the individuals trained will seek to move to another company; for example, an operator 
employee interviewed expressed their desire to work for an oilfield service provider having 
been educated abroad and trained by the operator.  
 
6.3 Isolating the Impact of the Oil Price Crash on Local Content and its Develop-
ment 
 
In order to assess the impact of the oil price crash, it is necessary to be aware of other 
supplementary pressures on local content development and its adoption in Uganda. Most 
notable of these supplementary external pressures is that the fall in the oil price coincided 
with the non-approval and subsequent delay of the field development project, which has 
resulted in a substantial reduction in industry activity. The introduction of the National Con-
tent Regulation (2016) was also considered to have positively impacted local content 
adoption by one government respondent, reflecting a form of coercive isomorphism; alt-
hough this was rejected by the majority of respondents. Despite most respondents dis-









plementation and intended objective. These supplementary pressures on local content, al-
beit one which has been largely dismissed, will be discussed in this section, allowing us to 
better isolate and comprehend the impact of the oil price crash.  
6.3.1 The Delayed Development Project 
The impact of the delayed development project has been simply to reduce industry activ-
ity, reaching a non-operational or maintenance state in recent years. Employees and for-
mer employees of Tullow noted that the first field development plan was submitted in early 
2013, predating the collapse of the oil price by at least 9 -12 months. The approval of such 
plans is considered to be a process by which there are a number of reviews, comments 
and document iterations and may take a few years. Resultantly, there was debate among 
respondents as to whether the oil price crash further delayed the approval of the develop-
ment project; although, it is also reportedly an issue of taxation in which Museveni refused 
to give any concessions to aid Tullow’s farmdown. In 2016 Uganda appeared to be pro-
gressing towards first oil, as the awarding of production licences to Tullow, Total and 
CNOOC signified, to many observers, that the development project would gain approval in 
the foreseeable future. However, as discussed throughout this thesis, no field develop-
ment plan has been approved during this research, as such it is now approaching a dec-
ade since the first development plan was proposed without a positive response from the 
Ugandan government. As such, respondents frequently noted the lack of certainty around 
the future of the development project as being a major impactor on local content and its 
development.  
 
Throughout the interviews, respondents noted both the effect of the oil price crash and the 
delayed development project in equal measure as being major influencers on the develop-
ment of Uganda’s oil industry as a whole. The data infer that these two external pressures 
did not engender the same response from the operators with regards to local content, alt-
hough both engendered a form of isomorphism. Respondents firstly note that overall staff-
ing numbers decreased significantly following the oil price crash but have gradually been 
reduced further in light of there being less work to be done; in 2013, the three main oper-









(Figure 12). By 2018, the overall number of people employed by all operators had fallen to 
168, of which 77% were Ugandan (Data provided by PAU). The data show that expatriate 
staffing, as a percentage, fell greater than that of nationals. This overall fall in staffing 
numbers is attributed to the lack of industry activity. One former operator employee com-
mented,  
 
“It (the government) badly delayed the approval and that effected operators because they 
couldn't have manpower and they can’t keep on paying guys who weren't working” (28 
June 2019) 
 
Secondly, respondents noted that the total value of contracts being awarded by operators 
has fallen substantially due to the dearth in operator requirements. In 2013, USD 
392,893,665 was procured and contracted by the operators to both Ugandan and foreign 
suppliers (OAG Report, 2015), but in 2019, this figure was less than USD 20,000,000, rep-
resenting a 94.91% decrease (Data provided by PAU, 2019).  
 
The lack of operations and uncertain business environment caused by the delay has also 
influenced local content development. Local content development spending was USD 
439,962 as highlighted in 2019 PAU data (although no information is provided to clarify 
whether this is just operator staff development or broader LCD spending), which is a very 
small proportion of the 2013 figures provided in the OAG; in 2013, local content develop-
ment spending on operator staff alone was USD 2,477,475, representing an 82.24% de-
crease. Respondents noted local content development spending has been negatively im-
pacted as faith in the timely commencement of the development and production phases 
decreased. One operator employee noted how the delayed development project has influ-
enced business confidence to invest in local content and its development,  
 
“The operators are very sceptical to go ahead and proceed with works like they did before. 
(…) so now they will not do any until the final investment decision is made, they cannot 










The data obtained infer that the delayed development project has engendered inactivity 
and uncertainty in Uganda’s oil industry, which in turn has brought about a reduction in op-
erations in Uganda. Consequently, this has caused employment, procurement and spend-
ing on local content development to decrease, vastly reducing the net benefits to the 
Ugandan economy.   
6.3.2 Local Content Legislation and Regulation 
The second supplementary pressure on local content, proposed by a respondent, is the 
introduction of new regulation and legislation (the National Content Regulations 2016 were 
consolidated in 2020 by the National Local Content Bill). This study does not believe that 
new legislation and regulation itself has been influential in delivering greater localisation, or 
to note institutionalist theory, engender coercive isomorphism; although respondents did 
infer that greater pressure from the government is a positively influencing factor (discussed 
further in 7.4). Despite being dismissed by most participants, I do believe it is important to 
note that the government did attempt to use regulation and legislation during the study pe-
riod to enhance local content development and adoption.  
Whilst one government respondent pointed to the importance of the new regulations, the 
National Content Regulations of 2016, an interventionist tool to actualise local content ob-
jectives, most interview participants were very dismissive of its impact. It was noted that 
operators have been mandated in one form or another to deliver on local content obligations 
and the introduction of regulation has not changed that, largely due to implementation and 
monitoring challenges. On the 22nd May 2020, the Uganda parliament finally passed the 
National Local Content Bill which will further regulate the industry, although its impact has 
not been investigated in this study.  
The data obtained in this research infer that operators have demonstrated a willingness to 
find loopholes within the laws and regulations or adopt local content on their own terms, 
whilst the government appears to be struggling to establish an effective framework for mon-
itoring and implementing its governance over the sector. Regardless of the form of mandat-









the effectiveness of regulation has been limited. The OAG report even notes government 
failure to follow up with operators to understand why proposed local content spends were 
not actualised following the submission of annual reports, as mandated in their licencing 
agreements (OAG Report, 2015). Early research (Lay & Minio-Paluello, 2010), suggested 
that licencing agreements failed to set any specific timetable or quota targets, simply that 
the licensee will gradually replace its expatriate staff. In this study, a number of comments 
were made which highlight the ineffectiveness of the laws and regulations, particularly 
around the employment of nationals; interview participants noted that operators have even 
manipulated their own nationalisation plan which they present to the government, a govern-
ment employee noted, 
“Because there’s nationalise plan, as I told you, they never implemented it so they just 
keep changing it and rotate somebody, if he (a non-national) has been here for 5 years, 
they change the title and change him to another title. We don’t seem to be on the same 
page” (28 June 2019) 
 
Other respondents were keen to note the ease by which operators can circumvent the con-
tractual clauses and the new regulations; a former operator employee noted, 
 
“So you have a report that say to we’ve done the interview process, all the people that 
we've got, including the one who used to do this job, by the way, of course, that's not indi-
cated, are not qualified, this is the basis of why we would need a work permit for ‘person x’ 
for three years. So you understand the dynamics” (21 June 2019) 
 
Whilst it was considered that local content regulation has been ineffective since its enshrine-
ment in 2016, there is little hard data to support this due to the lull in operator activity. Data 
from 2017 (the year following the introduction of the National Content Regulations) show 
Total’s proportion of procurement contracted to local suppliers falling back to 2013 levels, 
although this shouldn’t be read into too much as project demands vary according to the 
lifecycle, which, in turn can explain slight variations in procurement from year to year when 
the industry is operational. The utilisation of loopholes in local content regulation and con-









undermined the localisation objectives of the state. Most importantly however, it was con-
tended that the lack of implementation and monitoring has compromised the effectiveness 
of the new regulation.  
 
 
Petroleum Exploration, Development and Production Act, 2013 (henceforth PEDP Act) 
Petroleum Refining, Conversion, Transmission and Midstream Storage Act, 2013 
(henceforth PRCTMS Act) 
Petroleum Exploration, Development and Production Regulations, 2016 
Petroleum Exploration, Development and Production National Content Regulations 
2016 
Petroleum Refining, Conversion, Transmission and Midstream Storage Regulations 
2016 
Petroleum Refining, Conversion, Transmission and Midstream Storage National Con-
tent Regulations, 2016 
National Local Content Bill, 2020 
These regulations are augmented through binding provisions incorporated within pro-
duction sharing agreements (PSAs) with licensed operators. These contractual clauses 
provide for the training and employment of suitably qualified Ugandans, in addition to 
the payment of annual training fees to the government ActionAid (2017). As noted in 
Chapter 4, recent PSAs with operators have not been made available publicly.  
 
6.4 The Adoption of a More Localised Approach to Oil and Gas Operations in the 
Context of Lower Oil Prices 
 
The data collected through the questionnaires and interviews suggest that there has not 
been a wholesale adoption of a new, localised, operating model. Instead, there has been 
some incremental movement towards a more localised industry, with interview data sug-
gesting that CNOOC have been less willing to localise than the other operating partners. 
In exploring whether a more localised operating model has been adopted, this study 









looked at operator commitments to three central components of local content: employ-
ment, local procurement and the development of local capacity (both human and enter-
prise). Collectively these indicators are a marker for the progression towards a more local-
ised oil industry in Uganda. This research acquired data on local content figures from the 
PAU and utilised published data; these figures were compared against and analysed 
alongside questionnaire and interview data.  
 
Percentage-based data provide some positive signs that local content has and is pro-
gressing, although this data bely falling net contributions to the Ugandan economy caused 
by the delay of the development project. A number of presentations and press releases 
from the GoU focus on the positive aspects of the data, primarily the proportional growth 
between certain years; one conference bulletin from the PAU notes “Through continuous 
and dedicated regulation, the sector has seen a growth in percentage contract value spent 
with Ugandan companies from 17% in 2009 to 36% in 2016” (Petroleum Authority 
Uganda, National Content Conference 2019, Bulletin p. 55). This growth can be observed 
in Figure 25, but the same graph also shows local content falling from 2014 to 2017. Only 
one interview participant reinforced the notion of substantial progress, highlighting regula-
tory developments as the primary reason but also the falling oil price. The respondent, 
from the Ugandan government, noted, 
 
“Here it is a win-win situation. So all of this has contributed to the increase. So from that 
period of time, 2014, we have seen an increase in local content and employment of Ugan-
dans.” (25 June 2019) 
 
It is important to note that other respondents working for the GoU did not share the same 
opinion. The impact, as I discuss presently, can largely be defined as short-term and me-
dium to long-term. Short-term impacts are a business reaction to the price collapse, whilst 
longer-term effects are a response to a shared realisation that oil revenues are likely to be 
less than originally anticipated. In turn this realisation that revenues are less in both the 









heightened pressure from the indigenous communities and the government to enhance non-
fiscal linkages.  
6.4.1 Effect of the Oil Price Crash on Operator Local Procurement 
This research assumes that if operators had adopted a more localised business model, 
we would have seen substantial growth in the percentage of contracts awarded to local 
companies, along with the other, previously noted, components of local content. Although 
data published and data provided by the Petroleum Authority of Uganda (PAU) for this 
study underline a broadly positive narrative, a detailed look at the data reveals that there 
is no smooth progression. As a result of the significant fluctuations and unexplained 
changes in local procurement, it is difficult to conclude if any significant relationship be-
tween lower oil prices and procurement processes.  
 
The data published in the PAU publication highlight that between 2009 and 2016, the per-
centage of contract value spent with Ugandan companies actually peaked in 2014 at 42% 
(impressive considering Ovadia (2013) estimated Nigeria only achieved around 40% in 
2012 / 2013) and fell as low as 28% in 2017, the last year recorded in the publication. 
Data provided by the PAU for this study reinforce the lack of a smooth upward trend, 
showing local procurement returning to 33% in 2018 before reaching 76% in 2019. Figure 
Figure 25. Trend of Total Contracts (Petroleum Authority Uganda, National 









25, taken from a PAU publication, highlights the absence of a smooth growth curve and 
more importantly shows local procurement as a total percentage of overall procurement 
falling year on year between 2013 and 2017. Finally, we can observe a substantial correc-
tion in 2019, seeing local procurement as a total percentage of overall procurement dou-
ble from 2018 figures (Figure 28), although the precise catalyst for this appears slightly 
unclear.  
 
Figure 26. Operator Spending on Local Goods and Services between 2010 – 











Respondents expressed sentiments which were largely consistent with the above data, 
noting the falling procurement since the oil price crash and little proportional movement to-
wards a more localised industry until 2019. There was only one exception to the above, as 
the aforementioned government representative provided an account contrary to all other 
respondents and in stark contrast to the data provided by the PAU. The respondent com-
mented,  
 
“Here in Uganda there was, we could see companies buy in, for example, local goods and 
services, I can tell you until 2017 or 2018. I think the company spent about three point… 
over three billion US dollars just in local content (this is not corroborated by official data), 
just buying local goods and services. And this has been, this is the highest so far because 
we have been going up at a steady scale” (25 June 2019) 
 
N.B. The above table provides procurement data from 2017. During the year 2017, 
a total of USD 133m was spent on procurement contracts, purchase orders and 
call offs, 28% of which went to Ugandan companies as shown in the table. 
Figure 27. Procurement Data for 2017, Petroleum Authority Uganda, National Con-
tent Conference 2019, Bulletin 










In interpreting the data known to them, interview participants contend that the industry’s 
inconsistent demand for goods and services has also made it more difficult to understand 
whether operators are adopting localised procurement models or whether existing prefer-
ence for established and risk-free supply chains remain. It was noted that the depressed 
level of procurement also means that local procurement as a proportion of total procure-
ment can be distorted by a single substantial contract. Conventional knowledge suggests 
that when operations are at their lowest ebb, demand for more technologically advanced 
services, usually beyond the capabilities of local service providers in nascent hydrocarbon 
economies, are lower, meaning proportional spending with local suppliers is greater, 
broadly speaking this has been the case in Uganda. The notion that nascent, indigenous 
sectors in any international industry struggle to compete for technologically complex ten-
ders is well evidenced in literature (Hong and Snell, 2015; Khan and Nicholson, 2015) but 
has also been observed in oil and gas, “the use of specialised inputs and the technological 
complexity of the petroleum sector often limit the possibility of developing backward and 
forward links into the local economy. An economy that is very limited can hardly be ex-
pected to quickly supply services (let alone build forward links)” (Tordo et. al. 2013, p. 6).  
 
In the period since the oil price crash, we can observe Tullow adopting a very localised 
procurement position. The prolonged sale of Tullow’s Ugandan operations has coincided 
with a substantial reduction in Tullow’s procurement in the absence of operational activity, 
this can be observed in Figure 27. Whilst interview respondents contended that Tullow 
procured more readily from local suppliers, this was not reinforced by the OAG data in Fig-
ure 26 which provided data from 2010-2013. However, as we can observe from Figure 27, 
Tullow has moved to a very localised procurement position by 2017 (96%), seemingly re-
flecting the company’s willingness to favour local suppliers, but also, a movement to a 
more cost-efficient procurement model. It can be hypothesised that this movement to-
wards localised procurement reflects the pressure to reduce costs associated with the oil 
price crash and taking advantage of the goods and services available in the local econ-











Until 2019, the data provide little evidence that Total and CNOOC have sought to utilise 
local suppliers more. We can see from Figure 26 and 27 that Total’s local procurement 
was lower in 2017 than 2013, whilst CNOOC’s local spend has grown as a proportion but 
fallen hugely as an overall figure. The general consensus from this study’s participants 
was that they were unsure whether Total and CNOOC had become more willing to con-
sider local suppliers, even in areas where it is perceived that local capabilities are present. 
As discussed in Chapter 5 respondents noted that existing, indigenous service providers 
were not being utilised by Total or CNOOC, notably the example of Mineral Services Lim-
ited. As such, the evidence suggests that the pressures associated with a lower oil price 
have not been substantial enough to engender the adoption of shorter, more localised and 
more cost-effective supply chain.  
 
Data from 2019 deliver an interesting contrast, whilst overall procurement only falls slightly 
from 2018, the local share of procurement more than doubles to 76%. A Total E&P repre-
sentative noted that in the absence of considerable activity, the industry has been able to 
put time and effort into the localisation of procurement, noting that “theory has been turned 
into practice” and that “the IOCs sought alignment with the government”, seemingly as a 
result of increased government pressure. It was agreed that the lack of specialised inputs 
has been the factor that allowed the proportional spend to increase to 76%, meaning that 
contracts such as security services, catering services, transportation or administrative ser-
vices may have been localised whilst demand for foreign services has decreased. The 
movement to localise these contracts must still be viewed as a positive development.  
 
The developments that have been made in localising procurement, seemingly at a mainte-
nance level, are important developments, although, it does not reflect a substantial shift in 
operator procurement, simply the nearshoring of a number of smaller contracts. Given the 
time that has passed since the oil price crash, the data infer that the transition from 2018 
to 2019 represents Total and CNOOC attempting to align with government expectations, 
rather than a movement engendered by cost-considerations; reflecting the notion that the 









not necessarily mean that the conflicting objectives, CNOOC’s mandate to contract Chi-
nese companies and Total’s preference for an established and proven international supply 
chain, have been abandoned as local suppliers are likely to lose out to established inter-
national suppliers and Chinese service companies when the development project restarts 
and major contracts are tendered. As noted by the aforementioned Total representative, 
local procurement will once again drop below 40% when the project resumes as it is ex-
pected that the most valuable contracts will go to foreign companies.  
 
An unfortunate reality of this study is that the nature of the industry, notably its inconsistent 
requirement for inputs and procurement, makes it difficult to observe trends in procurement. 
Resultantly, in the context of lower oil prices, the only observation that can be made with 
regards to procurement is an incremental movement towards a more localised industry in 
2019, characterised by the nearshoring of small, maintenance level, contracts. Rather than 
a reaction to cost-related pressures, this seemingly reflects the increased importance of 
local content to the Government of Uganda and correspondingly greater pressure on the 
operators.  
6.4.2 Effect of the Oil Price Crash on Local Employment 
Employment has fallen across all operating companies in Uganda since 2013/2014, with 
the exception of new companies, Oranto Petroleum and Armour Energy, although the pro-
portion of Ugandans employed in the workforce has increased. The hard data coupled 
with interview data infer two main impacts of the oil price crash on local employment; the 
first being an immediate fall in the number of expatriates following the oil price crash, the 
second being a steady increase in the proportion of Ugandans in the operator workforce.  
 
As we can observe from Figure 29, prior to the oil price crash, in December 2013, 
CNOOC employed 78 Ugandan nationals (representing 68% of their workforce), Total 
E&P employed 123 Ugandan nationals (representing 57% of their workforce) and Tullow 









of National Content Report from oil companies for 2012-2014). Collectively in 2013, Ugan-




Moving forward, data provided by the PAU (Figure 30) show local employment across the 
three main operating partners reaching 77% in 2018 and 89% in 2019. As such, it is clear 
that a certain degree of job role localisation has taken place, the extent to which this rep-
resents a changing business model was discussed among interview respondents. One 
government respondent highlighted his certainty that localisation of the workforce was a 
result of the oil price collapse and a changing operator mindset. In responding to a ques-





11 At this point it is interesting to note the misinformation within the sector. A document noted as “Report Presented by the Minister of State for Energy to the Parliament” claims that 
“in 2013, Tullow Oil employed a total of 203 people out of which 80% were Ugandans, CNOOC employed about 115 people out of which 70% were are Ugandans & Total employed 
over 500 people out of which 80% were Ugandans” (Doc: Areas Open for Competitive Bidding for Petroleum Exploration Licences in Respect of the Second Licensing Round in 
Uganda, 2013). In contrast, the OAG Report is considered accurate.  
 
Figure 29. Operator Employment 2012-2014 (OAG Report, 2015) 









“The companies have totally changed their thinking. Initially companies would feel like, 
yeah, it's better for us to get our guys there, but they now understand that to see when 
you build capacity for these local companies, for these individuals, you train them, you 
give them this case, they can do better.” (24 June 2019) 
 
The majority of respondents were more cautious, contending that most of the managerial 
and advanced technical roles remain occupied by expatriates. Interview participants were 
largely in agreement that Total and CNOOC had been unwilling to localise certain mana-
gerial positions and adopt a substantially more localised employment model since the oil 
price crash. As such, the workforce statistics in Uganda demonstrates the progression that 
has been made but also that there remains room for further localisation. Uganda’s work-
force localisation position is perhaps comparable with neighbouring South Sudan in 2015, 
where Tiitmamer notes, “South Sudanese account for 80% of employment in the DPOC 
(Dar Petroleum Operating Company), 88% in SPOC (Sudd Petroleum Operating Com-
pany) and 85% in GNPOC (The Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company)” (Tiitmamer, 
2015, p. 14). Once again, the evidence suggests that CNOOC and Total were unwilling to 
abandon the objectives discussed in Chapter 5, namely CNOOC’s mandate to provide op-
portunities for the Chinese citizens in their employment and Total’s rigid recruitment and 
onboarding processes. A government employee noted that some locals had been pro-
moted, but agreed with the aforementioned sentiment that operators had utilised loop-
holes to maintain some expatriates,  
 
“In Uganda what happened is true, companies sort of work around it, they would change 
some job titles, they would send other expatriates to other areas and then maybe elevate 
a few local ones who survived to stay around.” (25 June 2019) 
 
This opinion was echoed throughout the interview process; despite the progression in lo-
calising some roles, respondents questioned whether the operators, notably CNOOC, 
were committed to the localisation of well-remunerated, primarily managerial positions. It 









achieved greater workforce localisation and are operating without foreign expertise; a 
model which many Ugandans hope to see CNOOC and Total adopt.  
 
A secondary finding concerns the immediate impact of the oil price crash on expatriate 
staffing in Uganda. Respondents contend that in protecting the short-term financial viabil-
ity of their operations and in light of the cost-pressures of the price crash, operators 
sought to shed their most expensive and easily releasable employees. This reaction was 
not limited to Uganda, even operations in actively producing nations saw operators cut 
jobs in order to protect the short-term profitability of the companies. For example, in De-
cember 2014, ConocoPhillips cut 230 of 1,650 jobs in UK, whilst reducing its global capital 
expenditure budget by 20% (BBC News, 2014). In a more open discussion, a number of 
respondents saw the staffing cuts as a pre-emptive measure, as the accelerating global 
supply of oil saw no signs of abating and operators anticipated oil prices falling further. A 
former operator respondent noted, 
 
“When, you know, the oil price started going the other way. So the first thing that the com-
pany had to do was basically look through that personnel and see which people can go 
first, which contracts were up for renewal and the majority of those were of course expatri-
ate staff, who were doing consultancy work. So they, they decided to do like an acceler-
ated development programme, where you learn as much as you can from the expat that's 
leaving, right so that when they have left, you do the job that they are doing, which is ap-
preciated, that's where I gained what (experience) I could, from there” (26 June 2020) 
 
This narrative was repeated by a number of interview participants and is supported by the 
data in Figure 31. In the below figures we can observe expatriate staffing greatly de-
creased between December 2013 and December 2014, concurrently we can see the spot 
price of Brent Crude falling by over 40% from June to December 2014 in Figure 32 It is 
also worth noting that a medium-heavy, waxy crude like that discovered in Uganda is likely 
to price lower than Brent or West Texas Intermediate (WTI), meaning that future opera-
tions in Uganda may have appeared less financially viable than those in other countries. In 









(WCS) which has a low API12 of 19-22 degrees and is priced significantly cheaper than 
WTI, in March 2015 the price differential of USD 14.25 or 28.5% lower when WTI is at 
USD 50 per barrel (The PAU claims Ugandan Crude has a API range of 17-31 degrees, 
albeit with a lower sulphur content that WCS). As noted by Tim Simard, head of commodi-
ties at the National Bank of Canada, when the global price of oil is lower "the first barrels 
to be turned off in a low-price environment are heavy barrels" making WCS "closer to the 
floor" than WTI (Pett, 2015). As such, operations in Uganda are “closer to the floor” than 
other operational sites around the world. One respondent contended that Uganda’s crude 
will be similar to regional products, Dar Blend and Nile Blend, whilst internationally similar 
to Maya Blend, a heavy crude. Spot prices for Maya Blend are not readily available, how-
ever the below historical data (Figure 31) demonstrates that the Maya Blend normally 







12 A crude oil will typically have an API between 15 and 45 degrees. Higher API indicates a lighter (lower density) crude. Lower API indicates a heavier (denser) crude. Light crude is 
typically in the 35-45 API range, which includes most of the highest valued crudes such as Brent and WTI. 
 









Over the course of 2014, the data show that Tullow reduced expatriate staffing by 38%, 
whilst only reducing Ugandan staffing by 20%, meanwhile, Total reduced its expatriate 
staffing by 59% and actually increased national staffing by 4% (Figure 33). A similar rela-
tionship cannot be observed within CNOOC, as expatriate staffing remained the same and 
local staffing increased. It would be incorrect to assume that the entirety of these expatri-
ate job losses reflect the falling oil price, as we must also acknowledge the non-respon-
siveness of the government to the field-development plans, however, interview data pro-
poses a strong correlation between the collapse in the price and the repatriation of expatri-
ate staffing. An operator employee reinforced this data,   
 
“If you look at the company journals for Tullow Oil or Total in 2012-2014, there were more 
expatriates, houses being rented for them, they had drivers as well, in the crash, 2014, 
most of them went back” (20 June 2020) 
 












It was also noted that many of the remaining staff saw their salaries and other allowances 
cut as a further response to the falling oil price. An operator employee gave the following 
assessments of the impact,  
 
“By default, the bottom line is affected. The prices, everything just came crashing down. 
They could no longer afford to bring in all the fancy labour, expatriates and also (…) Just 
to add on to what she has said, people's salaries were also reduced, by up to 20% and 
cutting everybody's salary, some allowances were scrapped, privileges that were given 
before were also scrapped” (24 June 2019) 
 
Substantial job and salaries cuts were naturally accompanied by a reduction in recruitment 
and internship opportunities, although the data does show considerably greater uptake in 
2019. Young professionals interviewed for this research found that their career opportuni-
ties in oil and gas had been greatly damaged by the oil price crash, causing many to divert 









and search for roles in other industries. A young professional noted that internships were 
very hard to come by from 2015 onwards, with only Icon Industrial Services (a core analy-
sis lab) hiring interns. With regards to employment, respondents were very dismissive 
about the opportunities available since the oil price crash, it was noted that,  
 
“They’ve been taking one or two brand new graduates every year” (23 June 2019) 
 
In summary, it is clear that there has been an increase in workforce localisation, although 
there is evidence that operators, CNOOC especially, are unlikely to move to localise man-
agerial roles in the near future. The data infer that lower oil prices have engendered an 
exodus of foreign labour and the accelerated promotion of a number of Ugandans. The 
difference between Tullow’s workforce localisation (93% in 2013) and all operating partners 
in 2019 (89%) suggests that there is still capacity for greater localisation in the near future; 
although, when the industry restarts in Uganda, greater expertise will be required and it is 
highly likely that expatriates will be needed to undertake specialised roles. Furthermore, if 
the assumptions discussed in Chapter 5 are correct, an IOC like Total may take longer to 
localise certain positions whilst CNOOC may always look to favour Chinese expatriates in 
senior positions, further workforce localisation within operating companies may not materi-
alise. This is likely to be compounded by the most localised operator, Tullow Oil, farming-
down its operations in Uganda.  
6.4.3 Effect of the Oil Price Crash on Operator Led Local Content Development 
This study found two primary effects of the oil price crash on local content development. 
Firstly, it was noted that there was an immediate fall in operator spending on local content 
development. The second is the more recent movement towards a more collaborative ap-
proach to broad-based local content development. The increased involvement of the oper-
ators in, primarily, donor-led local content development initiatives is consistent with the 
pressures engendered by the lower price environment; reducing costs but also ensuring 
the development of local capacity which, in turn, may reduce future operational costs and 










Respondents agreed with the premise that lower oil prices should incentivise greater oper-
ator adoption of local content and involvement in its development. Questionnaire respond-
ents were in agreement that ‘The oil price crash in 2014 has intensified the need to de-
velop local competences in line with operator requirements’; 74.6% of respondents 
‘strongly agreed’ or ‘agreed’, whilst only 8% ‘disagreed’.  
 
 
A supporting comment from the interview data reads, 
 
“So, the lower price if they hold, it actually even prescribes greater percentages and we 
must grow.” (25 June 2019) 
 
The logic that lower oil prices would engender greater attempts to localise was frequently 
proffered around the world at the time of the oil price crash, something I experienced per-
sonally at many conferences (Getenergy Global 2015, Conference Report). However, in 
many places, the falling oil prices saw long-term strategic goals such as localisation be-
come, temporarily, of secondary importance. Interview participants considered that the im-
mediate impact in Uganda was for operators to reduce further investments into non-opera-
tional areas, local content development was included within this. As staff numbers de-
creased significantly, we can also assume that less financing was required for operator 
staff development. Resultantly, immediately following the oil price crash, operator involve-
ment in local content development decreased significantly. Respondents spoke of local 
content development as an investment, one which would be repaid in a qualified work-
force that can ensure the operational excellence that the company expects; an operator 
employee discussed the immediate reaction of the operators, noting how the shock of the 
price crash led to the prominence of short-termism,   










“And if you ask any entity that is a profit-making entity, they cannot invest at that point and 
they are right. “I don't know where it's going, you're not making a decision. The global 
prices so low, I cannot invest my money right now without knowing if I'm going to get my 
money back or not.” And it's a wise decision.” (24 June 2019) 
 
Since 2017/2018, however, there has been an upturn in operator involvement in broad-
based local content development, albeit with seemingly fewer financial contributions. 
Whilst data highlight that spending is still below pre-crash levels, operator involvement in 
local content development, particularly broad-based local content development, has be-
come more collaborative, focused and effective. With fewer staff and a more localised 
workforce, it is seemingly logical that operator spending on the development of its own 
staff is lower than the period 2012-2014 (Figure 19 - Chapter 5). Instead, it was noted that 
operators have become increasingly involved in donor-led, broad-based local content de-
velopment initiatives, an area primarily beyond recoverable local content spending. 
 
Broad-based local content development in Uganda’s oil industry has benefited from in-
creasingly relevant donor interventions in recent years and this is where we are seeing 
greater operator cooperation with the project implementors. The involvement of operators, 
primarily Total and Tullow, and other industry players with donor agencies can lead to im-
proved development outcomes through mechanisms to increase alignment, which in turn 
informs relevant and well-implemented local capacity development initiatives that can go 
some way to satisfying future industry requirements for qualified labour and suppliers. Op-
erator collaboration with GIZ, headlined by the goal of delivering an accredited technical 
workforce, and what many believe is broad Chinese involvement in the creation of a Chi-
nese technical academy, ‘Sunmaker Oil & Gas Training Institute’, are manifestations of a 
more focused approach to broad-based local content development. These developments 
are still very recent, with respondents suggesting that the impact of these interventions on 
the wider workforce and supplier competencies was only becoming manifest during this 










CNOOC’s role in the arrival of Sunmaker Oil & Gas Training Institute in Kampala is uncer-
tain, however, the accredited institute, substantial in size and well-resourced, is already 
playing an important role in upskilling and training Ugandan professionals for the oil indus-
try. The speed at which the facility was constructed (by a Chinese contractor) and the in-
stitute’s development from nothing to an operational training facility is remarkable, espe-
cially considering the challenges faced by indigenous institutes (More on indigenous insti-
tutes in Chapter 7). It should also be noted that the Sunmaker Oil & Gas Training Institute 
is the SOE’s first facility globally and is not simply a franchised training institute, meaning 
it had no previous experience to learn from, making its rapid development even more im-
pressive. Whilst the institute operates commercially, many of its current cohort are benefi-
ciaries of a 27-million-dollar World Bank project, known as the Albertine Region Sustaina-
ble Development Project, which, as part of the project’s remit, is funding the technical edu-
cation of 600 individuals from the Albertine region. Its curriculum has also benefitted from 
the input of contracted international experts.  
   
Grey literature, media publications and the data obtained in this study highlight that the 
nexus of interaction between stakeholders has developed since the oil price crash. Re-
spondents noted that development agency interventions in broad-based local content de-
velopment have benefitted from greater engagement with industry leaders, notably opera-
tors such as Tullow and Total but also potentially future EPC contractors such as CB&I. A 
representative from a development agency noted the changing attitude among operators, 
 
“The operators became more adaptive in developing content and inclusive approach in the 
finalisation of the local content policy to address the negative effects that might rise due to 
inclusivity (lack of inclusivity).” (18 June 2019) 
 
The E4D/SOGA project, being implemented by GIZ, reportedly at the request of Total, and 
according to some respondents, the request of other operators, is the most substantial lo-
cal content development initiative in Uganda’s oil industry. The role of the operators in the 
E4D/SOGA project was debated among respondents, however, the GIZ website catego-









that Tullow Oil is listed as one of the few financiers, Total E&P as a partner (of which there 
are many), and CNOOC, not at all. The level of commitment to the project is reflective of 
the attitudes of the operators to local content and its development as discussed in Chapter 
5. Meanwhile, other interventions such as the World Bank’s Albertine Region Sustainable 
Development Project and involvement in UPIK’s development saw less interaction with 
operators but greater engagement with other stakeholders, including major EPC contrac-
tors like CB&I.  
 
The collaboration, particularly between Total, Tullow and GIZ for the E4D/SOGA project, 
but also in broader partnerships across East Africa with DFID (now FCDO - Foreign, Com-
monwealth and Development Office), NORAD, the EU (European Union) and Royal Dutch 
Shell, is seminal in its engagement of such a broad array of stakeholders, notably opera-
tors, engendering the development of relevant competences from HSE accreditations to 
bid management. Whilst there have been a number of programmes led by donor agencies 
in this area, respondents highlighted the importance of the project’s alignment with the ca-
pacity needs analysis and the ongoing coordination between funding bodies, advising par-
ties and implementors. In some respects, the notion of the multi-stakeholder environment 
has matured in recent years as we are beginning to see the impact of effective coordina-
tion between donor partners and the industry. This can also be considered a reminder that 
although operators are employers and contractors of local content, their knowledge and 
resources to develop it is often incomplete and traditionally considered to be far beyond 
their remit.  
 
Interview participants highlighted that operators, on their own, had shown little scope or 
interest for Ugandan enterprise development. However, through the E4D/SOGA pro-
gramme, operators, through less effort and funding of their own, can have a degree of in-
put into the service sector. The programme is assisting in upgrading HSE standards and 
practices across Ugandan enterprises, bid management training and coaching and an 
SME support programme being delivered through Stanbic Bank's Business Incubator. It is 









become more effective, but it has also broadened the scope of initiatives that operators 
can become involved with.  
 
The research highlights that the burden of delivering local content in Uganda has become 
a cooperative effort, although heavily reliant on donor interventions. The value of shared 
financial and technical burdens cannot be underestimated in the absence of business cer-
tainty brought about by low oil prices and non-approval of the development project; a fac-
tor that has seen operator local content development budgets decrease considerably. 
Throughout this research, respondents sought to highlight the benefit of cooperation be-
tween multiple stakeholders with broadly aligned objectives, however, they frequently 
highlighted occasions when opportunities for collaboration and cooperation had been 
missed. In concluding this subchapter, it is clear that the oil price collapse had one imme-
diate impact on operator led local content development, which was a substantial reduction 
in spending and involvement. Beyond the short-term impact, respondents, particularly 
those from the international community, recognised and commended a movement to a 
more focused and seemingly more efficient approach to local content development 
through collaboration with donor and development partners in broader coalition with other 
industry stakeholders.  
 
6.5 Uganda’s Donor Landscape - Increasing Involvement in Ugandan Capacity De-
velopment  
 
Although there has been greater donor involvement in Ugandan local content develop-
ment since the oil price crash, it is difficult to suggest that this is a direct result of falling oil 
prices as the oil price crash did not engender any specific pressures on the donor commu-
nity. Whilst some respondents contend that the interventions of donors in upskilling Ugan-
dans across the oil and gas industry reflects a response to conditions brought about by 
the oil price crash, it is equally the case that there has been a broader alignment of donor 
agency interventions across all of Uganda’s developing sectors to “create employable 









certificates” (The World Bank, PAD, 2015). Although, the genesis of this alignment ap-
pears to have developed around the same time as the oil price crash, it is seemingly a 
timely coincidence. The World Bank Project Appraisal Document (PAD) notes economic 
growth opportunities identified by the GoU13, including oil and gas, construction, ho-
tels/tourism, manufacturing, and agro-processing, all of which are reflected within donor 
interventions. Many interventions, such as those of the World Bank and Enabel, respond 
to multiple sector skilling requirements, whilst the E4D/SOGA project is focused on re-
source-based industries and their supply chain sectors such as construction, infrastruc-
ture, transport and logistics, catering and food supply.  
 
The World Bank, for the latter part of the previous century, focused on creating govern-
ance states, partially through the ability to dispense hard currency (Harrison, 2004). How-
ever, in the 21st century, there has been movement away from Structural Adjustment Pro-
grammes (SAPs) towards the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) enshrined 
within an interventionist country strategy led by a country itself (Owusu, 2013). This notion 
of a country strategy led by the country itself goes some way in explaining the increasing 
attention of the international development community to local capacity development in 
Uganda. For example, the World Bank’s “Albertine Region Sustainable Development Pro-
ject” seeks to improve regional and local access to infrastructure, markets, and skills de-
velopment in the oil rich Albertine region, reflecting Uganda’s desire to focus on capacity 
development in the oil sector (among others), the World Bank’s contribution to free market 
development and, more generally, a recognition of African leaders’ call for ‘trade not aid’. 
As well as funding the development of institutions, the World Bank’s project has provided 
scholarships for hundreds of Ugandans to receive a technical education for the oil and gas 
industry at Ugandan institutions; as such, the organisation’s contribution is very relevant to 
the current context of Uganda’s oil and gas industry.  
 
This research confirms that different donor agencies are characterised by differing roles 













and reaffirms the newfound pluralism of the donor community having witnessed the emer-
gence and re-emergence of ‘non-traditional’ development corporations. This study notes 
that Norway’s longstanding commitment to sound resource governance and robust institu-
tions has been preserved through guiding Uganda in the creation of a tripartite system for 
oil governance, meanwhile DFID’s (FCDO) world-leading commitment to social protection 
is as strong in Uganda as it is across Africa and the Indian sub-continent (Hickey et. al, 
2020). Among development objectives in energy & climate, health, infrastructure develop-
ment, water, governance, GIZ is playing an increasingly important role, globally, in voca-
tional training (GIZ India Bulletin) which is being continued in Uganda as we can see from 
the implementation of the E4D/SOGA project itself.  
 
It is clear that Uganda as a whole reflects the changing donor landscape across the Afri-
can continent. In the 1990s DAC donors (Development Assistance Committee (DAC-
OECD) accounted for 95% of international development aid on the continent, however, as 
noted by authors such as Manning (2006), the turn of the century marked the end of such 
dominance in the sphere and the return of non-DAC donors. Alongside the emergence of 
the African Development Bank (AfDB), who also supports Ugandan SME development 
along with E4D/SOGA and Stanbic Bank, it is manifestly clear that China has re-emerged 
as a major donor on the continent and in Uganda14. I was not able to reach anyone in-
volved in Chinese aid to Uganda but during my fieldwork I was invited to an AfDB SME 
development workshop, focused on the oil and gas industry. Nevertheless, respondents 
from the semi-structured interviews failed to highlight the AfDB as a major contributor to 
local capacity development for Uganda’s oil industry.  
 
The broader context of donor pluralism raises the question of the role of Chinese develop-




14 In 1974 Chinese aid reached the remarkably high proportion of 2% of gross national product. The propor-










openness of China to engage in Trilateral Development Corporations (TDC), trilateral pro-
jects and more equitable global development partnerships. Chinese donor involvement in 
Uganda has also taken place in the absence of TDCs with traditional western donors, with 
projects ranging from agriculture to healthcare. However, it is clear from existing literature, 
such as Mohan (2010), that the Chinese approach in Africa, as a whole, favours large 
scale infrastructure projects over sound institutional development and SME growth as a 
vehicle for economic development; the latter two being favoured by OECD donors. Critics 
claim that Beijing uses their development finance to create alliances with rulers of devel-
oping countries, to secure commercial advantages for Chinese firms, and to prop up cor-
rupt and undemocratic regimes in order to gain access to their natural resource endow-
ments (Tull, 2006; Kaplinsky et al., 2007; Naím, 2007; Pehnelt, 2007; Tan-Mullins et al., 
2010; Marantidou & Glosserman, 2015). Respondents in this study noted very little Chi-
nese donor involvement in Ugandan local content development, although some noted Chi-
nese sponsored roads and infrastructure in delivering overall benefit to the economy and 
servicing the oil industry15. 
6.5.1 Stakeholder Cooperation and the Creation of Pockets of Effectiveness 
In this case study, the importance of an interventionist approach cannot be underesti-
mated, as the data infer that donor interventions have been integral to the delivery of local 
content and in the creation of exceptional academic and vocational institutions. Pockets of 
Effectiveness (PoE) refer to exceptionally well-functioning government or government-
supported agencies in countries that have otherwise poor governance and weak public 
sectors (Leonard, 2008, 2010). In Uganda, notably through the E4D/SOGA programme, 
but also through the involvement of other donor stakeholders such as the Belgian Devel-
opment Agency, Enabel, and the World Bank, it is possible to observe the delivery of ef-
fective capacity development projects, albeit, sometimes without considerable Ugandan 














Recent projects have and continue to play an important role in upgrading institutions and 
courses to develop human capacity across the industry, including accredited welders and 
craftsmen, whilst providing significant support to nascent Ugandan enterprise. The degree 
to which these projects take place beyond government remits, notably the use of private 
institutions for education and training interventions and not state institutions, potentially re-
flects the prevalence of ‘Thinking and Working Politically’, taking into account Uganda’s 
bureaucratic and often unpredictable political processes. However, another manifestation 
of the increasingly politically informed interventions is the involvement of the development 
agencies beyond purely financial contributions. This can be observed in project appraisals 
which assign substantial weight and funding to ‘institutionalising systematic reforms’ and 
salaries for the international consultants who oversee project implementation. As will be 
discussed in the following writing, the approach taken by development agencies and very 
notably the E4D/SOGA project, is delivering increasingly relevant and improved develop-
ment outcomes through cooperation and building on previous development interventions.  
 
Respondents noted that the E4D/SOGA project is being implemented at the request of To-
tal and reflects the industry’s need for good technical skills, however, the programme is 
not limited to Uganda, or reflect countries of Total’s operations, and is also being imple-
mented across other East African nascent oil and gas industries (Kenya, Mozambique and 
Tanzania). Since 2015, the German Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (BMZ) together with the UK Department for International Development (DFID - 
moved to new Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office in Sept 2020 with re-
duced budget), the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), the EU 
and oil operators have collaborated with the Uganda government and private sector to im-
plement a project aimed at boosting the capacities of Ugandan youth and enterprises. As 
discussed, the central instrument of cooperation, primarily between industry and the do-
nors, was considered vitally important among respondents in ensuring the programme’s 
ongoing relevancy and improved development outcomes.  
 
When discussing PoE, Roll (2014) comments on underlying “foundational legacy”, a term 









necessary in that without their existence and interactions, PoE might not occur. Numerous 
donor initiatives and ongoing but often ineffective Ugandan government involvement has, 
on its own, not delivered PoEs. However, the accumulative interventions coupled with in-
creasingly relevant and politically informed donor support is delivering improved out-
comes. Manifestly we can see that public sector institutions are partnering and providing a 
practical base (such as the Nakawa Training Institute, also a former recipient of Korean 
development aid) for these upskilling programmes to take place. Although many of the 
practical bases being used by E4D/SOGA and Enabel are private institutions such as The 
Assessment and Skilling Center (TASC), Stanbic Bank's Business Incubator and Sun-
maker, and resultantly, are bypassing state institutions.  
 
In following on from the notion that donor interventions benefit from existing capacity, as 
discussed by Roll (2014) and Kuwajima (2016), PoEs can be attributed to “stylised se-
quential order” which explains the process of evolving and overcoming obstacles which in 
turn allow the institution or agency to become exceptional. Whilst the E4D/SOGA project 
as well as those being implemented by Enabel and the World Bank are partnering with 
both public and private institutions, the notion of stylised sequential order suggests that 
these institutions have been able to overcome obstacles such as corruption, a lack of po-
litical willing and mismanagement which in turn has made them viable partners for devel-
opment agencies. UPIK, for example, despite a number of years of underachievement, 
has become an exceptional public institution in that it is now capable of delivering the ac-
credited courses required; in 2018, UPIK launched 6G Welding training in “partnership 
with CB&I, GIZ E4D/SOGA and Bureau Veritas” and had trained 50 welders to American 
Welders Society standards by October 2019 (Project Update provided by GIZ). This, in 
turn, is owing to the earlier involvement of the World Bank, who’s ongoing projects sought 
to upgrade the UPIK and Uganda Technical College of Kichwamba (UTC) and add a new 
third institute in Nwoya district through investments in physical infrastructure, goods, cur-










In Uganda, the commitment of willing and well-resourced donors has been integral in the 
development of PoEs. Whilst these institutions existed prior to the most recent interven-
tions, donor funding and expertise has transformed average institutions and courses into 
strong and relevant offerings for the oil industry. Respondents highlighted institutions such 
as UPIK and Nakawa Vocational Training Institute as being prime examples of this. As we 
have noted, the oil price crash has not engendered greater operator investment in the de-
livery of broad-based local content development, particularly in light of the deteriorated 
planning horizon. And, as will be explored in Chapter 7, Ugandan governance alone is un-
likely to deliver the PoEs required to develop professionals for the oil and gas industry or 
engender a wave of Ugandan enterprise. As such, the involvement and interventions of 
donors in recent years has been entirely necessary in actualising local content develop-
ment objectives by implementing a well-funded and well-aligned set of programmes and 
initiatives. Whilst the increased relevancy of donor interventions has not been induced by 
the oil price crash, it is certainly timely.  
 
 
No. Project Planned Activities Target numbers Current Status 
A ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT 
1. Upgrading HSE stand-
ards and practices in 
Ugandan enterprises 
 
(06/2019 - 12/2019) 
 
! Development of ToR to 
up-scale the project. 
! Evaluation of bids and 
award of contract 
! Project kickoff 
! Call for applications and 
selection of companies 
! NEBOSH Training of 30 
local companies (2 deci-
sion makers from each 
company) 
! Coaching for 30 compa-
nies 
! ISO 45001 certification 
of 6 of the best 30 com-
panies 
! 60 decision makers 
NEBOSH certified  
! At least 6 companies 
ISO 45001 certified at 
the end of project 
! 300 jobs created in par-
ticipating companies 6 
months after training 
and coaching ends 
! The Assessment and Skilling Center (TASC) was 
contracted to implement the HSE project on be-
half of E4D/SOGA following a competitive ten-
dering process 
! Following a call for applications in print (Daily 
Monitor and New Vision of 18th June 2019), 
online (TASC, PAU, UCMP and AUGOS, among 
others) and on radio (Central Broadcasting Sta-
tion and 
Capital FM), Seventy-One (71) companies ap-
plied for the training. 30 of whom were selected 
based on a criterion developed in line with 
E4D/SOGA performance indicators. 
! This project was launched on Monday, 22nd July 
2019 at Fairway Hotel. 









2. Bid management train-
ing and coaching II p 
 
(06/2019 - 12/2019) 
! Development of TOR to 
upscale the project 
! Evaluation of bids and 
award of contract 
! Project kickoff 
! Call for applications and 
selection of companies 
!  Training of 65 local en-
terprises (2 people per 
company) 
! Coaching for 65 compa-
nies 
 
! 130 decision makers 
trained and coached to 
improve bid manage-
ment within their com-
panies 
! 500 jobs created in 
companies due to in-
creased number of bids 
won 6 months after 
training ends 
 
- After a competitive tendering process, E360, 
emerged as a winner and was contracted to im-
plement the bis management training and 
coaching project on behalf of E4D/SOGA 
- E360 then made a call for applications for Ugan-
dan companies willing to take part in the train-
ing. A total of 190 companies applied. 65 of 
whom were selected to participate in the train-
ing that was launched on Monday, 15th July 
2019 at Hotel Africana in Kampala 
- The launch marked the beginning of the train-
ing. 
3. SME support pro-




(06/2019 - 12/2019) 
 
 
! Development of project 
concept and project 
documents 
!  Contract signing 
! Project kickoff 
! Training and improved 
coaching of -300 SMEs 
in Kampala according to 
tested programme 
! Upscaling the incuba-
tor's approach to 160 
SMEs to be trained in 
Gulu and 
Mbarara districts (new 
tender for service pro-
vider in regions) 
 
 
! 300 SMEs in Kampala 
!  160 SMEs in Gulu and 
Mbarara (in total 760 
decision makers) 







! Project supporting documents for 
this project were successfully compiled and au-
thorized by 
E4D/SOGA's Country Office. 
! A contract was signed between Stanbic Bank's 
Business Incubator and E4D/SOGA. Formerly, 
Stanbic Bank's Business Incubator was offering 
SME training in Kampala only but with 
E4D/SOGA's technical and financial support, the 
Business Incubator will be able to extend their 
services to Gulu and Mbarara this year. As such; 
! SME training in Kampala is ongoing  
! Training to start in the regions: 
! Gulu: 6th August 2019 
! Mbarara: 13th August 2019 













(09/2016 - 05/2020) 
! Develop business 
model for SWRW HGV 
and PSV school 
! Master trainers training 
! Teachers training for 
school and broader sec-
tor 
! Adapt EAC curriculum 
to industry require-
ments, specifically oil 
and gas 
! Outreach campaign 
! Train drivers according 
to EAC Standard (done 
by SWRW) 
! Develop synergies with 
other private partners 
! Match drivers 
! 500 drivers trained by 
2020 based on the EAC 
curriculum (refresher or 
new license acquisition) 
! 150 drivers to find 
employment in 
Uganda's transport and 
logistics industry. 
 
! The Heavy Goods Vehicles and Passenger Ser-
vice Vans training School is running at full capac-
ity (delay due to long registration process) 
! 133 drivers trained including 
! 3 master trainers and 12 driving instructors 
! The training is done according to the East frican 
Curriculum by E4D/SOGA's implementing part-
ner Safe Way Right Way 
! Adaptation of EAC Curriculum to industry re-
quirement, particularly, 
oil and gas is ongoing through consultations with 
relevant stakeholders 
! Bid for Total E&P tender to train 100 HGV drivers 
handed in in line with 










5. Skills for Construction 
Project (S4C) 
 
10/2018 - 12/2019 
(extension planned to 
02/2020) 
 
! Develop project concept 
with industry and TOR 
!  Tender for service pro-
vider and awards of 
contract 
! Develop practice-ori-
ented training according 
to ECITB standards 
! Outreach campaign us-
ing IT-tool and selection 
of students 
! Training of student 
! Career advice and 
matching through con-
sultant 




 1,500 students trained 
in 
basic construction, HSE 
and level 1 ECTIB 
 525 students trained to 
ECITB level 2 in rigging 
or 
pipe fitting 
900 students placed in 
internships and jobs 6 
months after the train-
ing 
 
! Project concept was developed 
!  Tendering for a service provider was done and 
the contract was awarded 
to Solid rock and GOPA. The two firms are a 
partnership implementing 
on behalf of E4D/SOGA, the Skills for Construc-
tion (S4C) Project. 
! The S4C project was launched on 26th June 
2019 at Nakawa Training Institute in Kampala by 
the Minister of State for Minerals, Hon Peter 
Lokeris 
! Practice oriented training according to ECITB 
standards was developed 
and adapted to the training 
! Outreach campaigns were 
! undertaken to promote and attract 
students to apply for the training 
both in Kampala and Pakwach 
including, on radio adverts and 
brochures, among others. 
! 130 students were trained and have completed 
level 1 ECITB 
!  66 students that received training have com-
pleted level 2 ECITB 
!  Internship matching kicking-off 
! Further outreach campaigns planned 
! ECITB accreditation of 1 Vocational Training In-
stitute is ongoing 
 
6. Total GIZ welders train-
ing 
! Contracts for training 
providers awarded by 
Total 
! E4D/SOGA supports 
project management 
and quality assurance 
and contributes a mod-
ule on work readiness 
as well as internship 
placement for selected 
students 
200 welders trained and 
to American Welders So-
ciety 2G and 4G levels 
 
50 students completed training 
 










7. Heavy Lifting 
 
(Planned to Start 
08/2019) 
! Development of project 
concept and documents 
! Contract signing 
! Project kickoff 
! Selection of students 
through HR firms 
! Training and certifica-
tion of Heavy Lifting op-
erators 
! Matching of graduates 
through HR firms 
Between 200 women, 
men and youth trained as 
heavy equipment opera-
tors and supporting trades 
Project supporting documents were compiled 
8. Skills and Capacity for 
Organizational Produc-
tivity and Employment 
(SCOPE) 
 
(12/2016 - 08/2019) 
 
! Project developed, 
warded and kicked off 
!  Capacity development 
of 5 VTis to improve 
management, market 
orientation and attract 
and enrol fee paying 
trainees 
!  Upgrade VTI work-
shops 
! Strengthen linkages be-
tween the VTIS and the 
private sector for ap-
prenticeship, internship 
and sponsorship 
! Integrate work readi-
ness and entrepreneur-
ial trainings 
! Support VTIs to imple-
ment user friendly MIS 
! Support VTis to form 
networks for sharing 
best practices 
! 2,000 people in Alber-
tine region trained in 
relevant technical and 
practical skills for oil 
and gas related sectors 
! 5 VTis is strengthened 
! 1 VTI supported to 
achieve C&G accredita-
tion 
! 500 people certified in 
C&G in trades 
 
! 1,245 people trained 
! 191 students received international certifications 
!  200 students placed in industry placements 
!  415 students placed into decent jobs tot 
! Activities stopped in March 2019 due to allega-
tions of fraud which have been confirmed by 









9. Ready to Work (RtW) 
Project 
(08/2017-11/2019) 
! Project developed with 
Barclays Bank and UMA 
!  7 VTIs and 3 universi-
ties selected as partners 
! RtW Training plan de-
veloped with VTIS 
! Training of VTI trainers 
!  Coordinate trainings at 
VTIS 
! Support and advise 
UMA on 
matching students 
! Develop an IT-Tool to 
match 
graduates with private 
sector employers for in-
ternships 
! Impact evaluation study 
design 
• 20,000 Ugandans are 
trained 
• 5,500 graduates (50% 
women) trained in work 
readiness skills 
• 1,200 internships pro-
vided 
• 1,480 youth in jobs 
 
• 1,300 graduates trained 
• 366 students placed in internships and jobs 
• IT-Tool in final development stage 
• Local subsidy with UMA renewed 









10.  ! Use monitoring and 
evaluation of impacts to 
check/confirm project 
strategies and learn for 
future measures 
! Conceptualize phase II 
of overall regional pro-
gramme in discussions 
with partners and fund-
ing partners 
(DFID, NORAD, BMZ, 
EU) 
! Country assessment 
and academic M&E 
support in Uganda to in-
form strategy for phase 
II, 
! Capitalize on current 
approach and the ex-
pertise developed and 





! RWI contracted, study designs almost ready for 
Skills for Construction and Ready to Work 
! Country assessment starts Monday,29th July 
2019, afterwards meetings 
with donors and National Steering Committee 
planned 
! Discussions with Donors at HQ level ongoing, 
BMZ has extended the commission until 
12/2023, NORAD 




The data obtained in this research highlights that the oil price crash has engendered, di-
rectly and indirectly, small movements towards a more localised oil industry in Uganda. 
The exponential growth which many Ugandans were expecting has not been forthcoming. 
Instead, we can observe incremental developments, with the concept of an evolving and 
more local operating model, occasionally blurred with the notion of an industry forced into 
reactive changes in order to minimise costs. Nevertheless, the progress that has been 
made, albeit small, must be considered an important development. 
 
It is possible to characterise the impacts of the oil price crash into short-term and long-
term effects. Immediately following the oil price crash, we can observe a reduction of ex-
patriate staffing and a reduction in local content development spending. More recently, the 









the roles previously occupied by expatriates, a small realignment of operator procurement 
with government expectations in 2019 and a more collaborative approach to local content 
development. This collaborative approach, be it by design or good fortune, is delivering on 
many broad-based local content development objectives that will allow for greater local 
participation as the industry moves forward to production.  
 
We can also observe subtle differences in operator commitments to local content in light 
of the lower oil price. Tullow was the first to localise procurement at a maintenance level, it 
appears that CNOOC and Total have moved in the same direction in 2019. A similar 
movement can be observed in employment, with CNOOC and Total moving towards the 
more localised position already occupied by Tullow. With regards to local content develop-
ment, respondents contended that Tullow and Total, particularly, had increased their en-
gagement with capacity development projects, notably the E4D/SOGA project with Tullow 
as financier and Total as a partner. CNOOC’s role is less clear; the Chinese SOE Sun-
maker has been set up in Kampala to deliver accredited courses for the wider industry but 
respondents were critical of CNOOC’s absence in other broad-based local content devel-
opment.  
 
Respondents contended that operating more locally was a more cost-efficient business 
model and that one would expect cost-conscious operators to pursue localisation more 
readily than can be observed. As discussed in Chapter 5, it does appear that wholesale, 
accelerated localisation is in conflict with CNOOC’s mandate to deliver work and contract-
ing opportunities for Chinese people and businesses and Total’s commitment to existing 
recruitment and onboarding processes and a reliable, international supply chain. As noted 
by an operator employee, the current proportional level of contracting will not be sustained 
when the industry restarts, as major international companies will be best placed to take on 
major contracts. As a result of the aforementioned factors, it is unlikely that we will see 
greater localisation in the short-medium term and following the approval of the field devel-
opment project; although, the net-value to the economy will increase vastly with greater 










The increasing relevancy of donor interventions in developing indigenous oil and gas ca-
pacity was a major finding emerging from this research. Donor and development agencies 
have long filled a void in expertise and funding, in the case of Uganda, especially in areas 
related to education. However, more recently, the trend of development interventions to 
focus on the delivery of employable skills in developing sectors has seen donor relevancy 
grow. The popular narrative among respondents is that Total and Tullow played an im-
portant role in GIZ’s implementation of the E4D/SOGA project in Uganda and that opera-
tors are continuing to work with the project implementor, this is supported by those in the 
development agency community. Whilst the nexus of interaction between stakeholders 
has played an important role in increasing the relevancy of donor interventions, the timely 
nature of these interventions, in the lower oil price environment, may prove to be vitally im-
portant as Uganda moves towards oil production.  
 
Although further research would be necessary, I believe that there are few examples of a 
place where foreign stakeholders have been so integral to the development of local ca-
pacity for oil and gas. As such, it is clear that there are a number of shortcomings with re-
gards to state-led local content development in Uganda; copious data obtained in this 
study suggest that this is a result of government failings, both concerning human and en-
terprise capacity development and engendering local participation. Respondents noted 
how Ugandan companies were originally only capable of providing very basic services, 
such as security and catering, even a Kenyan company was contracted to deliver logistics 
capability between Mombasa and exploration sites in Uganda. Indigenous capacity has 
developed over the past 15 years, however, some respondents were sceptical as to the 
extent to which Ugandans and local companies will be able to benefit as the industry 
moves forward. The following chapter explores indigenous contributions to local content 










Chapter 7: The Ugandan Context, a Good Local Partner?  
 
This chapter argues that there have been severe failings in the governance of local con-
tent which have hindered its timely development and negatively impacted its adoption. My 
research indicates that an incapacitated bureaucracy has mismanaged the actualisation of 
the government’s local content objectives, failing to bring in regulation and legislation in a 
timely manner to mandate its adoption but also not implementing practical measures to 
aid the development of local capacity. This failing is particularly manifest within education; 
despite oil being discovered in the country 15 years ago, Uganda’s universities and col-
leges are still largely unaligned with the needs of the industry. Resultantly a significant 
number of Ugandans have graduated from university or college on oil and gas related 
courses without the practical skills and accreditations required by the risk-adverse indus-
try.  
 
In this chapter I also argue that the involvement of the executive in oil governance has not 
been conducive to enhancing local content development and adoption in line with the gov-
ernment’s own desire for a localised oil industry. My research shows that the President’s 
decision to delay the progression of Uganda’s oil and gas project to the ‘development 
phase’ has impacted the business confidence of operators, services companies and EPC 
contractors and their ability to invest in long term capacity development in Uganda. I also 
contend that the President’s involvement and political influence on the administration of oil 
and gas has negatively impacted the inclusivity of the industry, allowing certain groups 
closest to the executive to benefit, notably from scholarships and career opportunities. It is 
also argued that CNOOC has benefitted from a preferential arrangement with the govern-
ment and can dictate terms relating to local content due to Uganda’s indebtedness to the 
Chinese state; this itself is also a consequence of executive intervention in resource gov-












This chapter explores the role of the government, the public sector and Uganda’s aca-
demic and vocational institutions in developing local content and making provisions to en-
sure local content objectives are achieved. Whilst local content regulation mandates that 
the operating partners and other companies conform with Ugandan objectives, the role of 
the state can be much more expansive in both contributing to and inhibiting the growth 
and adoption of local content, closely resembling a developmental state. Institutionalist 
theorists, such as Mkandawire (2001), have underlined the positive impact that dynamic 
and proactive state intervention can have in avoiding market failure in developing econo-
mies. These contributions, commonly referred to as dirigisme, also highlight the value of 
state intervention in local content and local capacity development.  
 
As noted by Hansen et. al. (2014), outsiders are frequently puzzled as to why African gov-
ernments “simply do not implement the right policies to benefit from extractive FDI” (Han-
sen, Buur, Therkildsen and Kjær 2014, p. 20). The notion of extractive institutions (Ace-
moglu & Robinson, 2012) goes someway to delivering an in-depth understanding of why 
some institutional frameworks do not always prevent corruption and other illicit behaviour. 
The Ugandan state and those who work for it have been no stranger to criticism, both 
within the country and by international observers. Existing research has highlighted the 
challenges and pitfalls of resource governance (Van Alstine, 2014; Pahl-Wostl, 2009) par-
ticularly across sub-Saharan Africa where many of Uganda’s continental neighbours have 
failed to deliver the promised benefits of oil and gas. Despite the prophetic examples of 
Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea, among others, and the extensive research on good re-
source governance, Uganda’s experience has not necessarily reflected literature on best 
practice (Thurber et. al. 2011; Tordo et. al. 2013,). 
 
Contrary to this body of literature on best practice, Uganda’s President, Yoweri Museveni, 
demonstrates a considerable degree of discretionary power which is indicative of the inef-
fective political system and administration which operates beneath him. In the absence of 
restraints and altruistic elites, few have reaped the benefits of the industry with a number 









As a result of a highly personalised form of governance and an under-resourced civil ser-
vice, respondents talked of severe public sector lethargy across multiple arms of govern-
ment, notably education, which further hampers attempts to deliver on local content aspi-
rations. With further regards to political factors, respondents contended that Uganda’s in-
debtedness to China has afforded CNOOC greater bargaining power and the capacity to 
flout local content regulations.  
 
This chapter also discusses the challenges around the delivery of tertiary education16 in 
Uganda. Tertiary institutions play an important role in the development of future capacity 
for the oil and gas industry, from the relatively small number of degree educated profes-
sionals absorbed by operators to vocational training for broad-based local content in the 
wider value-chain. Despite the time afforded by the delay of the development project, it 
was found that Uganda’s academic and vocational institutions have been largely unsuc-
cessful in aligning their offering with the needs of the oil and gas industry, with the culpa-
bility seemingly not lying with the international stakeholders. Whilst many young Ugan-
dans have invested their time and money to study and pursue a career in oil and gas, the 
pursuit for many has a been a ‘white elephant’ with the promise of well-paid jobs, fre-
quently noted in the media and pro-Museveni newspaper, ‘New Vision’, not corresponding 
to real prospects.  
 
This chapter addresses my third research question. The chapter dives deep into topics 
pertinent to the Ugandan political economy, including its political settlement, institutional 
framework but also education, and assesses its impact on the oil and gas industry and the 
actualisation of local content objectives. In particular this chapter also analyses the state 
of Uganda’s institutions in light of the president’s discretionary power and penchant for mi-
cro-managing the oil sector. The first two sections of this chapter assess the impact of fac-
tors relating to Uganda’s political economy on local content and its development in 













given to misgovernance and corruption in section 3, criticisms frequently levelled at gov-
ernments across sub-Saharan Africa. Sections 4, 5 and 6 assess Ugandan led progress in 
education, training and other capacity development initiatives.  
 
7.2 The Political Environment Surrounding Oil and Gas in Uganda and its Impact on 
Local Content Adoption and Development 
 
Akin to existing research on Uganda’s resource governance (Tangri and Mwenda, 2019; 
Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey, 2016), this study acknowledges that the Ugandan govern-
ment’s approach to resource governance has not heeded the prophetic examples of the 
African states that have preceded them. This study finds that the government’s manage-
ment of the oil and gas industry has not been conducive to the development of local con-
tent, primarily due to the creation of an uncertain business environment characterised by 
delays and the unconstitutional involvement of the executive.  
7.2.1 Separating Politics from Bureaucracy 
Respondents of this study found it difficult to distinguish between the involvement of the 
executive and the bureaucracy despite the existence of measures (the Norwegian Model, 
as referred to in Chapter 2) to ensure commercial, policy, and regulatory functions are all 
managed by different administrative institutions and not the executive body. Historical 
studies have demonstrated a degree of separation between politics and the civil service in 
Uganda (Miller, 1975); it was noted that in the absence of political unity, there was little will 
to tamper with the colonial inheritance of a neutral civil service during the nascency of the 
Ugandan state, although the neutrality of the pre-independence civil service is debatable. 
Herrick (1969) also highlights that throughout the 1960s, appointments below deputy min-
ister were made on the basis on merit, however, according to Miller (1975), Prime Minister 
Obote was aware of pressures to politicise the bureaucracy due to competing tribal inter-
ests for representation and appropriate distribution of social and development projects.  
 
More recent literature notes that bureaucracy in Uganda has become highly personalised 









the President and bypassing formal institutions; in highlighting this, Golooba-Mutebi and 
Hickey (2013) note the establishment of the Medicines and Health Services Delivery Moni-
toring Unit under State House rather than within the Ministry of Health. Meanwhile, Okuku 
identifies the exceptional role of the executive in resource governance, “the President en-
sured the rescinding of the parliamentary resolutions and demanded the caucus to grant 
him powers to sign the new deals between Tullow, Total and CNOOC in total disregard of 
the resolutions. (…) In February 2012, the President ordered the Minister of Energy to 
sign new PSAs and Farm-down contracts with Tullow, Total and CNOOC worth $2.9bil-
lion”17 (Okuku, J, 2015, p. 12; Baguma, Thawite and Nzinjah, 2012).  
 
Questionnaire respondents believed that the President’s involvement in negotiations had 
been effective in promoting local content. Question 2.15 of the first questionnaire asked 
respondents whether they were in agreement with the following statement, ‘The executive 
body’s (the President) prominent role in negotiations with operators has been effective in 
promoting local content’; 51.3% of respondents strongly agreed or agreed with the state-
ment, whilst only 22.3% strongly disagreed or disagreed. However, further investigation 
suggests that the President’s involvement has not been entirely positive, with most inter-
view respondents lamenting his role in the delayed field development project and a num-
ber of experts questioning the impact of his interference on administrative effectiveness. It 
may be the case that the ability to provide open answers during the interview process al-
lowed respondents to caveat their survey response, with many participants believing Mu-
seveni was committed to local content but not always supporting his government’s strat-
egy for developing it and increasing its adoption.  
 
The President’s reported level of involvement greatly undermines the institutional frame-
work which had been put in place with the assistance of foreign experts, referred to as the 
tripartite Norwegian Model. Beyond oil and gas, literature acknowledges that the personal-













dividuals, many of whom have refused to delegate significant decision-making responsibil-
ities; factors that have contributed to the ineffective, biased and corrupt nature of adminis-
trative institutions (Teja, 2018; Tangri 2010; Booth 2006). Respondents from this study 
concurred, noting that the executive body’s personalisation of resource governance has 
reduced administrative effectiveness, highlighting the frequent requirement for Presidential 
approval and the preeminence of loyal technocrats in advisory functions over government 
departments. A former operator employee noted, 
 
“It's not his mandate, the ministry is responsible for those negotiations. So yeah, I think, 
despite the fact that any government entity cannot take a decision without his approval. I 
mean if he says no, there's no way you can move however much you have done. For in-
stance, if you look at when the exploration phase ended, it's coming to about 7 years, but 
up until now, no single decision has been taken.” (27 June 2019) 
 
Survey and interview respondents contended that a notable manifestation of the Presi-
dent’s involvement in the oil industry and with regards to local content is the spilling-over 
of Sino-Ugandan relations into the oil and gas industry. Survey data suggest that CNOOC 
benefited from preferential arrangements, reflecting China’s growing influence over the 
country as a whole and Uganda’s considerable indebtedness to the Chinese state; a num-
ber of Ugandan employees and former employees of CNOOC concurred. 60.5% of ques-
tionnaire respondents answered, ‘Yes’ to the question ‘Does CNOOC have a preferential 
arrangement / relationship with the Ugandan government?’, whilst only 27.9% answered 
‘No’. In a follow up question, 48.6% of respondents responded, “Yes’ to the question, 
‘Does this relationship allow CNOOC to flout (disregard / not adhere to) local content re-
quirements?’, whilst 31.4% of respondents answered ‘No’. Langer et. al. (2020), noted that 
despite the operators forming a joint venture, they each negotiate their contracts sepa-
rately and have different access to the President; CNOOC according to their respondent, 
has best access to the President and “their things get done very fast” (Langer et. al., 2020, 
p. 119). Whilst hard data are unavailable, it can be noted that CNOOC has previously 
been the least localised of the operating partners; further investigation would be required 










Noting political settlement theory, whilst Uganda’s elites may be aligned with national de-
velopment objectives, the ruling collation has weak implementation capabilities. In general 
terms, this would suggest that CNOOC is less localised than the other operating partners 
as the state struggles to implement its local content prescriptions on the operators 
(CNOOC being the least willing to comply), rather than a result of elite level agreements. I 
challenge this notion, firstly because of the considerable data collected in this study but 
also such a discussion should take note of the vast topic that is Sino-Ugandan relations 
and the leverage that is debt to the Chinese state.  
 
Beyond the proposed preferential arrangements with CNOOC, the data obtained in this 
study highlight two direct consequences caused by the executive’s interference and deci-
sion to delay the field development. Respondents firstly point to the impact on business 
confidence, among all areas of the industry and consequently the industry’s ability to em-
ploy, train and invest in local content. Secondly, respondents disputed whether the de-
layed development project has allowed for local content to develop in line with industry re-
quirements, with many noting the considerable opportunity cost of the delay and the num-
ber of indigenous suppliers that liquidated or lost interest due to the sector’s inactivity. The 
President’s predominance over the institutions of state is very apparent in this area of re-
search and does prompt one to question whether administrative performance would have 
been improved without executive interference.  
7.2.2 Impact of Delayed Development Project on International Business Confidence 
and Local Content Adoption 
Overwhelmingly, interview respondents believe that the executive and the government’s 
lack of responsiveness to the proposed field development project has stifled local content 
and its development in Uganda. Respondents frequently detailed that fourteen years after 
the discovery of commercial quantities of oil, there are still no operational oil and gas sites, 
and as a result, no oilfield service companies or EPC contractors employing and contract-










“It was often drawn to my attention that Ghana discovered oil roughly at the same time as 
Uganda discovered the oil and I believe Ghana is now exporting oil and Uganda's only re-
cently broken ground, I think. So, you do wonder why things take so long.” (11 July 2019) 
 
Meanwhile, a former operator employee in Uganda noted, 
 
“I have to fault our government because it didn't do much when we started this. Look at 
him, Kenya, they started after and look at where they are now.” (19 June 2019) 
 
As discussed in Chapters 5 and Chapter 6, the employment and contracting of Ugandans 
and Ugandan companies has fallen greatly in recent years, owing to a lack of activity in 
the sector. First and foremost, the delay in the field development project has seen local 
employment by operators remain low following the oil price crash. In 2013, the year follow-
ing the proposal of the first joint development plan (Tullow Oil, 2013a, p. 6) to the Presi-
dent, 370 nationals were employed by the three operating partners; this had fallen to 168 
in 2018. Equally, in 2013 USD 106,439,118 was spent with Ugandan suppliers, in 2018 
this figure was USD 14,364,196. Although data provided by the government for 2018/2019 
are vague with regards to what is included within it, it is clear that there has been a huge 
fall in local content developing spending since 2013. The impact of this delay on the oper-
ators was reinforced by a senior consultant,  
 
“In the period around 2012, 13, 14, Tullow's shares fell by half because of non-response 
from Uganda to Tullow's development plans, as far back as that time Tullow put his plans 
on the table, to go ahead and produce and Uganda did not move to approve.” (20 June 
2019) 
 
Furthermore, the continued delay of the development project has also impacted the pres-
ence of EPC contractors and oilfield service providers, normally international, in Uganda. 
Whilst the delay pushes peak employment, expected during the development phase, into 
the future, a big opportunity cost is the lack of involvement of service providers and EPC 









that by falling behind East African neighbours, it is possible that EPC contractors and oil 
field service providers will recruit and train staff from nascent oil industries in Tanzania, 
Kenya, Mozambique and Madagascar, among others, and elect to take them to future op-
erations in Uganda, further disadvantaging indigenous Ugandan labour. One operator em-
ployee noted this occurrence,  
 
“They start their recruitment when the government says “maybe” concerning FID (Final In-
vestment Decision), they all come in, you know, their own pressure to employ, the local 
content. But when it reaches and the government keeps postponing, it demoralises them 
also to go with other countries. Like for Schlumberger, they have sub-African recruitment, 
so if it comes like Uganda, they keep on postponing, next year, next year, next year it 
goes to other countries to employ” (25 June 2019) 
 
As such, we can see that not only has demand for local content decreased as a result of 
government policy, but we can also see that businesses have been less available to invest 
in the development of indigenous capacity as the industry becomes sceptical of future pro-
gress. Resultantly, we can observe that the state’s governance and executive intervention 
have, at its very least, delayed demand for local content, pushing the promised national 
development further into the future.    
7.2.3 Impact of Delayed Development Project on Indigenous Capacity 
On the supply-side, a small number of respondents, from varying backgrounds, believe 
that the government has made a concerted effort to delay the progression of the develop-
ment project in order to provide more time for local capabilities to develop. It is undoubt-
edly true that the delay has allowed for more individuals to graduate from tertiary institu-
tions, the same goes for the cumulative number of companies that have declared them-
selves ready to service the industry. We have also seen the progression of the Kabaale 
Industrial Park, an initiative to create a supplier base in the Albertine Graben, although this 










Conversely, it was more commonly accepted that the delayed development project has 
had more negative consequences for indigenous capacity and its development. A number 
of respondents contended that there was actually fewer competent indigenous service 
providers now, ready and willing to service the industry, whilst some participants focused 
on the opportunity cost, contending that even if there has been a small increase in compe-
tent suppliers, there has been substantial economic damage sustained by existing and de-
funct suppliers. In Chapter 6 we observed that many indigenous businesses struggled as 
a result of the oil price crash and the lack of activity; interview participants highlighted that 
many local suppliers had borrowed heavily at the beginning of the decade and had not 
been able to internalise the associated costs and has since liquidated. Furthermore, it was 
also proposed that as a result of the falling and irregular demand, the appetite to service 
the oil industry has also diminished; a service provider employee noted, 
 
“The first thing is, is that all decline in the oil prices which occurred in 2014, that slowed 
down the market in Uganda. Many companies closed operations, drilling companies, ser-
vice companies, and now the wait, so that kind of killed the interest of people to carry on” 
(22 June 2019) 
 
As such, the notion that indigenous capacity has universally benefited from the additional 
time is not supported in this study. Participants noted that as registration of the potential 
suppliers for Uganda’s oil and gas sector started in December 2016, it is hard to compare 
supplier numbers now with the exploration period, however a number of industry figures 
were confident that many prominent suppliers were no longer operational or looking to 
service the oil industry.  A similar narrative was noted with regards to human capacity. 
Whilst it is undeniable that more Ugandans have enrolled themselves in vocational or aca-
demic courses in recent years, only a very small number have been able to gain experi-
ence in a working environment and many former industry employees have since lost their 
employment due to the sector’s inactivity. It was largely agreed that those with recent and 
significant experience could still be asset to the industry going forward, however, many 










“I mean they were laid off, during downsizing. So they have some experience working with 
operators but they've taken some time now, they have probably another job. So they 
would need some retraining but they are competent people” (27 June 2019) 
 
Whilst there is limited hard data to highlight the availability of indigenous capacity across 
the years, the data collected in this study infers that there are little, if any, benefit from the 
delay of the development project, with a number of respondents commenting that the 
costs outweigh any possible benefits. Whether this strategy will bear fruit is not something 
we will be able to properly assess until the government approves the field development 
plans and the industry can restart. However, it is clear to see why the President’s manage-
ment of the industry has been so heavily criticised, particularly by this study’s respond-
ents, as the strategy has risked the employment of Ugandans and indigenous contracts 
over the past decade years in favour of graduates and businesses in the next decade.  
 
7.3 ‘Misgovernance’ and its Impact on Local Content and Inclusivity  
 
Akin to other developing economies, the Ugandan government has frequently been the fo-
cus of accusations of corruption and misgoverance, and consistently ranks poorly on the 
annual corruption perception index by Transparency International (Ranking 137th in 2019, 
of 179; 179th on WGI Corruption Control Index of 209; 119th of 2019 in WGI Rule of Law 
Ranking). In this study, respondents contended that corrupt practices and misgovernance 
were greatly hindering the development of inclusive local content, allowing for a small 
group to benefit disproportionately and reducing opportunities for most Ugandans.  
7.3.1. Corruption and Ethnic Politics 
Beyond the extralegal involvement of the executive body, respondents delivered consider-
able criticism at the government’s commitment to good resource governance and inclusive 
local content development. Data gathered in this research brings into question the inclu-
sivity of Uganda’s local content objectives. There is evidence to suggest that politically 
connected elites have personally been able to benefit from the development of the oil in-









answered ‘Yes’ to ‘Have political elites captured the local content market for their own pri-
vate gain? Rephrased: do political elites have a monopoly on the Ugandan oil and gas 
supply chain?’, whilst only 21.4% of respondents answered ‘No’. Elite capture18 is not an 
uncommon occurrence in underdeveloped and developing states with weak institutions 
(Patey 2015; Polus and Tycholiz 2016). There is currently very little hard data to verify 
these claims in Uganda’s oil industry, however, media reports and scholarly articles, in-
cluding Muhumuza (2017) contend that Uganda has fallen victim to elite capture. Muhu-
muza highlights an environment whereby political elites can capitalise on inside-
knowledge of industry demands, regulatory requirements of the industry, business con-
nections and substantial wealth.  
 
The above sentiment has also been shared by Tangri & Mwenda (2013) and (Hansen et 
al. 2014). Tangri & Mwenda (2013) contended that patronage contributes to anxiety about 
the exploration and production of oil resources and consequently has an adverse effect on 
the operator and business confidence. A concerned operator employee noted “What do I 
do if the supplier I have chosen because it is the best company is overruled by the minis-
ter and he forces me to use a bad company?” (Hansen et al. 2014, p. 18). This study 
failed to find specific examples of politicians pressuring operators to use specific Ugandan 
suppliers, although it was noted that some individuals had been able to circumvent a fair 
recruitment process as a result of political patronage.  
 
The notion that the industry is not universally accessible was reinforced in the semi-struc-
tured interviews, with a considerable number of respondents highlighting the value of elite 
level connections and ethnic / tribal preference. It was suggested that MPs and high rank-
ing civil servants have significant influence over the hiring of Ugandan staff, noting that 
some people are only employed because of their political connections. An operator em-














recruitment process and how this can permeate into companies, even those without Ugan-
dans in decision-making positions, namely the operators, 
 
“Some positions are all about who knows me and are my friends ministers, like sometimes 
you just see like if you're in a recruitment HR just sit and you just receive a letter from par-
liament, telling you to recruit someone” (18 June 2019) 
 
More frequently, however, respondents were keen to point out the challenges of universal 
representation that exist because of the entrenched nature of ethnic and tribal19 politics in 
Uganda, most notably the prominent role of people from the West or the specifically the 
President’s ethnic group, the Banyankole20. Bareebe and Titeca (2013) note that Muse-
veni has faced accusations of promoting and encouraging tribalism and nepotism, provid-
ing the following example after the promotion of an officer from outside the favoured re-
gion, “having only one General out of six coming from outside the president’s person from 
a region other than the president’s to hold such a senior rank. They cannot portray re-
gional balance (Bareebe and Titeca, 2013, p. 43)”; these ratios are mirrored beyond the 
armed forces. Likewise, the data from this study infers that the President’s ethnic group 
occupies favourable positions inside and out of government and this is largely replicated 
across the oil and gas sector and its public and private stakeholders. One operator em-
ployee made the following comment, 
 
“You see it in paper as everywhere and people talking about it, that people from the West, 
that people, is areas where the president is from. So where the President is appointing, 
now he appointed someone from the West, so when he appoints someone from the West 
that person now has an influence there and that person will also appoint someone from 
there (…) you will find the majority of people in charge will be from the West because they 





19 Nine ethnic groups account for approximately 70% of Uganda’s ethnic groups, the largest group being the Buganda. Within each ethnic group, there are numerous tribes (Ame-
ber. 2019). Refer to Chapter 5 for more discussion of the ethnic and tribal makeup of Uganda. 










Preferencing towards those from Museveni’s tribe was a recurring theme of the research, 
although it is worth noting that a minority of respondents refuted its existence. There is no 
literature that highlights widespread tribal preferencing within the Ugandan oil and gas in-
dustry, although there is a body of literature that supports the uneven distribution of gov-
ernment positions; Bareebe and Titeca (2013) talk of the development of a self-serving oli-
garchy through the use of patrimonial structures to further the President’s personal rule. In 
noting the existence of these patrimonial structures Bareebe and Titeca (2013, p. 104) 
highlight the role of Museveni’s family and associates across the political spectrum and 
Ugandan economy, the following occupying roles in the oil industry, 
 
Geoffrey Kamuntu - He owns a procure-
ment firm that does consultancy work for 
the oil explorers in the Albertine region of 
Western Uganda. (He is a son-in-law to 






Albert Muganga - He is in import/export 
business and in 2008 his company 
Kenlloyds Logistics was awarded exclu-
sive rights to manage the country’s oil re-
serves in Jinja. The contract was can-
celled after protests from big oil compa-
nies like Shell, Caltex and Total. (He and 
the President’s son Muhoozi married sis-
ters (Ishta and Charlotte respectively), 
daughters of Foreign Minister Sam 
Kutesa) 
 
Whilst most respondents did not refute the predominance of the Banyakole, a number of 
respondents contended that there is a prevalence of different ethnic groups within different 
organisations in that business or administrative leaders and managers are likely to recruit 
and support people from their own group or tribe. One former operator employee noted 
the role they perceive patronage to play in recruitment in Uganda,  
 
“They advertise but I still believe that as a problem for all Ugandans is that they favour that 
own. That's the problem for Uganda profile interviews and get people in the right position 










“In certain organisations, now move away from oil and gas alone, you will find one group 
from one area, in another organisations you will find another group from a different area. 
Depending, as I said from the people who are doing the interview, they will also bring that 
people.” (27 June 2019) 
 
The prevalence of ethnic or tribal politics and, or, patronage through connections is in it-
self a challenge to the fabric of transparent and honest governance. Bac (2011) notes that 
the presence of connected elites reduces transparency during decision making and de-
creases the probability that corruption or wrongdoing is detected. Interview participants in-
ferred that the favouring of a tribe or peoples from one region was greatly hampering the 
inclusivity of local content and were concerned that such a patrimonial and nepotistic sys-
tem would breed more corrupt practices and greater elite capture. Although Uganda’s in-
stitutions are not extractive to the degree of Mobutu Sese Seko’s in neighbouring DRC 
(reference to Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012), these institutions lack the capacity to prevent 
elite capture in its entirety and promote inclusivity.  
7.3.2 Patronage and the Misallocation of Scholarships 
The overriding narrative within this section of the research was that there is a select group 
of well-connected individuals, almost exclusively from the Western region or Buganda who 
have and continue to benefit from international scholarships. As one operator employee 
noted, the recipients of these ‘enhancements’ are the ‘who’s who of Uganda’. Data col-
lected from both the questionnaires and the interviews infer that the funding and access to 
courses has not been distributed fairly among the population, instead respondents high-
lighted a system which fails to reward those from minority / non-Ankole or Buganda 
groups. Operating companies have been the main source of international scholarship 
funding, deductible against future earnings, who, arguably have little cause to involve 
themselves in ethnic / tribal politics or other forms of patronage; however, this supposed 










Respondents commonly spoke of the effect of selective scholarships on perpetuating a 
perennial circle of elitism. A graduate of Makerere University suggested that many of the 
people already in the industry were not known to them or their classmates, instead they 
had benefited from scholarships and a western education, 
 
“The list of people who are already in the industry, you keep wondering where they're 
coming from? But at the end of the day you hear stories of people who were taken abroad, 
educated from the other side (primarily Europe and the UK) to come and takeover.” (23 
June 2019) 
 
A publication from International Alert (2009) highlighted the concerns that some ethnic 
groups were more likely to benefit from enhancement opportunities and scholarships; it 
was noted that Banyankole people are disproportionally represented in government and 
were receiving preferential access to courses related to oil and gas, “rumours are already 
rife that Banyankole applicants have been given preferential treatment in being admitted 
to the new technical school being set up for oil experts at Makerere University” (Interna-
tional Alert, 2009). An international consultant reinforced this notion and eluded to the con-
nection between education, training and the cycle of job capture among a certain tribe, the 
respondent commented, 
 
“Although this year many institutions have been able to access funding (through Private 
Sector Foundation or Enabel - which is a Ministry of Education fund), we do find a majority 
of a certain tribe getting the high job position in governmental oil institutions.” (18 June 
2019) 
 
Discontent with this matter has also been raised in the Ugandan Parliament and more 
broadly in the media; MP Florence Ibi commented in the house “the names that are here 
on the list, which my honourable colleagues printed out, are not from any other part than 









there has been no published data which can be used to cross reference this; an interna-
tional consultant working within the Ugandan government highlighted the apparent lack of 
transparency in the scholarship selection process, 
 
“Since 2007 all major oil and gas companies in Uganda have continued to take Ugandan 
students for oil and gas training abroad to countries like UK and Scotland to study special-
ised oil and gas courses, but no known procedure for choosing such students is known.” 
(11 July 2019) 
 
Interview data was also reinforced by survey data from the second questionnaire. 55.8% 
of respondents agreed that, ‘Sponsored programmes for education and training have 
fallen to Uganda's political elite and those connected with them’, whilst only 30.2% of re-
spondents disagreed. Collectively, data from this study infer that sponsored programmes 
for education and training are unequally distributed amongst the population, furthering the 
exclusivity of the industry and reducing prospects for many Ugandans. Such a factor is 
concerning; operators are mandated to develop local content in a fair and inclusive man-
ner, however, appears this is being undermined by corruption and malpractice within the 
government and civil service. Once again, it appears that institutions lack the capacity and 
the autonomy to promote inclusivity where possible.   
 
7.4 The Role of the Ugandan State in Local Content Development 
 
Whilst scholars of political economics note that socialism has the capacity to allocate re-
sources effectively, it is widely accepted that free-market economies may not. In this 
study, we can observe that substantial resources, be it government funding or the time 
and savings of an individual student, have been inefficiently employed with the objective of 
developing Ugandan competences in line with the requirements of the oil industry. Align-
ing Uganda’s vocational and academic institutions with the requirements of the oil industry 









highlights ongoing challenges around education, with respondents almost unanimously cit-
ing problems with the adequacy of the curricula being taught and a dearth of accredited 
courses and institutions. 
 
As the nation had a dearth of relevant capacity in the early 2000s, local capacity develop-
ment is an integral part of delivering local content objectives. 85.3% of respondents 
strongly agreed (45.3%) or agreed (40%) that there was very little workforce or supplier 
capacity in Uganda to support the development of an oil industry when commercial quanti-
ties of oil were found. Only 8% of questionnaire respondents disagreed with this statement 
(none strongly disagreed) and interview respondents were unanimous in agreeing with the 
fundamental premise that education, training and up-skilling is a necessity in developing a 
more localised industry. The capacity of the indigenous education systems to deliver for 
the industry occupies considerable importance in any local content development strategy, 
a former operating company manager commented, 
 
“If you want to train people then you have a good crop to pick from.” (20 June 2019) 
 
The following subsections explore the governance of education the role of state and pri-
vate institutions in indigenous capacity development in Uganda’s oil and gas industry. 
Data from this study highlight widespread shortcomings across the pedagogical spectrum, 
observing both continued misgovernance and resource misallocation.   
7.4.1 Primary and Secondary Education 
This study found that, as a result of widespread deficiencies in primary and secondary 
schooling, the number of students who were appropriately qualified to enrol on oil and gas 
related courses, both vocational and academic, was greatly reduced. The evidence sug-
gests that the narrowing of the skills pool is very apparent in the Albertine region, where 
there is a greater dearth of secondary schooling and in turn a dearth of relevantly qualified 
individuals who can enrol into tertiary education. Although most Ugandan interview partici-









system, international respondents were more critical. A manager from a development 
agency expressed considerable concern, 
 
“It's a bad educational system, a lack of funding. It went down to be 15%, now we are at 
10%, I think, of governmental funding, it's getting so bad that World Bank is refusing at the 
moment to go for a new global partnership in education. So that's really the process, you 
have to spend for somebody in to be education. Most of the education is paid by actors 
like, UNICEF, is paying it, World Bank is paying, the government is not investing in educa-
tion.” (17 June 2019) 
 
In July 2020, the World Bank announced it was providing USD 150 million of funding to 
Uganda to enhance secondary education in the country, but acknowledged that in 
2019/2020, education expenditure as a share of the national budget fell to just 10%, sub-
stantially less than the Sub-Saharan Africa average of 16% (World Bank Press Release, 
2020). It was indicated that the declining education budget contrasted with the growing 
number of Ugandans requiring primary and secondary education. The median age of 
Uganda is 15.9 years, meaning that more than approximately half of the population are 
expected to be in education, most of them reliant on state schooling. In recent years this 
has been exacerbated as Uganda has also taken in many refugees from neighbouring 
countries, predominantly women and children, furthering the burden on the education sys-
tem. A development agency respondent concurred, noting, 
 
“There's a lack of teachers and lack of infrastructure or lack of material, lack of modern 
training techniques. It's basically in rather bad shape. The worst of the surrounding coun-
tries” (11 July 2019) 
 
Furthermore, Uganda’s education system does not have universal reach, international 
bodies note a low survival rate in the completion of primary education, UNESCO states 









cessed in 2019), substantially below neighbouring and comparable countries in Sub-Sa-
haran Africa21. In addition to this, statistics from the Ugandan Ministry of Education and 
Sport in 2016 show that private secondary institutions vastly outnumber state institutions 
two to one (approximately 4,000 versus 2,000), such a scenario can only advance ine-
quality between the ‘haves and the have nots’ and raises questions about the standards of 
education across all these institutions. It is also worth highlighting that Uganda’s high 
achieving secondary schools are disproportionately located in and around the capital and 
not in Uganda’s oil rich region, a factor which continues to influence the truly local part of 
local content (four of the top five schools in the country are based in and around Kampala 
according to ‘Schools Uganda 2019’). One senior government technical employee made 
the following comment, noting the variance of secondary school achievement within the 
country and its effect on sub-national local content, 
 
“You know, in Buliisa, basically, some areas are with quite few secondary schools. The 
level and levels of people going beyond the O level, the secondary education, are few and 
when companies, for example, if you open a location and you tell people this is the voca-
tion, the minimum requirement is secondary school, you must have good grades in phys-
ics or whatever. Most people will be locked out. (…) With time, people will realise we need 
to do secondary, at least get a pass in physics to qualify to work with vocation or taking up 
from this. Then from there I go and do other certification”. (21 June 2019) 
 
As such, we can observe that the earlier stages of education can have a defining outcome 
on local content and its development as the skills’ pool is narrowed throughout the age 
groups. In 2012, only 60,000 to 70,000 students graduated from secondary school in 
Uganda and qualified to go on to university education (Galukande, 2018), a very small 
proportion of the overall age group. Galukande et. al. states that only 35% of these 60,000 
to 70,000 graduates went onto find places in public universities, with the most being ab-
sorbed by Makerere University (Galukande et. al. 2018, p. 92). Kasekende, Deputy Gover-













year enrolled at university, suggesting that most school graduates will be absorbed into 
private universities. Meanwhile, entry to vocational courses is higher owing to the lower 
entry requirements and ongoing efforts to improve TVET (Technical and Vocational Edu-
cation and Training) skills across the country at all age groups. According to Dr Wilfred 
Nahamya, deputy executive secretary at the Uganda Business and Technical Examination 
Board, candidates registering for technical and vocational assessments increased from 
62,896 in 2016 to 86,342 in 2017 and to approximately 100,000 in 2018 (Agaba, 2019). 
 
A 2018 publication by UNICEF concluded that declining education outcomes, namely the 
number of students completing school grades and receiving ‘O’ levels, is “strongly corre-
lated with reduced sector spending” (UNICEF, 2018); UNICEF add that of 1.7 million stu-
dents at P1 (age four-five) only 100,000 complete ‘O’ levels. As such, despite the positivity 
shown by a number of Ugandan respondents in this study, published data and official re-
ports overwhelmingly corroborate the comments of international respondents who took 
part in this study. Uganda’s primary and secondary schooling is underfunded, lacking in 
public (state) institutions at secondary level across the country and as a result places edu-
cation out of the reach of many individuals. In turn, this means that there is a smaller 
group of individuals who have the necessary academic attainment to enrol on oil and gas 
related courses, academic or TVET. The data above highlights that overall enrolment to 
tertiary education represents a very small proportion of the age group and as such, not 
only do opportunities for inclusivity decrease, but we can observe a narrower and less di-
verse talent pool. In underdeveloped nations, underfunding of state activity is widespread, 
and whilst education represents a primary tool of an interventionist state to raise human 
capacity and engender future national development, the Ugandan state is underutilising 
this tool, the impact of which is likely to undermine the inclusivity of formal industries like 
oil and gas.  
7.4.2 Challenges and Misgovernance of Local Content Development in Uganda 
Prior to the discovery of commercial quantities of oil, Uganda did not possess a great ca-
pacity for education and training, this is highlighted further by its dependence on donor 









both specific to oil and gas and more general technical skills, was requiring of considera-
ble attention. This study found that the Ugandan government responded very slowly to the 
requirement to raise indigenous capacity in education and training, failing to put frame-
works in place and to equip government agencies with the funding and capacity to under-
take their mandates. An international consultant shared his observations,  
 
“I've worked in several other countries at a national level, in my experience, Uganda is 
probably the slowest to respond and adapt to put structures in place to make things hap-
pen.” (11 July 2019) 
 
This study noted two main shortcomings with regards to the state’s role in governing and 
engendering local content development. Firstly, respondents believed that there was a 
dearth of political will and a lack of preparation in genuinely developing local capacity 
through education. Secondly, it was found that government institutions were frequently in-
capacitated and suffered from insufficient technical capacity, to the extent where good ini-
tiatives were ineffectively implemented. 
 
Kasozi (2003) and Magara (2009) highlighted the challenges facing Uganda’s territory ed-
ucation system in the light of the expansion of public institutions from the 1990s and early 
2000s. The increasing number of universities22 and the expanding university population 
has required the development of great state and institutional capacity to provide appropri-
ate governance, or as Magara notes “the need for the provision of better management, 
control and governance of public universities” (Magara, 2009, p. 64). In this study, the 
data contend that the Government of Uganda had demonstrated little preparedness to de-
velop local capacity in line with the growth of the oil industry. A representative from an ac-





22 Of the 53 universities registered in Uganda in 2021, only one, Makerere University, existed before Muse-









“It is possible even to possibly go on the Hansard in parliament and not find any discus-
sion on oil until 2005, previously, before that no mention and that has an effect on, what, 
for example, the training institutions are focusing on, it has an effect on where government 
expenditure and investment is going in terms of educational institutions, in terms of human 
capital development.” (19 June 2019) 
 
Inadequate preparation is not unique to Uganda, Gyampo (2010) comments on inade-
quate preparation and sequencing in Ghana despite the nation pressing forward with pro-
duction a decade before Uganda. The depth of discourse in the political arena has greatly 
affected the timely preparation and planning in the field of education and training. When 
discussing the role of the government, participants commented, that in some cases, gov-
ernment bodies were and continue to be incapacitated due to a lack of funding and re-
source, and resultantly could not deliver the required guidance and leadership. Existing 
literature highlights the under-resourced nature of government bodies with education, the 
National Council for Higher Education (NCHE), responsible for evaluating national man-
power requirements and advising government on policy concerning institutes of higher ed-
ucation (GOU 2001: Article 5) was found to be lacking in adequate professional and tech-
nical capacity to carry out its mandate (Ssentamu, 2018). A senior representative from an 
association of academic and vocational institutions concurred,  
“There is no standardised way, even with which curriculum development is approached in 
Uganda. That is the truth, my brother. We have a National Curriculum Development Cen-
tre that is hugely, in my view, incapacitated. It cannot pick up, it cannot keep the pace with 
the ever evolving nature of the industries as to develop courses and curricula in time.” (26 
June 2019) 
 
This notion was well supported throughout the interview data and as such, it was inferred 
that the government’s ability to raise indigenous capacity has been hampered by une-
quipped and ill-prepared state institutions. Resultantly, there were no approved oil and gas 
curricula across Uganda’s institutions, no established standards for vocational education 
which corresponded to industry requirements and no established capacity for governing 









explored. Mwakali and Byaruhanga contended that Makerere University has been offering 
a Master of Science degree in Geology by coursework and thesis since 1999, however, 
the programme was started before the discovery of commercial petroleum reserves in the 
Albertine Graben and did not adequately cover the discipline (Mwakali & Byaruhanga, 
2018, p. 12). A respondent concurred, 
 
“Around 1995 to 99, 2000, when I was in the university, there was nothing like oil and gas 
on the Makerere university curriculum. So, there was not a course, maybe it was, an elec-
tive or something course, but at that time, no one had graduated to the level of where 
someone would get a certificate or diploma or degree in something or oil and gas related.” 
(19 June 2019) 
 
As a result, it is no surprise that many prominent Ugandan civil servants within the rele-
vant government departments (Petroleum Authority Uganda, Ministry of Energy and Min-
eral Development) or the Ugandan National Oil Company were educated overseas in the 
years prior to resource exploration; senior examples of those educated abroad in the early 
2000s include: 
 
Proscovia Nabbanja, Chief Executive Officer at Uganda National Oil Company Limited 
(UNOC), Imperial College London, MSc Petroleum Geoscience, 2003-2004 
Lyoidah Kiconco, Head of Exploration and New Ventures at Uganda National Oil Com-
pany Limited (UNOC), University of Cape Town, MSc, Petroleum Geoscience, Petroleum 
Sedimentology and Stratigraphy, 2004-2005 
Josephine Wapakabulo, Inaugural Chief Executive Officer at Uganda National Oil Com-
pany Limited (UNOC), Loughborough University, BEng and PhD 
 
Administrative capacity forms an integral part of institutionalist theory of effective govern-
ance and in this case study bureaucratic capacity in education is an important vehicle for 
actualising positive change within academic and vocational institutions themselves. As will 









its administrative capacity has proven a telling factor in managing the development of ter-
tiary institutions to educate and upskill Ugandans for oil and gas.  
 
7.4.2.1 Public Sector Lethargy in Education and Upskilling 
 
The data gathered infer that a number of promising initiatives to upskill and educate Ugan-
dans have been, and continue to be, ineffectively implemented by the civil service. Some 
respondents contended that Uganda’s administration was still finding its feet and lacked 
experience and technical knowhow, whilst others were critical of bureaucratic processes 
and unwilling individuals. A number of interview participants, primarily from the donor com-
munity, highlighted the lethargic nature of the public sector in Uganda and noted practical 
challenges of working with them. Respondents commented on the mis-functioning of the 
long-awaited Sector Skills Council, a potentially valuable platform for defining require-
ments, discourse and coordinating efforts in achieving the supposedly shared objective of 
upskilling Ugandans for the oil industry; an international consultant noted, 
 
“In 2017, that sector skills council (Oil and Gas Sector Skills Council) consisted of mainly 
or either the oil companies and training providers. Aside from that, there was very little in-
fluence or impact from the private sector, so it met very, very irregularly when it met, it was 
very often a foray (…) Unfortunately it wasn't happening effectively.” (11 July 2019) 
 
Many international participants concurred with this sentiment, with a small group highlight-
ing individuals within the civil service who have not been conducive to promoting dis-
course and the implementation of local content initiatives and interventions. One of these 
individuals highlighted was the civil servant overseeing the Sector Skills Council for oil and 
gas; three international respondents specifically noted the challenges of working with the 









noted that the Ugandan public sector was difficult to work with due to bureaucratic tenden-
cies and ‘institutional lethargy’23. These obstacles were not only highlighted by interna-
tional respondents, with a Ugandan industry leader noting the ongoing challenges of work-
ing with the Ugandan public sector on local content development topics,  
 
“But now whenever I would go to a meeting, we would go to a meeting to plan for a meet-
ing, to do a meeting for another meeting to organise a meeting. Now I'm from private sec-
tor, I don't get per diem, but they're getting the per diems for that kind.” (24 June 2019) 
 
In furthering this understanding of why the sector skills council for oil and gas has been 
largely ineffective, it was noted that private sector involvement (Ugandan enterprise) was 
lacking and not prioritised. The respondent pointed to the weakness of the private sector, 
commenting on the myriad of challenges facing the nascent Ugandan suppliers and that 
many of them were considerably more pressing than industry-wide skills development. An 
international consultant made the following comments, 
 
“It’s unreasonable to expect that you can set up powerful employer led bodies when the 
employers are not necessarily there and if they are there, they’re not necessarily inter-
ested in engaging in strategic skills development initiatives because they are more inter-
ested in trying to get their own companies either off the ground or operating profitably. So 
even though they recognise that skills development is a big issue, it's not really an issue 
where they want to take leadership. So, this was often said to me, in the cases of Uganda 
can, the private sector is not in a position to take leadership yet.” (11 July 2019) 
 
This issue is largely compounded by the absence of oil field service companies and EPC 
contractors. The Sector Skills Councils provide the opportunity for strategic skills develop-
ment to be led by the needs of all employers in the industry, but it is apparent that this op-
portunity to engage willing and available oil stakeholders is not being utilised by those who 













could be a valuable platform for the state to receive guidance on the ongoing requisite 
skills demand of the industry, which in turn represents valuable information for tertiary in-
stitutions, assuming they are capable and willing to act on it.  
 
Focusing on the wider administration of oil in Uganda, a public sector participant con-
tended that there are too many ministries concerning themselves with the development of 
human capacity for the oil industry, quoting a lack of coordination not only between exter-
nal partners but also within the civil service and arms of government; namely the Ministry 
of Labour, the Ministry of Education and Sport and The Ministry of Gender, Labour and 
Social Development (other departments are still broadly involved, such as the Ministry of 
Trade, Industry and Cooperatives). It was noted that Uganda sought international partners 
to assist with the capacity building and curriculum development of two centres of excel-
lence in the Albertine region. An international consultant expressed his surprise as to why 
it took three and a half to four years to award these contracts; the respondent made the 
following remarks concerning his experience upon arriving in Uganda,  
 
"They told me that it was being advertised in many, many places. They told me that they'd 
been on exploratory visits to South Africa and India and places like that in looking for cen-
tral partners, and they'd been unsuccessful in finding these potential partners. It all ran en-
tirely counter to my experience for example, of working in Saudi Arabia  
(…)  
(Concerning Uganda when the respondent was contracted to the Ugandan government 
and led the initiative) And in fact, it never proved to be problem. And we had very, very 
large numbers institutions from UK, from Ireland, from New Zealand, from Australia or 
many other countries around the world falling over themselves to be awarded those con-
tracts.” (11 July 2019) 
 
Uganda’s bureaucracy is susceptible to inefficiency (Yanguas & Bukenya, 2016) and it is 
clearly inferred from the data collected in this study that the civil service, has not been an 
efficient vehicle for driving local content initiatives forward. As the supposed leading force 









budgets for state institutions and overseeing curricula implementation, the state’s role 
within this multi-stakeholder environment cannot be understated. This study finds that 
shortcomings of state’s administration of education and training has had a negative impact 
on the growth of tertiary capacity to cater for oil and gas requirements. In institutionalist 
theory, bureaucratic performance is considered an integral predeterminant, not only of ef-
fective governance, but national development itself. Once again, we can observe that bu-
reaucratic capacity is insufficient in overseeing the development of an educational sector 
that reflects the oil industry’s requirements.   
 
7.4.2.2 Curricula Alignment with Industry Requirements 
 
In the absence of strong guidance and centralised leadership, academic and vocational 
institutions themselves have had a considerable degree of autonomy over the courses be-
ing delivered in their institutions. A consistent narrative throughout the semi-structured in-
terviews suggested that if institutions could prove they had, to a certain degree, the capac-
ity to teach their proposed courses, the government and the relevant institutions such as 
the National Curriculum Development Centre would not oppose its teaching. Respondents 
questioned the extent to which existing courses really engage with what is relevant to the 
oil and gas industry and challenged the forces perpetuating irrelevant teaching; notably 
the dissemination of primitive and unaligned curricula around Uganda’s tertiary institutions 
and the hiring of teachers immediately following graduation. The latter removing any op-
portunity for teachers to gain practical work experience or phronesis and for development 
reflection (Finlay, 2008).  
 
With regards to oil and gas skills’ requirements, there is a clear distinction between the 
role of the universities and the vocational institutes. University courses are expected to de-
liver an education that is relevant theoretically and practically to the intended role of the 
graduate in the oil and gas industry. Vocational courses, however, are not necessarily re-
quired to be specific to the oil and gas industry; for technical roles, such as civil craftsmen, 
mechanical technicians, electrical technicians or welders, the industry demands strong 










“Most skills that are required, that are good skills, they are not oil and gas, just good tech-
nical skills. So, again, I think this has kind of frustrated people (…) The skills required in 
development are basically technical skills that can be applied to any industry. So why are 
you spending time saying you're looking to create a university for oil and gas?” (reference 
to the Principal of the Uganda Petroleum Institute, Kigumba reportedly looking to achieve 
university status) (23 June 2019) 
 
15 years after commercial quantities of oil were discovered in Uganda, very few vocational 
institutions have reached a position to deliver the accredited vocational learning that meets 
industry requirements. It is important to note that skills acquired in vocational education 
institutions, such as carpentry, painting, scaffolding and welding, are most demanded by 
the industry before oil comes online. An international consultant who oversaw the recent 
development of TVET institutions commented on the delivery of the workforce development 
strategy and inferred that the vocational institutions should have been able to respond better 
to these requirements,  
 
“The workforce development strategy and plan was done with very close collaboration, as 
I understand that, you know, it predated my involvement, I think it was 2015 and we 
signed off, but it was all done with very close collaboration with the, at that time, Tullow 
and the two other major oil companies and they signed off and supported that strategy so 
that the strategy actually for example, specified appropriate standards and appropriate 
qualifications to which the providers in Uganda should have been able to respond. But 
partly that was dependent on getting these international partners (academic and voca-
tional partners) in place in order to help take that forward.” (11 July 2019) 
 
With regards to one specific institution, a number of respondents focused on the develop-
ment of the Uganda Petroleum Institute, Kigumba (UPIK), which was formed in the Alber-
tine-Graben region to respond to the industry’s demand for skilled technical workers. Re-
spondents highlighted an ongoing disagreement between UPIK and Tullow Oil (the main 









2009; the OAG report notes “Review of UPIK’s documents indicated that their initial curric-
ulum was designed without involving/consulting the oil companies” (OAG Report, 2015, p. 
42). The Observer (2013) noted that the majority of UPIK graduates are unemployable by 
the oil and gas industry due to lack of quality relevant skills. One of the institute’s first cohorts 
commented that, 
 
“When I went to UPIK, by that time, Tullow was the biggest operator in our industry. So 
Tullow, he complained to UPIK and they should just train people in the skills of welding 
and so on and so forth. Not about oil and gas drilling operation. So that collision has 
arisen around skills also.” (24 June 2019) 
 
A number of respondents contended that UPIK is still failing to heed the advice of the oper-
ators, regardless of the curriculum overhaul, as the institution seeks to gain university status 
and to become a hub institution for East Africa rather than focusing on the delivery of good 
technical skills. In contrast to most respondents, an international expert proposed there may 
be some benefit for such a move, suggesting that the university status will help address the 
stigma attached to vocational education. Despite the focus on UPIK, respondents believed 
that the lethargy with which curricula alignment has been addressed is not isolated to this 
institution alone. A proficient example market failure in Ugandan education revolves around 
the spread of ineffectual curricula throughout the country’s academic institutions. It is ap-
parent that vocational institutions and some universities have adopted and adapted an early 
curriculum from UPIK and it has been noted that this now forms the basis of many oil and 
gas courses around Uganda. Respondents also note that these curricula were comple-
mented further by course materials taken from the internet. A former UPIK student and 
current university lecturer noted that, 
 
 “If you go there (the universities), you see the list of people who have worked for UPIK, it 
is a big chunk of it. You can go to universities like Kyambogo and you can try to say, okay 
where did your curriculum come from and you’re going to find that people from UPIK were 
having a big stake in it. If you go to other private institutions and try to see where did the 










Respondents highlighted that many lecturers in oil and gas courses are recent graduates 
themselves, either from the same institution or from other institutions such as UPIK. Due to 
the nature of the industry and a low level of graduate absorption, many cohorts of students, 
UPIK graduates included, have gone on to seek professions outside of those intended for 
them, frequently in education with the curricula they were taught as the backbone of their 
teaching. Resultantly, the shortcoming of UPIK’s theoretically dense curricula have perme-
ated across Uganda’s tertiary education sector and continue to be taught in other institu-
tions, both vocational and university. The practical element of the pedagogy is still severely 
lacking as, in many cases, the teachers themselves have not had any substantial ‘hands 
on’ experience in the industry or during their studies. An international consultant com-
mented,  
 
“They don't have the staff who are capable of delivering those skills because the way in 
which teachers in Uganda are recruited is that they are recruiting from the universities as 
graduates. So, graduated as a mechanical engineer for example, you then do a teacher 
training course, you are then recruited by one of the training institute. You have no indus-
trial experience, and you have no practical skills. So, you may be a mechanical engineer, 
but can’t actually train anyone in welding because you don't have welding skills yourself. 
You understand the theory metallurgy, no doubt that metals fuse and all this kind of stuff, 
but you can't actually do anything with the welding.” (26 June 2019) 
 
Worryingly, many institutions have not heeded the advice of fellow stakeholders. Regard-
less of funding deficiencies or other constraints, Ugandan tertiary institutions continue to 
deliver courses with limited relevancy to the industry, instead of removing the course from 
its offerings. Resultantly, we can still observe courses like Oil and Gas Management and 
Oil and Gas Accounting being offered at UTAMU (Uganda Technology and Management 
University) and Victoria University respectively (among others), providing an entirely the-
ory-based education in complete contradiction to numerous reports, press releases, the 










Shortcomings in the development of curricula for the future oil and gas workers appear to 
reflect failures both on the part of the government, its administration and the tertiary insti-
tutions themselves. Younger respondents were critical of the education which they re-
ceived, noting grievances such as excessive course units, many of which were taken from 
free online resources, a lack of practical attachments and work experience among other 
factors. Uganda is not alone in its education system could benefit from greater standardi-
sation and regulation; these challenges are consistent across much of sub-Saharan Af-
rica. In channelling an institutionalist and interventionist approach to governance, it is most 
definitely the case that a more centralised and regulated approach could have seen re-
sources (public finances, student time and money) invested more efficiently in Uganda’s 
tertiary institutions. In the absence of strong sectoral governance, even in a mixed public 
and private market for tertiary education and training, we can observe a severe misalign-
ment with industry requirements that is only being truly addressed in light of increased do-
nor intervention.  
 
7.4.2.3 Underfunding and Insufficient Practical Learning Facilities in Tertiary Educa-
tion 
 
This study found that the capacity to deliver courses, regardless of their relevance, was 
greatly hindered by a dearth in tools, training equipment and facilities primarily due to fi-
nancing challenges. The notion that Ugandan state institutions are underfunded is well sup-
ported in existing literature; NCHE (2011), Ssentamu (2013) and Sejjaaka (2016) note the 
downward direction of funding per capita. Coupled with the costly nature of establishing and 
maintaining vocational facilities, here lies another reason as to why both academic and vo-
cational courses have frequently been lacking in practical, hands-on, or laboratory-based 
elements. An international consultant highlighted this practical challenge,  
 
“They lack the equipment and they lack the materials in order to deliver real skills. So if 
you come back to this issue that welding for example, how many of those institutions have 
facilities that are capable of training 6G welders, well probably only UPIK has that, as far 









need, they don't have the staff who are capable of delivering those skills because the way 
in which teachers in Uganda are recruited is that they are recruiting from the universities 
as graduates.” (11 July 2019) 
 
Existing literature proposes that the IMF / World Bank’s Structural Adjustment Programmes 
(SAP) stipulated that the government reduce its support for higher education (Tiberondwa, 
1998; Tiberondwa, 2001; Kasozi, 2003), resulting in dire conditions in the early 2000s; the 
situation was so neglected that of the 1813 established academic teaching posts in Mak-
erere in 2002, only 952 (53%) were filled (Makerere, 2003, p. 6). Mamdani (2006) highlights 
that vocational programmes began to proliferate, for which universities such as Makerere 
lacked both space and qualified staff. Consequently, Sejjaaka (2016) believes that decreas-
ing or stagnating government investments into university facilities, following the commer-
cialisation of academic qualifications, has largely been at the expense of practical educa-
tion. Despite these challenges, respondents contended that universities have embarked on 
offering courses in oil and gas for which they do not have the resources, both financial and 
physical, to deliver. A government technical expert in oil and gas, shared his reservations 
about the readiness of the tertiary sector to deliver relevant courses,  
 
“For example, universities may want to start something, but they don't have funds to buy 
the necessary equipment or for example, to teach petroleum engineering, you may need 
specialised laboratories to teach it effectively. So you may find actually, I think there is few 
universities, they have slowed some course because they lack the capacities, they lack 
the human capacity and the real infrastructure capacity to start because they want to offer 
quality and when they look at or do their due diligence around in other universities, they 
realise they will need a specialised lab to handle this type of work which they don't have, 
and they have to postpone some of their things" (21 June 2019) 
 
Throughout the interviews, a number of young professionals reaffirmed that their educa-
tion did not meet their expectations in terms of practical experience, either in a laboratory 
or workshop environment or through work placements (attachments as often referred to by 









knock-on effect on tuition fees. It was noted that the cost of university education was com-
paratively high given the developing nature of the country, although there is a lack of hard 
evidence from which to compare fees. A recent graduate noted, 
 
“Student enrolling is not a problem, but there are financial problems because the course 
itself is expensive because now tuition alone is 1.3 million (UGX) (Approximately 270 USD 
per semester, Bachelor’s Degree, Makerere University)” (23 June 2019) 
 
Desk research highlights that 1.3 million UGX per semester is one of the lowest in Uganda 
for a public university education and is substantially cheaper than the private institutions. 
This data further reinforces the notion discussed in section 3.2 of this chapter, that educa-
tion, training and ‘enhancements’ are not universally accessible to all Ugandans; taking 
the above example, we can see that the fees for one academic year (two-semesters) ac-
counts for 87% Ugandan GNI per capita (USD 620 in 2018, Source: The World Bank Data 
Bank). 
 
Institutions cooperating with development partners and other stakeholders have been able 
to overcome these financial challenges more effectively. Institutions such as Sunmaker Oil 
& Gas Training Institute with Chinese backing, and UPIK with the support of GIZ and the 
World Bank through Employment and Skills for Eastern Africa (and relations with partner 
institutions, Rogaland Training and Education Centre (RKK) and the Stavanger Offshore 
Technical College), are able to cater accurately for the demands of the industry as they 
have been able to invest in relevant training equipment. Whilst UPIK’s development into 
an accredited institution has not been alacritous, its achievements have been vastly 
greater than any other Ugandan institution broadly serving the oil and gas industry.  
 
As highlighted by Mwakali and Byaruhanga (2018, 2020), vocational and practical ele-
ments of any education increase the unit cost per students. Resultantly the decreasing or 
stagnating funding for tertiary education goes against the oil industry’s requirement for 
courses with greater practical relevance. In light of these challenges noted above, it is 









respondents to be largely irrelevant and that so few vocational institutions have been ac-
credited by an international awarding body in oil and gas, a minimum requirement for any 
graduate wishing to use his or her skills in this risk averse oil and gas industry. As high-
lighted in Chapter 5 and 6, donor intervention, notably with industry guidance, appears to 
be the key determinant in whether an institution can overcome funding challenges and 
truly become a pocket of effectiveness, filling a substantial void in the absence indigenous 
bureaucratic and technical capacity and funding.  
 
7.4.2.4 The Long Road to Accreditation 
 
Whilst the relevance of the curricula is the primary hurdle for many institutions, accredita-
tion also presents a formidable challenge, especially for those not connected with donors 
or international partners. Whilst, accreditation and quality assurance have emerged as an 
important tool in education (Romanowski, 2017), reflecting the commodification and stand-
ardisation of academic and vocational achievement and correcting the market failures as-
sociated with laissez-faire liberalism, the oil industry demands specific standards of its 
own. Oil and gas is one of the most safety conscious and risk averse industries in the 
world, perhaps only second to aviation. Incidents in living memory, including Macondo, 
Deepwater Horizon, Piper Alpha and the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, resulted in considerable 
loss of life, environmental damage and monumental costs to business. As such, uncom-
promisingly high standards must be maintained throughout the cycle of oil and gas pro-
jects, and accreditation and certification plays a major part in ensuring that personnel, 
both entering the industry and those already in it, are capable of carrying out the work re-
quired of them. In Uganda, although many cohorts of students have graduated over the 
past decade from TVET institutions and universities, very few of them have graduated with 
the certification which permits them to work either at the rig-site or carry out their technical 
roles across the oil and gas value chain in accordance with international industry stand-
ards. One senior government official commented, 
 
“You’ve got to push for employing nationals but if you don’t have a responsible person it, 









One of the studies, the industrial baseline studies clearly brought out the fact that Uganda 
is not very strong in the area of certified technicians’ skills” 24 (20 June 2019) 
 
A fellow senior government employee concurred,  
 
“Much as they may have requisite diplomas, mechanical, electrical, or whatever, the ac-
tual, actual permitting issues, which will allow them for example, to work at the rig-site, 
they don't have them. They have never done HSE certification which is mandatory” (25 
June 2019) 
 
Health and safety certification, virtual and practical learning and student exposure to work-
ing at the rig-site remains a considerable challenge. As the senior government employee 
noted above, without the requisite certification, it is impossible for a graduate to pursue 
non-office work without additional post-graduate training, placing the burden of certifica-
tion on the operators or the industry itself. During the interview process, it was clear that 
very few graduates had been made aware of certifications required during their education, 
both vocational and academic learning, potentially as their institutions are not able to offer 
the relevant accreditation. Many local students were also unaware of free online courses 
such as the International Well Control Forum, Level One certification (an introductory 
course into the basics of HSE at the well-site), perhaps demonstrating that Ugandan insti-
tutions have not fully comprehended the importance of accreditation and certification, 
even at entry level25. In contrast, an operator employee who was educated in China 
shared their experience, seemingly demonstrating a closer link between the Chinese NOC 
and Chinese tertiary education than we can observe in Uganda,  
 
“They did tell us, all the accreditations have sections within the coursework because when 




24 N.B. Reports vary on the number of certified technicians, an NTV article quotes a government representative noting that over 1000 certified technicians had graduated (14th Nov 
2020), whilst Robert Kasande, the Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development (MEMD) is quoted in busiweek.com noting 2000 certified technicians 
(14th Feb 2020) - also published by Q-Sourcing Servtec Group. As such it must be assumed that not all the 12,020 Ugandans registered as of November 2019 on the National Oil 
and Gas Talent Register are certified technicians (New Vision, 2019). These figures must be compared against the 13,000 jobs expected to be created indirectly by the industry, 
65% at least will be technical.   









need to take it also when I got an opportunity to work, I said, I needed to do this.” (23 June 
2019) 
 
For the industry as a whole, the biggest challenges lie on the vocational side of education.  
Whilst the government of Uganda has accredited a number of vocational institutions for oil 
and gas in Uganda, it is international accreditation which is required by the operators, oil-
field service companies and the EPC contractors. The requisite accreditation or certifica-
tion is often beyond the financial capabilities of the Ugandan institutions, regardless of 
whether they have the capacity to meet the required standards. A number of government 
respondents also noted their doubts that indigenous vocational and training institutes 
would ever be able to provide for the whole industry, highlighting the substantial financial 
costs of developing training facilities to cater future refinery activity in line with interna-
tional standards. Two international respondents made the following comments,   
 
“You need an international certification system, but this is very expensive” (17 June 2019) 
 
“Most of the institutions in Uganda are actually incapable of meeting the standards re-
quired by City and Guilds, by ECITB” (11 July 2019) 
 
Uganda’s problems with regards to accreditation are further exacerbated by the fact that 
the operators do not share the same criteria in terms of accreditation and certification. As 
such, an institution which wishes to cater for the whole industry would require considera-
ble financial outlay in order to reach the standards required by multiple awarding bodies. 
Whilst not impossible, it highlights a further complication and challenge for indigenous in-
stitutions in maximising their courses’ relevancy to the industry. Foreign and multinational 
organisations offering training in Uganda are naturally more advanced, SeaOwl delivers a 
number of internationally recognised certifications whilst the Chinese training provider, 
Sunmaker Energy, can deliver internationally accredited training, including IADC, IWCF, 










The role of the international development community through organisations such as the 
World Bank, GIZ and Enabel has revolved around working with indigenous partners and 
represents an area of real progress with regards to aligning education and training with in-
dustry requirements. As such, it would be true to say that no indigenous institution has 
successfully been accredited by an international awarding body thus far without the assis-
tance of a development partner, further underlining the shortcomings of Ugandan govern-
ment policy and intervention. These findings also reinforce the challenges that face a nas-
cent hydrocarbon nation, particularly in an underdeveloped economy, in the context of 
achieving self-imposed localisation objectives.   
 
7.5 Market Forces and Market Failure in Private Education 
 
This study found that misalignment between academic offerings and industry require-
ments is most apparent within private universities and vocational institutions. The growth 
of private universities is a recent development in Sub-Saharan Africa, only emerging in the 
1990s following the implementation of neoliberal policies (SAP induced) and the economic 
crisis of the 1980s, which led to major reductions in funding for public universities (Banya, 
2001; UNESCO, 2001). As of 2021, there were 44 private universities in Uganda, almost 
five times more than public universities (nine), many of whom have sought to offer 
courses, that to some degree, cater for the oil and gas industry.  
 
Owing partially to the lack of central guidance on curriculum development, private institu-
tions have, in many cases, taken a further degree of autonomy in creating courses which 
supposedly deliver industry relevant courses. The private nature of Uganda’s universities 
and vocational institutions brings about a new dimension when exploring the discrepan-
cies between industry requirements and the curricula being taught. A number of respond-
ents asserted that the commercial nature of these private institutions perpetuated a prac-
tice whereby aligning curricula with industry needs is not necessarily a priority as long as 
the institution is still able to attract paying students. As noted previously, some curricula 









were aware of courses that had simply been taken from the internet. A young professional 
and association member made the following comment,  
 
“This is one thing I raised constantly when, when I was an active board member in the 
SPE. I raised concerns about it because most of the universities are private. So it’s a 
money making venture. So that alone has negative consequences. And the education sys-
tem, we have all these private institutions offering all sorts of courses. I've seen the 
courses, advertising courses in oil and gas. So I asked myself now courses like, Oil and 
Gas Logistics, Oil and Gas Management. No! I'm like how many managers are we going 
to have? So like I said it's a big problem. These are private entities that just exist for busi-
ness. They're trying to make money, but they're not really building anything for the country 
in terms of local content” (18 June 2019) 
 
Existing literature highlights the challenges associated with the preeminence and growth 
of private institutions across sub-Saharan Africa. Ochwa-Echel (2016) notes the warnings 
of the director of the United Nations African Institute for Economic Development and Plan-
ning who stated that “the growth of the private universities was eroding universities’ role in 
the advancement of the continent since it was/is promoting private gain as opposed to 
public purposes” (Ochwa-Echel, 2016 p. 11). In furthering this, respondents from this 
study were critical of the role of private Ugandan institutions in looking to profit from the oil 
industry, most agreeing that their contributions to educating and training Ugandans have 
been minimal. A technical oil professional in government employment made the following 
assessment,  
 
“The oil sector is interesting to everybody. So when a college or university comes up with 
a course, Oil and Gas Management or whatever, people just jump onboard. After graduat-
ing, they realise the chances are very few (…) private universities as long as they prove to 
the National Council of Higher Education that they have the capacity to offer that course, I 
don't think they can stop them (…) like I told you they don't have the facilities which must 
be in place for, especially for practical courses, to be taught effectively, but of course peo-










Whilst the relevancy of courses is one side to the problem, the other side is that the poten-
tial students are unaware that the course they are enrolling on is unlikely to improve their 
career prospects; this is also a familiar challenge in other countries across the continent, 
Zakaria and Alhassan (2018) discuss awareness of post-graduation employability in 
Ghana. Potential students struggle to verify the quality of the courses as information of 
university standards and rankings, let alone courses standards, as this information is not 
readily available in Uganda. Despite the limitations in terms of alignment, practicality and 
employment prospects, tuitions fees for academic and vocational courses in Uganda are 
often many times the average yearly salary; for example, an MBA course in Oil and Gas 
Management will cost the student $3900 (USD) at the Virtual University of Uganda, ap-
proximately six times the nation’s GDP per capita.   
 
As Hayek (1945) shows in “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” knowledge never exists as 
a coherent whole. Correspondingly, in this case study, we can observe that students do 
not have universal access to information, which in turn leads them to enroll on courses 
which do not have the capacity to meet their expectations. In this case study, the market’s 
allocation of resources is ineffectual and fails to reflect the needs of the industry whilst de-
priving students of a genuinely valuable education and their savings at a pivotal and ca-
reer defining age. Mkandawire (2001) notes that an interventionist approach is often ap-
propriate for market failure such as this. In my study, the data infer that most private insti-
tutions are not motivated by the public good, in many cases providing an education that 
limited value as there are few career opportunities in the oil and gas industry for poorly 
skilled graduates. To this end, an operator employee shared his perspectives, noting that, 
in many cases, any perceived connections between institutions and other stakeholders 
are not part of a genuine attempt to align courses with oil and gas requirements. Instead, 
their objective is to bypass curricula development whilst appearing to be a credible institu-
tion for potential students. The respondent made the following comments, 
 
“Most of these institutions see it like a marketing strategy for them (…) they are not so 









maybe machines, automatically people come to my institution and give me money. They 
are just advertising what they do at the end of the day. There's no connection between the 
two” (20 June 2019) 
 
The same respondent noted that out of 500 university graduates, it is likely that only 10 
are taken into employment by the industry each year, although no published data is avail-
able to support this. As such, some respondents went as far to suggest that education 
was being mis-sold (although not unique to Uganda (Inderst & Ottaviani, 2009)) as the 
courses being taught, by their very existence at least, create an unwarranted sense of 
hope that students may kickstart their career in the oil and gas industry by enrolling. A for-
mer operator employee and now leading figure in local capacity development noted how 
these academic institutions in Uganda are profiting by delivering a false sense of hope, 
 
‘It's quite shocking and sad, whenever I see adverts in the press by some of these univer-
sities, ‘Oil and Gas Law Masters’ and then I'm thinking why? Because you're selling this 
hope to these guys and ultimately, they won't be needed by the industry. That is less than 
1% of the needed manpower which manpower is already full right now. But just like any-
thing, you know our country's quite interesting because everything is driven, or everything 
rides on hope” (24 June 2019) 
 
Whilst accepting that many of the private institutions still have a way to go in terms of 
aligning courses with industry requirements and being aware of the criticism from the oil 
and gas industry, a senior representative from an association of academic and vocational 
institutions made assurances that courses are not being mis-sold, noting that there are no 
career guarantees made by private institutions. According to a senior government official, 
the screw is finally being tightened on the private institutions, ensuring some level of com-
pliance,  
 
“Now the private players, the challenge they are facing is regulation; the Minister of Edu-










Whether the government and the civil service have the capacity to implement this objec-
tive remains debatable. Many interview participants contended that any attempt to ad-
dress this misalignment is too late, as many cohorts of students have now graduated from 
these institutions without the skills and certifications required by the oil and gas industry, 
regardless of whether these skills are supposedly technical or universal in nature. Even in 
a market dominated by private actors, a dynamic or developmental state should look to 
address the aforementioned market imperfections and failures, as well as human capital 
challenges (Mkandawire, 2001), be it through regulation or even playing a greater role in 
informing students about their choices in further education. This notion that greater inter-
ventionism can correct market failure is central to institutionalist theory.  
 
7.6 Public Perception of Vocational Education and Graduate Unemployment 
 
In following on from the theme of market forces, we can observe that there has been 
greater demand for a university education in Uganda, rather than a vocational one. This is 
not isolated to just the oil industry or Uganda. Ali (2007), in an African Union report, noted 
that vocational education suffers from poor perception across the African continent and 
this study reinforces that notion. In Uganda, many students and their parents prefer the 
university pathway and the promise of a ‘better’ career, although there is evidence that vo-
cational education is becoming more popular (note vocational enrolment in section 7.4.1). 
A senior government official commented, 
 
“If you tell a parent to take his child to become a scaffolder after Senior 4, they'll say, “Hell 
no!” So, what we are seeing today, from your previous things, is that we’re supposed to 
have young welders, people in their 16 and 15 but we now see people in their 35s. Now, 
these are people who have got degrees or diplomas and they’ve failed to get work for 
some reason and now they return (to education or training).” (27 June 2019) 
 










“Ugandans are very anti-blue-collar skills things. It is only until recently people pushing, 
people pushing and their responses in terms of pay for these people. But it is just an atti-
tude of Ugandans. Everybody wanted to go to higher education and come out wearing 
graduation garments to the extent that today even kids graduate out of nursery school and 
they are formal functions, for graduation. So it’s mainly an attitude thing.” (24 June 2019) 
 
Despite Uganda’s poor socio-economic environment, blue-collar work is almost consid-
ered to be disreputable among this survey’s respondents; although it should be noted that 
most respondents represented a comparatively wealthy class, one that is financially fortu-
nate enough to pay for a tertiary education. Moreover, despite the prevalence of agricul-
tural work as the nation’s greatest income source, it was inferred by senior government 
employees that people from agricultural backgrounds, typically labour-intensive work, still 
do not perceive blue-collar work as a suitable career path. As such, many young men and 
women have chosen to pursue courses such as Geology & Petroleum Studies, Petroleum 
Geoscience and Production, Oil and Gas Management and Oil and Gas Accounting, de-
spite the increasingly apparent reality is that there are relatively few opportunities in 
Uganda’s oil industry for those pursuing these universities degrees and regardless of 
whether these degrees are not wholly, if at all, aligned with industry requirements. With re-
gards to oil and gas industry in Uganda, the perception that following a university educa-
tion will deliver better career prospects is often misled.  
 
Vocational education and training has been accepted as one of the chief means of provid-
ing young people with the necessary skills, the underlying assumption being that the major 
deterrent to employment is a lack of skills (Okwuanaso, 1985). Despite this, very few Af-
rica nations have been able to fund its development. In Uganda, it is clear that vocational 
training for the oil and gas industry is starting to be prioritised in recent years, however, as 
noted by an international consultant, addressing the stigma is still a major issue, which in 
turn explains why UPIK is looking to looking to achieve university status. The consultant 
noted that whilst awarding university degrees for technical courses may not be the way 
forward, if those learners could progress from TVET qualifications to more academic 










“Offering technical students’ progression to degrees would help to address the stigma is-
sue.” (11 July 2019) 
 
Reflecting the market failure paradigm of laissez-faire liberalism, it is apparent that de-
mand for university degrees in oil and gas is frequently misled, as the career opportunities 
for graduates are substantially less than those enrolling on a good vocational course. As 
highlighted by institutionalist theorists Mises (1920) and Hayek (1945), actors are not om-
niscience and will often make decision based on their ignorance; arguably in an underde-
veloped nation, actors are likely to be even less informed as information is less readily 
available and internet usage is not universal. Seemingly, considerable work needs to be 
done in order to, not only attract people toward vocational and technical courses, but also 
to ensure that students are not drawn towards degrees which deliver very little for their ca-
reer progression. As Mwakali and Byaruhanga (2020) contend, the population need to be 
continually sensitised to the importance of technical and vocational education in order to 
attract first-class students and not just leftovers from academic routes and failed university 
applicants. With regards to industry requirements, considerably greater numbers of tech-
nical graduates are needed for the industry to move forward in a truly localised fashion (as 
noted in section 7.4.2.4). 
7.6.1 Graduate Unemployment and Retraining 
Largely as a result of the factors listed above, many cohorts of students have graduated 
over the last decade and many have never worked in the oil and gas industry; one factor 
is the delayed field development, another factor is that graduates simply did not have the 
correct capabilities for the industry they wished to work in. Resultantly, many graduates 
have taken different career paths and respondents were unsure as to whether they could 
be an asset to Uganda’s oil and gas industry when the development phase begins. An op-
erator employee commented that the absorption level has been very low following the in-










“After that (reference to the slowdown and oil price crash) out of the 500 (graduates) like 
10 will be absorbed by these companies. So where will the others go, as trainees, not as 
employees or internships, not on permanent and then they do 6 months and have to apply 
for a job elsewhere.” (23 June 2019) 
 
Having examined UIA records, it is apparent that these low levels of absorption reflect a 
general trend within the economy, although levels in the oil and gas industry are consider-
ably more concerning. The Uganda Investment Authority indicates that on average only 
about 113,000 of the 400,000 graduates who enter the labour market annually are ab-
sorbed across all industries. As absorption in the oil and gas industry is so poor, many 
young professionals have pursued careers in mining and water resource management, a 
number have even entered the teaching profession, educating students in the sphere of oil 
and gas, despite having no practical experience themselves. A respondent commented, 
 
“We saw graduates now taking a different direction. Mostly to mining, hydrogen, the 
groundwater. So there are few graduates in the petroleum sector and the local content 
there is quite limited out from that.” (21 June 2019) 
 
Whilst many may not harbour any intentions of returning to the oil and gas industry, those 
that do are likely to be severely lacking in experience, and their academic learning beyond 
retention. Because of this, significant retraining would be required in order for the individ-
ual to be competent in an oil and gas role, although some transferable skills, such as 
those in HSE, may remain wholly relevant across other industries where oil and gas grad-
uates have found work. The same oversupply of labour is reflected in internships and 
summer placements for students, one former student supported this notion,  
 
“Usually you have internships where you get yourself like practical work and join the in-
dustry, they take you to the field in Hoima or other places. They'll be a few people chosen 
for the company and then the rest will remain doing like soft-work. I myself, I didn't get the 









so only few, like five people, like out of the class of 60 people (were taken on for intern-
ships).” (23 June 2019) 
 
As such, this study contends that there is a misallocation of resources within education 
and training and the very fact that graduates are struggling to find roles post-graduation 
and placements during their studies is indicative of the challenges being faced. The reality 
is that of the 13,000 or so direct and indirect jobs promised by the Industrial Baseline Sur-
vey, very few of the roles are yet to be recognised as a result of the delayed development 
project. Whilst technical graduates can be absorbed into the wider economy, those with an 
education more specific to oil and gas may lose competence without the requisite experi-
ence in the industry. In light of the increasing number of vocational graduates from accred-
ited courses and the expectation that the industry will restart soon, there is hope that this 




This study found that, despite numerous prophetic examples, Uganda’s resource govern-
ance has not been conducive to the timely development of local content and its adoption. 
The need for greater state intervention, not only regulation, is in part, owing to the histo-
ries of other oil rich states on the continent, many of whom adopted a laissez-faire ap-
proach to the sector’s development, allowing for the creation of economic enclaves (Han-
sen, 2014) with few linkages to the indigenous economy. In this case study, the data sug-
gest that governmental and institutional failings have not only restricted the industry’s 
growth but also restricted the industry’s inclusivity, noting the perpetuating cycle of prefer-
ential academic enrolment, profitable careers and business opportunities. It was noted 
that those without connections and those not from the prominent ethnic groups are less 
likely to experience such benefits and opportunities.  
 
Data collected through the semi-structured interviews highlighted that government leth-
argy, be it the lengthy delay in approving the development project or a lack of leadership 









local capacity development. Respondents contended that a lack of political will appears to 
have pervaded the government institutions responsible for overseeing local content and its 
development. More precisely however, this study found bureaucratic and administrative 
capacity to be lacking, despite Uganda’s well-established bureaucratic traditions. Arms of 
government have been found to be underfunded, understaffed and lacking in the re-
sources required to engender positive change across the industry; be that monitoring the 
implementation of regulation or creating centres of academic or vocational excellence.  
 
Whilst many respondents were critical of the government for the often-incapacitated na-
ture of its administration and funding problems across tertiary education, the ongoing cre-
ation and teaching of largely irrelevant courses provoked a good number of respondents 
to question the competence and motives of academic and vocational institutions alike. Pri-
vate institutions have been no more successful in reacting to the requirements laid out in 
numerous reports, including the Industrial Baseline Survey. It was inferred throughout the 
research that the private and commercial nature of some institutions has perpetuated the 
teaching of largely irrelevant oil and gas courses, meaning that many Ugandans graduate 
from comparatively expensive courses with minimal skills or relevance. As a result of the 
above factors, movement towards the widespread development of requisite skills has 
been sedate, largely undermining the notion that the Ugandan government has intention-
ally delayed the development project in order to allow local content more time to develop. 
 
Uganda’s role in localising the oil and gas industry is defined beyond regulation and its 
management of the development project but by its capacity to create local content through 
sound governance and leadership. It is clear that much more could have been done in or-
der to develop local content, both proactively in the early years and reactively following the 
Industrial Baseline Survey and similar reports. The biggest losers are not the future em-
ployers such as the operators or EPC contracts, but arguably the Ugandans themselves 
who have looked to pursue a career in oil and gas. Only a small percentage of graduates 
have been absorbed into the industry thus far, for many, the industry has been a white el-
ephant. Whilst the often-inadequate nature of their education, training, practical experi-









an oversubscription towards non-vocational education which itself is in contrast to the in-
dustry’s well-publicised requirement for good technical skills. In reference to institutionalist 
theory, it is clear that the disequilibrium that exists between the supply and demand of la-
bour has been requiring of more dynamic and proactive government intervention.  
 
In recent years, substantial progress towards a more aligned education and training sector 
has been made with donor assistance. Respondents found it difficult to attribute much, if 
even half, of this movement to the Ugandan government or the institutions themselves alt-
hough there is definitely a degree of indigenous foundation legacy. Resultantly, one could 
conclude that factors relating to the political economy of Uganda have actually hindered 
rather than helped the development of local content, with the aforementioned challenges 
being responsible for a dearth of real, Ugandan led, progress.  
 
This study contends that academic and vocational capacity would be very limited and una-
ligned with industry requirements without donor interventions. More than a decade since 
oil and gas was found to be commercially viable in Uganda, the realisation of a localised 
industry is still severely hampered by a lack of academic and vocational education capac-
ity and an uncertain business environment. Dynamic state involvement, resembling a 
more developmental approach, has been and continues to be a missing ingredient in 










Chapter 8: Discussion and Conclusion 
 
This research, through a single case study, sought to address a number of questions re-
lated to local content, its adoption and development in an environment characterised by 
lower oil prices. This chapter summarises the findings from the three main research chap-
ters and then provides further interpretation and assesses the implications. The chapter 
also looks at the limitations of the research, addresses the ability of this study to inform fu-
ture state and private sector decision-making as well as the generalisability of the findings 
to other countries.  
8.1.Summary of  Research Findings 
Research Finding 1: The oil price crash has encouraged operators in Uganda to 
adopt a more localised business model, particularly within Tullow and Total, whilst 
the changes at CNOOC, the Chinese NOC, were more subtle  
 
Corresponds to research question 1: Is there a new operating environment driving the de-
velopment of a more localised operating model and can we isolate a turning point for oper-
ators in the adoption of a localised business model? 
 
Whilst lower revenues are one part of the lower oil price environment, increased pressure 
from indigenous communities and the government to replace its share of oil revenue with 
backward linkages is another factor. As such, the oil price crash cannot be viewed purely 
by its immediate impact. Oil prices have remained below 2014 levels since prices nadired 
in 2016; correspondingly evidence suggests that government and community expectations 
for local content have become heightened in the context of reduced potential for oil rents. 
As noted above, and in line with this study’s hypothesis, the data demonstrate that there 
have been movements, albeit incremental, towards more localised operations in Uganda. 
We can observe that operators, some more than others, have improved local content 
adoption and are increasingly engaged with broad-based local content development. 
There are clear distinctions between corporations; Tullow, a company with a reputation for 









content in Uganda, moving to a position where most employees and procurement, in the 
current maintenance state, is indigenous. Total, an IOC with a global presence and tradi-
tionally, risk-averse operating model, has also moved to a slightly more localised position 
and seemingly plays an active role in important, broad-based local content initiatives. The 
data also show CNOOC becoming more localised, greater local employment, improved 
procurement from indigenous suppliers at a maintenance level and through another Chi-
nese company, Sunmaker Oil and Gas Training Institute, a commitment to broad-based 
local content development, albeit with commercial intent. However, the above develop-
ments come with the caveat that more could have been done and the movements ob-
served are significant but not substantial.  
 
Identifying a turning point is not made easy by the existence of other pressures (as dis-
cussed in Chapter 6, Section 3) that can influence local content adoption and its develop-
ment. However, it appears clear from the research that the oil price crash of 2014 engen-
dered a significant and immediate reaction from operators, causing them to greatly reduce 
the number of expensive expatriate staff. In the years following, we can observe a continu-
ing movement towards a more localised workforce, including a significant increase in the 
number of local staff in 2019. Such an immediate response was not observed in procure-
ment, although in 2019 we do see a clear effort to localise procurement at maintenance 
level. And despite an immediate fall in local content development spending following the 
oil price crash, recent operator involvement in broad-based local content development has 
gone beyond the traditional remit of the operator community.  
 
Research Finding 2: The emergence of a multi-stakeholder environment in the de-
velopment of local content, largely characterised by the evolution of operators and 
donors into substantial contributors to indigenous capacity development 
 
Corresponds to research question 2: What role are the leading stakeholders playing in lo-
cal content development and adoption in Uganda and does the elaboration of this model 











This thesis proposed that there was insufficient knowledge about the roles of organisa-
tions in the multi-stakeholder environment which now characterises local content and its 
development in oil and gas industries. As highlighted by the Industrial Baseline Survey 
(2013) and the Capacity Needs Analysis (2016), the industry requires inputs that are di-
verse in nature. Many of these inputs, both human and supplier, require substantial certifi-
cations as well as academic and vocational accreditations which are not readily available 
in an underdeveloped or nascent oil industry. Correspondingly, developing the requisite 
indigenous capacity to support the operations of oil and gas companies, international oil-
field service providers, EPC contractors and the industry as a whole has necessitated the 
participation of international partners with the relevant experience and funding to develop 
Ugandan capacity.  
 
The increasing role of the operators in developing local content was noted under “Re-
search Finding 1”. However, despite greater adoption of local content on the whole, there 
are underlying factors that define the companies’ attitude to local content (as discussed in 
Chapter 5); many of these factors remain and still account for variations in commitment. It 
is clear that Tullow’s model is more localised and is resultantly most “available” and willing 
to support local content development. Total, more globalised in its approach to operating, 
has involved themselves with E4D/SOGA project but has not been universally proactive, 
even blocking the Getenergy Field Ready project in Uganda since the oil price crash. 
CNOOC, with a commitment to Chinese employment and procurement as part of their 
mandate is seemingly the least active in local content development. Collectively, the oper-
ators have sponsored and provided further education and training for their own staff as 
well as providing scholarships for the further education of government staff and promising 
graduates. Increasingly operators are also playing a part in the development of broader, 
largely vocational, competencies, through alignment with donor-led interventions, which 










Whilst the progression of operators to become active participants in broad-based local 
content development is an important development, increasingly relevant donor interven-
tions have been integral to actualising Ugandan state objectives. International donors 
have been major contributors to education and vocational training in Uganda for decades, 
however, as demonstrated in this study, it is only recently that we can observe interven-
tions becoming increasingly aligned with the oil industry’s requirements, supposedly mir-
roring developments in other key sectors in which donors are engaging. Donor interven-
tions have aided the delivery of pockets of effectiveness, such as UPIK, and continue to 
play an important role in the provision of scholarships, particularly for technical and voca-
tional skills, a factor that should enhance the inclusivity of the oil industry, albeit below 
managerial levels. More broadly we can also observe the running of workshops for Ugan-
dan suppliers, such as those funded by the AfDB. 
 
International EPC contractors and oilfield service companies will be the largest employers 
in Uganda during the development and production phases of the oil and gas project lifecy-
cle. Resultantly, these companies are best placed to indicate their future requirement for 
skills and procurement as well as the requisite standards and certifications. However, as a 
result of the uncertain business environment, future contractors have not been consist-
ently present in Uganda. Consequently, these companies have only been able to provide 
guidance from afar, as we can observe from the engagement of an EPC contractor with 
the World Bank and UPIK in aligning vocational courses with future industry requirements. 
It did appear that if these companies had a greater presence in Uganda, they would have 
been keenly involved in local content development.  
 
Donor intervention and greater operator application is only necessary in light of state inca-
pacity and inadequate state intervention in developing local capacity. As many underde-
veloped and nascent hydrocarbon economies have struggled to achieve satisfactory lev-
els of local content in their own country, it should perhaps come as no surprise that 
Uganda’s local content journey has not been smooth. Nevertheless, the government ap-
pears to have positive intentions for its oil wealth. There are very strong narratives that 









committed to local content and its development, supposedly furthered by Uganda’s deci-
sion not to rush towards production, leaving substantial time for local content to develop in 
line with industry requirements. One positive intervention, albeit slightly removed from the 
development of local content itself and funded with a loan from the British Government, is 
the building of an enterprise park in Kabaale; despite being substantially overdue, the 
business park is likely to be an essential base for indigenous enterprise.  
 
However, the research also shows us that the role of the Ugandan state has been limited 
in truly engendering the development of local content. The true impact of the delayed de-
velopment project is currently unknown, although the argument that Ugandan companies 
and people have had more time to prepare is largely undermined by the notion that many 
former indigenous suppliers and oil and gas workers have either gone out of business or 
lost their jobs in the industry. We can also observe that institutional capacity has severely 
hampered the positive involvement of the state in local content and its development. Mu-
seveni’s administration has embarked on a number of positive interventions, such as the 
founding of UPIK in 2009, however, turning the interventions into pockets of effectiveness 
has proven more challenging. For example, UPIK has been the beneficiary of multiple do-
nor projects with greater engagement with the operators than most vocational institutions, 
however, it is only recently that the institution has become truly relevant to the industry it 
looks to serve. Beyond purely being incapacitated, Uganda’s governmental institutions do 
not appear to be truly disconnected with politics, as we see from the supposed preferential 
treatment given to certain ethnic groups in the awarding of international scholarships. Col-
lectively these factors have made Uganda reliant on donor interventions in delivering 
pockets of effectiveness and other stakeholders in providing scholarships and funding fur-
ther education and training.  
 
Research Finding 3: Insufficient bureaucratic capacity in Uganda has prevented the 











Corresponds to research question 3: What role does the political economy of Uganda play 
in the realisation of local content objectives? 
 
Аs noted above, Uganda’s governance of the sector appears strongly aligned with the ob-
jective of ensuring substantial Ugandan participation. Unlike Ghana, the Ugandan state 
did not sanction the immediate production of oil and gas, allowing time for administrative 
frameworks to be put in place and indigenous capacity to develop; although most would 
agree that the pace at which the industry is progressing is undesirably slow. Uganda’s ad-
ministrative framework (based on the so-called Norwegian Model), enforcing local content 
within regulations, licences and now legalisation and a few dynamic interventions (such as 
the founding of UPIK) over the last 15 years are examples of this commitment.    
 
However, in line with institutionalist theory, notably seminal work of Acemoglu and Robin-
son (2012), this research found the lack of bureaucratic capacity to be responsible for a 
number of state failings. The state has moved slowly in developing the requisite regulation 
and legalisation, this is compounded by a lack of capacity to monitor operators and imple-
ment local content requirements. This insufficient capacity for regulating and monitoring 
can also be seen in education and training, where the state’s lack of intervention has per-
petuated the teaching of many irrelevant and unaccredited courses (or courses not ac-
credited by recognised bodies). Beyond regulation, as we can observe in Chapter 7, pro-
active interventions to develop academic and vocational education capacity and to engen-
der local supplier development have been hindered by an underfunded and technically in-
capacitated bureaucracy. As noted by an experienced international consultant, Uganda’s 
development of academic and vocational capacity is comparatively very slow and that the 
progress that has been made could have been done in a much timelier manner. In the ab-
sence of an effective administration, we can observe that Pockets of Effectiveness are un-
deniably linked to donor interventions.  
 
Meanwhile, despite the implementation of the Norwegian Model and emphasis on institu-
tional quality, there are widespread reports of corrupt practices and evidence that the 









discretionary decision making is not uncommon in underdeveloped and developing na-
tions, the impact on the inclusive nature of local content can be substantial. The data sug-
gests that many respondents are aware of non-inclusive practices around oil and gas. 
Uganda’s bureaucracy is not separated from politics and this is evidenced in a number of 
ways, notably the fact that members of Museveni’s family occupy elevated positions in 
government and the oil industry. Correspondingly it can be concluded that Uganda’s bu-
reaucracy is not separated from politics and lacks the administrative capacity to prevent 
unconstitutional and extra-legal practices within the government.  
 
Research Finding 4: Donor agencies have proven a vital partner in developing local 
content, filling voids in funding, technical knowhow and administrative capacity 
 
Corresponds to research question 2: What role are the leading stakeholders playing in lo-
cal content development and adoption in Uganda and does the elaboration of this model 
differ between key corporations in the oil sector and other stakeholders in the local content 
landscape?  
Western development aid on the African continent has experienced a legitimacy crisis 
over the past decade and longer, perhaps coinciding with the re-emergence of non-DAC 
donors. As highlighted by Bräutigam (2011), unlike the West, who often attach political 
conditions to their aid, the Chinese state gives aid and conducts business without impos-
ing political preconditions but does require the recipient nation to contract Chinese compa-
nies. This has coincided with decreasing demand for western donor agencies’ conven-
tional offering of financial assistance; Polus and Tycholiz (2017) note that, as a result of 
substantial increases in Uganda’s tax revenue, foreign aid, notably western aid, does not 
play such a role in balancing the budget as it did in the 1990s. Resultantly, the prevalence 
of the Chinese state over western donor agencies is very pronounced in Uganda. How-
ever, in contradiction to the notion of declining western donor influence, this study found 
the interventions of western development agencies to be critical in developing local con-









The increasing relevancy of donor interventions has proven essential in funding and guid-
ing the development Ugandan capacity; this has largely been achieved through the deliv-
ery of programmes to develop indigenous human capacity in a number of important and /. 
or nascent sectors. Within oil and gas, the donor community has demonstrated an aware-
ness of the industry’s requirement for labour and been responsible for a considerable 
growth in requisite skills development. Whilst donor interventions were numerous prior to 
the oil price crash (Figure 21 - Chapter 5), the new level of relevancy is characterised by 
focused interventions to develop accredited vocational courses, numerous scholarships 
for indigenous peoples to undertake these courses, the provision of technical expertise to 
guide implementing bodies (if the implementing body is Ugandan) and an approach 
guided by consultation with industry stakeholders, notably the future employers and con-
tractors of local content.  
 
Respondents contended that stakeholders, notably operators, have become increasingly 
engaged with donors, which, in turn, has informed donor interventions and is responsible 
for improved and more relevant development outcomes. As such, pockets of effectiveness 
in this case study, are universally linked with donor interventions. The E4D/SOGA project 
is purely focused on oil and gas and resource industries in East Africa, however, the 
World Bank’s ‘Skills Development Project’ and Enabel’s support of ‘Skilling Uganda’ exist 
beyond oil and gas. Correspondingly, it appears to be the case that western donor agen-
cies are finding renewed relevancy in supporting the development of local academic and 
vocational institutions in line with industry requirements and upskilling indigenous peoples.  
 
These recent development interventions, which are delivering manifestly positive out-
comes in requisite skills development, appear to reflect the growing prevalence of ‘Smart 
Aid’ (Joseph & Gillies, 2009) and ‘Thinking and Working Politically’. The donors in ques-
tions have primarily worked with relatively strong indigenous partners and have delivered, 
especially in the case of E4D/SOGA, a coordinated approach. Pockets of Effectiveness 
have largely developed as a result of previous donor interventions, forming ‘legacy foun-
dations’ which, in turn, provides later donors with stronger partners, both in terms of insti-









The donor interventions which are particularly relevant to this study have partnered with a 
mix of institutions, the World Bank operated through the MOES (with the provision of tech-
nical expertise) and UPIK, whilst E4D/SOGA and Enabel have worked directly with a num-
ber of private vocational and technical institutions, bypassing public institutions and poten-
tially complex interactions with the GoU. 
 
8.2 Theoretical Contributions 
 
While this study’s main contributions revolve around its empirical richness, it also builds 
upon existing theoretical constructs to deliver its own theoretical contributions. A key con-
tribution revolves around the institutionalist construct of isomorphism, which can be ob-
served in this case study and characterises the movement from the non-compliance 
model to the position we see today following the oil price crash. Isomorphism suggests 
firms would adopt similar ways of operating in response to a common stimulus and we can 
observe that in this thesis, although operators adopted more localised positions to varying 
degrees. The thesis also suggests that a fall in the oil price is more conducive to engen-
dering isomorphism in the context of local content adoption than regulatory changes, 
which represents a form of coercive isomorphism. This is because the oil price drop im-
pacted the profitability of the oil and gas industry, forcing firms to make changes in order 
to avoid sizeable losses. Meanwhile regulation was seemingly perceived as something 
that could be avoided.  
 
This thesis also reinforces the institutionalist’s rejection of spontaneous order in the con-
text of resource endowed nations, highlighting that linkages, as espoused by Hirschman, 
do not form naturally but require an interventionist strategy. Noting institutionalist authors 
such as Chang (2001), who claimed that Hong Kong was possibly the only industrialised 
nation to achieve that status without substantial state involvement, the Ugandan oil indus-
try is illustrative of the failures which occurred without centralised strategy. While the 
Ugandan state does not reflect the exemplar  conventional ‘developmental state’, foreign 









content in line with the Ugandan government’s aims. The failures observed within educa-
tion in this case study further challenge the anti-dirigisme which is embedded in neoliberal 
thought. As such, this thesis highlights both the failures of the market when intervention-
ism is absent and the creation of pockets of effectiveness when interventionism is present. 
This finding reinforces the work of authors such as Mkandawire (2001), who suggested a 
more dynamic state can address challenges including market imperfections and failures.  
 
Following on from the notion of dirigisme being a key part of transforming resource wealth 
into national wealth, this work builds upon existing literature concerning local content pol-
icy. While influential authors such as Tordo. et. al (2013) discussed only regulatory and 
legislative interventions, this research, through an institutionalist lens, highlights policy 
doesn’t have to revolve solely around regulation. Further prescriptive works by organisa-
tions like the World Bank may consider the addition of interventionist approaches, such as 
the development or creation of training centres and academic programmes. These inter-
ventions would help build local capacity needed by key stakeholders to overcome failures 
within the labour market, with the end goal of creating a labour market that reflects indus-
try requirements.  
 
Furthermore, while this thesis does not reject neoliberal thought and the prescriptions of 
good governance and strong institutions arising from the Post-Washington Consensus 
(Williamson, 1990), it highlights that these alone are not sufficient for actualising envis-
aged local content objectives in the context of underdeveloped resource economies. In a 
similar vein, the research underlines the triapartite model for resource governance, known 
as the Norwegian model, can be undermined when institutional capacity is weak, mirroring 
the conclusions of Thurber. et. al. (2011). Museveni’s discretionary power and penchant 
for micro-managing the sector’s development has hindered the effective working of 
Uganda’s institutions. As Thurber. et. al. (2011) suggest, institutional capacity can be di-










8.3 Implications and Future Recommendations: The Case for Interventionist Gov-
ernance 
 
In this study, I have sought to address a number of research questions related to local 
content, its adoption and development. I believe that the above findings are important for 
informing future research into local content within business models as well as policy de-
sign, governance and interventions for developing indigenous capacity. Whilst there are a 
number of findings that are distinct and separate from each other, I believe that, underly-
ing all these findings, is a strong commendation of interventionist governance as a vehicle 
to actualise local content objectives. Interventionism is strongly linked to the notion of the 
developmental state. Andrews and Nwapi (2018) conclude that it is difficult to apply the 
concept of the developmental state, which stems from East Asian examples in the 20th 
century, to Uganda in the context of its resource governance. The authors’ policy-heavy 
research concludes mixed findings when considering whether Uganda’s governance of its 
oil is developmental in orientation. I concur with the sentiment that Uganda’s governance 
has not been entirely consistent with the concept of a developmental state and my find-
ings suggest that the state could play a much more proactive role in developing Ugandan 
content in engendering greater value creation.  
 
Those responsible for governing the sector should recognise that local content can be 
more than a matter of compliance for operators, the adoption of local content can repre-
sent a cost-efficient business model. It is clear from the study that operators, such as 
Tullow and Oranto (although more will be known about Oranto as they grow in Uganda), 
are keen to utilise local capacity whenever indigenous competencies meet industry re-
quirements. Whilst, there is a significant body of literature that looks at policy development 
and regulatory comparisons between oil producing nations (as discussed in Chapter 2), 
there is little research concerning the role of a proactive, developmental state in develop-
ing local content. Even Andrews and Nwapi’s (2018) aforementioned study gives no con-
sideration for the role of the government in creating the requisite skills through state edu-









case of Uganda, dynamic and effective interventions have universally been instigated by 
donor agencies, replicating the role a developmental state could play.  
 
There are a number of areas where we can hypothesise the positive impact of greater 
government intervention. Firstly, a more proactive and capable state may have prioritised 
greater implementation of local content regulation but also a more interventionist approach 
to the education and training sector. My research findings highlight that universities and 
vocational institutions have struggled to provide courses relevant to the industry. Result-
antly, vast numbers of students have graduated from Uganda’s institutions over the past 
15 years having embarked on courses supposedly related to the industry, yet very few of 
them have graduated with the requisite skills for the industry. Whilst the oil industry itself 
could have benefitted from greater indigenous capacity during the exploration phase, I 
contend that the real victims are the graduates themselves, who invested considerable 
time and money into their future, to find that the industry they intended for themselves re-
quired further certification and training; instead the limited number of permanent positions 
within the industry over the past 15 years appear to be occupied by “people from the other 
side”, or in other words, those who were fortunate enough to be educated overseas. As 
such, greater regulation in education could have at least served to protect students from 
courses which were unlikely to benefit their careers.  
 
A greater level of intervention could see the government restrict the number of institutions 
offering courses related to the industry, instead prioritising a small number of universities 
and vocational institute to become centres of excellence. The foundation of Sunmaker Oil 
& Gas Training Institute is a perfect example of how a well-guided and resourced pro-
gramme can achieve a truly relevant offering in a very short period of time and demon-
strates what might be achievable if a host government focuses resources on a singular in-
stitution or a few organisations. However, Uganda’s experience with academic and voca-
tional capacity development is progressional, with incremental development coming one 
after another across multiple institutions, frequently punctuated by considerable gaps in 
time. The prime example being UPIK, with curricula alignment and then accreditation fol-









commercial quantities of oil and gas in Uganda, there is a plethora of institutes that offer 
courses which do not meet industry standards. Thanks to donor interventions and the in-
ternational training institutes, we can observe that there are a small number of technical 
institutes that have relevant offerings for future oil and gas professionals.  
 
In theorising why this has happened, a recurring theme from the research was that the 
government was “finding its feet”. It was noted that Uganda’s administration and Muse-
veni’s technocrats lacked technical knowhow, and correspondingly, the government was 
cautious and has taken incremental steps with regards to governing the industry’s devel-
opment; notably the implementation of regulation and legalisation. Coupled with the slow 
pace of developments in education and training, particularly around curricula alignment 
and international body accreditation, it is largely the case that free market forces have de-
termined the direction of local content, at least until recent years. 
 
Whilst there has been considerable writing concerning an administrative model for re-
source governance, notably the Norwegian Model which, through government institutions, 
is seen as vehicle to engender an inclusive oil industry, there is no such work concerning 
a model for interventionist approach to actualise local content development objectives. 
Furthermore, whilst geography is a determinant of the industry’s requirement for labour 
(offshore, onshore, pipeline required etc.), the industry’s labour demands and many pro-
curement requirements are standardised throughout the world, partially due to the global-
ised nature of the industry but also a considerable adversity to risk. The considerable but 
not great scale of the labour requirement coupled with the specific certifications and ac-
creditations required by the industry lends itself to a more controlled environment for edu-
cation and training, with fewer, but better resourced institutions. As such, given the homo-
geneity of the industry’s demands for labour and in a number of areas of procurement, it 
seems logical that there should be a model for an interventionist state that prioritises aca-
demic and vocational skills development rather than waiting for the market for academic 









plied to supplier development, with a singular state run ‘business incubator’ arguably be-
ing preferable to a business incubator run out of the CSR branch of a major regional bank, 
which is the current state of affairs in Uganda.  
8.3.1 The Future of Licence Proliferation in the Context of the Increasing Importance 
of Local Content 
The research demonstrates that operators, who are responsible for undertaking major na-
tional development projects, have varying alignments to an important national objective, 
being local content. This raises the question as to whether host governments would be 
more willing to award licences to operators that have demonstrated a willingness to oper-
ate more locally in the past, rather than those, such as CNOOC, who’s core commitments 
are in conflict with local content objectives? Correspondingly, will we start to see compa-
nies like Oranto, an expanding African operator, and Tullow, an African-focused operator, 
expand further across the continent as a reflection of these operators’ alignment with 
heightened host government prioritisation of local content? Furthermore, whether the in-
creasing importance of local content, coupled with the notion that some operators are 
more opposed to operating locally, will influence the future proliferation of exploration and 
production licences could be a topic of future research.  
 
It is, of course, the case that local content is not the only consideration of a host govern-
ment; notably with CNOOC, it is possible to observe resource exploitation as part of 
greater Sino-Ugandan relations which in turn is supposedly delivering on broader develop-
ment objectives of the Ugandan nation, such as enhancing Uganda’s road and infrastruc-
ture network. We can also observe that Chinese SOEs appear successful in engaging 
Ugandan elites. Despite a host of negative consequences associated with Sino-Ugandan 
relations, most prominently indebtedness, academics such as Swilling (2019) note that it 
will not be easy to remove the factors that perpetuate the relationship’s existence, as 
China is familiar with neopatrimonial arrangements and adept at exploiting them. Although 
it should be noted that state-owned companies from other nations are equally adept at ex-










Licences in Uganda were reportedly granted having considered full proposals from the op-
erators which include how the companies proposed to localise their operations; although, 
as noted in Chapter 5 and 6, operators have been known to change their own localisation 
plan after the licence has been awarded. However, as contended throughout this thesis, 
local content has become of heightened importance to host nations throughout the period 
studied; it may now be the case that governments will look to appraise operator adoption 
of local content in other locations before licencing operators in their own country.  
 
In the context of Tullow’s ongoing business challenges, in part caused by the non-respon-
siveness of the GoU to field development plans, it may be an African operator, like Oranto, 
that benefits from the increasing importance governments attribute to local content. Other 
operators such as Eni are also reportedly committed to local content and its development, 
manifestations including the support of the Getenergy Field Ready project across the Afri-
can continent. With regards to Eni, further research may be required to understand how a 
(partially) state owned operator can be suitably reactive to local content requirements in 
countries of operation.   
8.3.2 Western Donors Becoming ‘Relevant’ Again 
As noted earlier in this chapter and by Hickey & Izama (2017), the past two decades have 
seen the declining influence of traditional western donors in sub-Saharan Africa and the 
ascendency of non-western partners, notably the Chinese state. In 2010, China was the 
biggest single investor in Uganda, reflecting trends across the continent. However, this 
study has demonstrated that western donor agencies can be very relevant to African de-
velopment agendas and in this case, without undermining Museveni’s ideal of Ugandan-
led development. This notion is particularly current given that one of the world’s largest 
IFIs, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, has announced its inten-
tion to become operational in sub-Saharan nations.  
 
In Uganda, we can observe that donor led local capacity development initiatives, like 
those that we see in oil and gas, are being implemented across a number of other sectors, 









were highlighted by the GoU as sectors requiring intervention. This study is largely una-
ware of the effectiveness of interventions outside of oil and gas, with the exception of a 
number of comments to suggest that these interventions had been more successful in 
tourism, construction and manufacturing. However, given the considerable and growing 
African indebtedness to China and the relevancy of the western interventions noted in this 
study, it could be hypothesised that western donors may once again have primacy in the 
future; although this may be dependent on western nations improving relations with Afri-
can elites and a worsening of Sino-African relations.  
 
These interventions, in developing indigenous capacity, appear to be a positive develop-
ment in western donor-recipient relations. The programmes allow for western donors to 
support market economies and, in theory, promote inclusive growth in line with their broad 
mandate, whilst, in contrast to the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), not dictate 
the direction of national development agendas. Given the frequency of graduate unem-
ployment in Uganda and other sub-Saharan states such as Ghana, there is substantial 
scope for further interventions in capacity development and employability programmes on 
the continent. As non-traditional donors do not appear to be motivated to intervene in 
these areas, the further relevancy of OECD donors in sub-Saharan Africa may be defined 
by the success and longevity of capacity development initiatives.  
 
8.4 Discussion: Local Content in Uganda in the Context of Covid-19  
 
Beyond the effect of the lockdown on Ugandan local content development and the tempo-
rary closure of academic and vocational institutions, it is likely that Covid-19 will have ma-
jor impact on the global oil industry, with Uganda being no exception. In the context of this 
study, it is entirely plausible that Covid-19 will prolong much lower oil prices; an article by 
McKinsey notes “demand for refined products is down at least 20 percent and has 
plunged refining into crisis. We think it will be two years at least before demand recovers, 
with the outlook for jet fuel particularly bleak” (McKinsey, May, 2020). As of June 2020, the 
average annual oil price for 2020 is actually lower that 2016, the year in which spot prices 









oil are likely to remain particularly acute, perhaps further incentivising a localised business 
model and heightening the need for local participation amongst those governing the sector 
in light of reduced potential oil revenue. It may also be the case that lower oil prices will 
further delay Uganda’s industry, as Uganda’s heavy oil is likely to be ‘closer to the floor’ 
than other crudes.  
 
Although probably more relevant to the industry globally rather than Uganda’s still nascent 
sector, the oil price crash of 2014, which was substantially greater proportionally than the 
collapse of 2020, may have already engendered the resilience required to successfully 
navigate future price crashes. This study did note some movements towards more local-
ised business models which are almost universally considered to be more cost-efficient 
and represents an approach which widens the variance between operational costs and 
revenue. As such, the notion that an IOC like Total, which has demonstrated it is less able 
to localise operations and arguably slower at adapting to market pressures, is balanced by 
the notion that the ‘oil majors’ have substantial cash reserves; an important factor for any 
business experiencing challenging periods. We can also see that an internationally operat-
ing NOC, like CNOOC, which harbours non-commercial objectives, such as providing jobs 
and contracts for Chinese people and companies, also appears less resilient to this re-
newed price pressure; although cost-efficiency challenges may also be countered by the 
notion that Chinese labour and services tend to be less expensive than western counter-
parts. 
 
In the context of Uganda, we are unlikely to be able to observe the impact of Covid-19 on 
the oil industry and local content until the pandemic has passed, especially given the in-
dustry’s non-operational state. It may be the case that this new price shock will reinforce 
the need to adopt a more localised model even further, however, particularly in the ab-
sence of any activity in 2020, it will be difficult to isolate the impact on maintenance pro-
curement, which has largely been localised already, and vastly depleted operator work-











Whilst an important factor, localisation is not necessarily the panacea to another oil price 
crash globally, other factors include geography and the maturity of the operation. An in-
dustry, such as that in the UK, which is largely localised, has the world’s highest produc-
tion costs due to the geography of oil reserves and the expensive technological inputs re-
quired to enhance recovery rates from mature wells, in addition to the relatively high cost 
of inputs on the British Isles and in Northern Europe. Nevertheless, as some barrels are 
switched off around the world as a result of Covid-19, localised industry’s may be more re-
silient and avoid such a fate. Indeed, the impact of Covid-19 on local content adoption and 
development may be a future research topic, potentially reinforcing the findings of this the-
sis. 
8.4.1 The Longevity of Museveni’s Administration and Ugandan Oil 
My research suggests that Museveni’s administration has looked to develop Uganda’s oil 
industry with the national interests at the core of their motivations, albeit rather entwined 
with the notion that prominent Ugandans will benefit the most, displaying clannism charac-
teristics that are not dissimilar from Putin’s Russia (Rutland, 2016). However, despite the 
best intentions, there is clearly a perception among Ugandans, both in this study and in 
the media, that Museveni’s oil policy has not served the country well. Articles, such as that 
of Mwenda (2020) highlight this discontent, noting the faults of such assertive resource 
nationalism and an administration hellbent on not being cheated by its chosen operators. 
Resultantly, this hardliner approach has seen Uganda’s oil industry substantially delayed, 
with Mwenda (2020) noting the GoU’s insistence on not backing down in tax disputes with 
the companies it had to beg to come to Uganda in the first place despite the government 
already having negotiated very favourable production sharing agreements. Most mani-
festly, as a result of Museveni’s approach to the industry, the Ugandan people are not 
seeing the benefits of the oil endowment which has been promised for many years and 
election after election. Despite winning a highly controversial election in January 2021, 









may begin to wonder if Museveni’s management of Uganda’s oil industry will hinder his 
ability to leverage the promise of ‘his oil’26 to extend his administration in the future.   
 
8.5 Limitations of this Research 
 
As is clear from Chapter 6, isolating the impact of the oil price crash on local content 
adoption and development is not an exact science, especially given the slow progress of 
Uganda’s oil industry towards production. With regards to generalisability and the implica-
tions of this research for other nascent oil and gas economies, it is perhaps the case that 
there are less and less frontiers of oil and gas. When the research for this thesis com-
menced, it was seemingly the case that Kenya may be one of the countries that would fol-
low in Uganda’s footsteps, however, it is now the case that Kenya is producing oil, many 
years before Uganda is set to go onstream. It may be the case that very nascent indus-
tries like those found in Madagascar and Somalia may become oil and gas producers in 
the not-too-distant future and correspondingly the host governments could look to play a 
more proactive and interventionist role in local content development as suggested by this 
study’s findings.  
 
This research would have also benefitted from a greater understanding of the GoU’s strat-
egy for oil and gas industry. It is most certainly the case that even well-informed state em-
ployees were uncertain of the country’s plan to more forward to production and resultantly 
it is difficult to draw conclusions around the exact causes of the delayed development pro-
ject. Correspondingly, such information would have assisted in informing the study as to 
whether the GoU is delaying for unrelated political reasons, such as ensuring political ad-
versaries don’t benefit from the oil industry, or whether the GoU is genuinely invested in 
ensuring Ugandan capacity is sufficient before the industry moves forward. As demon-
strated by Hickey and Izama (2017), discourse into the nature of Uganda’s oil agreements 













settlement theoretical framework, whilst this study’s investigation into local content and its 
development is better served by institutional political economy theory.   
 
Finally, this research is subject to the conventional criticisms of single case study re-
search. Criticisms normally centre around the concept of external validity or generalisabil-
ity as a the political, social and economic context of a case in question may bear little re-
semblance to another case. For example, with regards to this case study, the exact opera-
tor landscape in Uganda is not replicated anywhere else in the world. However, I am confi-
dent that the findings of this study are generalisable even when the operator landscape is 
very different as this research focuses on a common challenge in nascent oil and gas 
economies, moving from little or no indigenous capacity to a highly localised industry.   
 
8.6 Final Thoughts 
 
Instead of local content being a highly politicised concept, often pitting host governments 
against its operators, this study demonstrates that stakeholders can share the objective of 
a more localised industry. Whilst theoretical research on the topic can be illuminating, I be-
lieve greater attention should be given to the vehicles which can transform a nascent oil 
and gas industry into a localised one. I also contend that Museveni’s administration has 
approached the industry with a degree of nationalism which is appropriate to develop 
greater linkages from the oil industry into the wider economy, however, the progress of the 
industry, parallel to the development of local capacity, represents somewhat of a national 
embarrassment. In the same sense that international expertise were required to explore 
and develop Uganda’s oil industry, international expertise could have been better de-
ployed to assist in governing the sector and managing the timely development of local 
content on behalf of a government which has been incapacitated in many areas.  
 
I would like to further this research by exploring what a more interventionist approach to 
local content would look like. I believe this research provides a strong commendation for a 
developmental state approach in order to actually the objective of a localised oil industry 









be achieved. From the perspective of a host government, this study has highlighted the 
vast inefficiencies of a largely free market for education and training, resulting in many co-
horts of students graduating with few of the required skills, in turn being unfavourable for 
both the graduate and the potential employer; a similar challenge has been seen in enter-
prise development. The proposed study may also allow for the more practical results of 
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An Exploration of Ugandan Local Content Development in the New Oil and Gas Operating 




I would like to invite you to take part in a research study. Before you decide you need to 
understand why the research is being done and what it would involve for you. Please take 
time to read the following information carefully. Ask questions if anything you read is not 
clear or would like more information. Take time to decide whether or not to take part.   
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
 
This study intends to understand how local / national content objectives are being achieved 
in the “new oil and gas operating environment”. The study contends that a new international 
oil and gas operating environment, characterised by less stable market prices and the on-
going politicisation of oil supply, has engendered a new operating model whereby oil and 
gas operators pursue local content objectives as an efficient business model and not as a 
compliance matter. As recent as 2016, literature noted and suggested that the fulfilment of 
local content obligations had been somewhat of a Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
matter for operators. This study was designed to test whether this perennial paradigm of 
minimal compliance has given way to a new, localised global oil industry and understand 
how this new paradigm plays out in a nascent hydrocarbon producing economy.  
 
As such, we must now look to view the development of local / national content through a 
new lens, one where we can observe two or more actors pursuing localisation objectives. 
Whilst government policies, programmes and initiatives have been observed considerably 
in existing literature, this new oil and gas operating environment suggests that governance 
can no longer be viewed in isolation. Instead, we must consider developments against the 
new paradigm of shared responsibility and collective goals. This research aims to under-
stand how this new operating environment is manifesting itself in Uganda with regards to 
the development of local content and will be driven by the need to develop an understanding 
of the interconnectedness of operating companies, governments and other parties within 
this redefined political economy of the oil and gas industry. 
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There are many definitions of local / national content; this researcher contends that the 
definition can be refined to focus on three key criteria which will reduce ambiguity and chal-
lenges concerning measurability; these are employment, indigenous company participation 
and indirect employment. 
 
What are the risks of my participation? 
 
This research will not bring any physical discomforts to those partaking as respondents. Any 
personal or professional risk must be given careful consideration by the participants, how-
ever it should be noted that identifiable interview data will not be published without explicit 
consent.  
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
 
We cannot promise the study will help you but the information we get from the study will 
help to increase the understanding of local content development in the new operating envi-
ronment.  In turn, this may benefit you or your work. 
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
 
Data collected from the interview stage will be kept anonymous for publication, unless you 
provide explicit consent that you wish to have your name associated with your comments. 
All data will be securely stored and will not be shared in its raw form with anyone. All data 
processing will be completed in accordance with European laws on data management 
(GDPR). The data processor (also the researcher) is complaint with GDPR practice. All raw 
data will be destroyed following the completion of the project. 
 
Will I be compensated? 
 
Unfortunately we cannot offer any compensation or remuneration for your participation.  
 
Do I have to take part? 
 
Your participation is entirely voluntary and you have the right to withdraw at any time. Re-
fusal to participate will not result in a penalty or a loss of benefits to which the research 
participant may be entitled.  
 
Who is organising or sponsoring the research? 
 
This research is self-funded by the researcher in the pursuit of a doctoral degree from the 
Open University of the United Kingdom. The researcher is also affiliated with the Uganda 
Petroleum Institute in Kigumba.  
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
 
The results of this study will be published as part of the researchers PhD programme. You 









As a participant you will be informed about all of the outcomes of the research by email or 
another preferred method of communication.  
 
Has the study received approval from a Ugandan based Research Ethics Committee? 
 
The research has been approved by the Makerere University School of Social Sciences 
REC.  
 
Costs to the participant? 
 
The researcher foresees no financial costs to research participants.  
What is the procedure for withdrawing from the research? 
 
If you wish to withdraw from the research, you are encouraged to contact the researcher or 
the research supervisor on the details provided below. You will be withdrawn from the re-
search immediately and you will receive confirmation from the researcher accordingly. 
 
How many individuals will participate in this study? 
 
The researcher wishes to attract 80 participants to undertake the questionnaire, and 40 to 
take part in the interviews.  
How long will the data be stored for? 
 
Collected data will be stored for ten years by the Open University, before being reviewed 
for relevance and possibly destroyed. The unpublished data will be de-identified before 
storage.  
Why have I been invited? 
 
As an important stakeholder or observer in the development of local / national content in 




This study has received the favourable opinion of the Open University (United Kingdom) 
Human Research Ethics Committee. Reference no. HREC/3130/Fox 
 
Contact Details: 
Name: James Fox 
Email: james.fox@open.ac.uk 
Number: +44 (0)7890797566 
Title: PhD Researcher  
Institution: Open University of the United Kingdom 















Secondary Contact and Supervisor: 
Name: Prof. Giles Mohan 




Name: Dr. Stella Neema 
Title: Chairperson 
Institution: Makerere University School of Social Science Research and Ethics 
Committee 
Email: sheisim@yahoo.com 













RESEARCH CONSENT FORM: INTERVIEW 
 
Name of Researcher 
James Fox 
Title of study 




Please read and complete this form carefully.  If you are willing to participate in this 
study, ring the appropriate responses and sign and date the declaration at the end.  
If you do not understand anything and would like more information, please ask. 
• I have had the research satisfactorily explained to me in ver-
bal and / or written form by the researcher. YES  /  NO 
• I understand that the research will involve: a semi-structured 
interview based on pre-discussed questions on the topic of 
local content development in Uganda YES  /  NO 
• I understand that I may withdraw from this study at any time 
without having to give an explanation.  This will not affect my 
future care or treatment. YES  /  NO 
• I understand that all information about me will be treated in 
strict confidence and that I will not be named in any written 
work arising from this study. YES  /  NO 
• I understand that any audiotape material of me will be used 
solely for research purposes and will be destroyed on com-
pletion of your research. YES  /  NO 
• I understand that you will be discussing the progress of your 
research with others at The Open University YES  /  NO 
• I understand that my responses will be stored in accordance 
with The Open University policy and GDPR and destroyed  
upon the completion of this research YES  /  NO 
 
 













I freely give my consent to participate in this research study and have been given a copy of 








At any point, should you wish to withdraw from this study, please contact: 
 
Name: James Fox 
Email: james.fox@open.ac.uk 
Number: +44 (0)7890797566 
Title: PhD Researcher  
Institution: Open University of the United Kingdom 
Affiliated Ugandan Institution: Uganda Petroleum Institute - Kigumba 
 





Secondary Contact and Supervisor: 





Name: Dr. Stella Neema 
Title: Chairperson 
Institution: Makerere University School of Social Science Research and Ethics 
Committee 
Email: sheisim@yahoo.com 










RESEARCH CONSENT FORM: QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Name of Researcher 
James Fox 
Title of study 
An Exploration of Ugandan Local Content Development in the New Oil and Gas Oper-
ating Environment 
 
Please read and complete this form carefully.  If you are willing to participate in this 
study, ring the appropriate responses and sign and date the declaration at the end.  
If you do not understand anything and would like more information, please ask. 
• I have had the research satisfactorily explained to me in ver-
bal and / or written form by the researcher. YES  /  NO 
• I understand that the research will involve a questionnaire us-
ing the Likert Scale composed of approximately 25 to 30 
questions all questions related to local content development 
in Uganda. YES  /  NO 
• I understand that I may withdraw from this study at any time 
without having to give an explanation.  This will not affect my 
future care or treatment. YES  /  NO 
• I understand that all information about me will be treated in 
strict confidence and that I will not be named in any written 
work arising from this study. YES  /  NO 
• I understand that you will be discussing the progress of your 
research with others at The Open University YES  /  NO 
• I understand that my responses will be stored in accordance 
with The Open University policy and GDPR and destroyed  
upon the completion of this research YES  /  NO 
  
I freely give my consent to participate in this research study and have been given a copy of 






At any point, should you wish to withdraw from this study, please contact: 











Name: James Fox 
Email: james.fox@open.ac.uk 
Number: +44 (0)7890797566 
Title: PhD Researcher  
Institution: Open University of the United Kingdom 
Affiliated Ugandan Institution: Uganda Petroleum Institute - Kigumba 
 





Secondary Contact and Supervisor: 





Name: Dr. Stella Neema 
Title: Chairperson 
Institution: Makerere University School of Social Science Research and Ethics 
Committee 
Email: sheisim@yahoo.com 












1. Which of the below best describes your organisation? 
 
2.1 There was very little workforce or supplier capacity in Uganda to support the development of 
an oil industry when commercial quantities of oil were found 
  
2.2. Employing nationals and procuring from local suppliers represents a cost efficient way of op-
erating in Uganda 











2.3 On average, expatriate workers are paid more than local workers in exploration and production 
 
2.4 Operators are employing Ugandan nationals and procuring from the domestic supply chain 
only when it represents a cost effective business decision 
 
 
2.5 The oil price crash in 2014 has intensified the need to develop local competences in line with 
operator requirements 










2.7 Operators and the government share the same objectives for local content development 
 
2.8 All operators are equally committed to local content development 
 
2.9 Operators have pooled resources (in clusters) to train / up-skill nationals and raise local capac-











2.10 Operators have worked together to ensure local suppliers have the capacity to meet operator 
requirements 
 
2.11 NGOs, Development Agencies and Multilateral Organisations (e.g. The World Bank, NORAD, 
GIZ, DFID) have played an integral role in the development of local content and capability 
 
2.12 Uganda!s administrative framework for the oil industry has been conducive to the adoption of 
local content 
 










2.14 Operators can reject local suppliers when requirements cannot be met and seek international 
suppliers 
 
2.15 The executive body!s (the President) prominent role in negotiations with operators has been 
effective in promoting local content 
 
2.16 Operators have been the sole providers of the technical expertise guiding the development of 
local content in Uganda 
 
 
2.17 Developing capacity to deliver business, technical and vocational education, and training for 










Questions with statistically significant results 
 
Question P Value 
2.1 There was very little workforce or supplier capacity in Uganda to support 
the development of an oil industry when commercial quantities of oil were 
found 
P < 0.0001 
2.2 Employing nationals and procuring from local suppliers represents a cost 
efficient way of operating in Uganda 
P < 0.0001 
2.3 On average, expatriate workers are paid more than local workers in explora-
tion and production 
P < 0.0001 
2.4 Operators are employing Ugandan nationals and procuring from the domes-
tic supply chain only when it represents a cost effective business decision 
P = 0.0006 
2.5 The oil price crash in 2014 has intensified the need to develop local compe-
tences in line with operator requirements 
 
P < 0.0001 
 
2.6 Operators have played a leading role in developing local competences (hu-
man and supplier) 
P < 0.0001 
2.9 Operators have pooled resources (in clusters) to train / up-skill nationals 
and raise local capacity for education and training 
P = 0.0038 
2.10 Operators have worked together to ensure local suppliers have the capac-
ity to meet operator requirements 
P < 0.0001 
2.11 NGOs, Development Agencies and Multilateral Organisations (e.g. The 
World Bank, NORAD, GIZ, DFID) have played an integral role in the develop-
ment of local content and capability 
P < 0.0001 
2.12 Uganda’s administrative framework for the oil industry has been condu-
cive to the adoption of local content 
P < 0.0001 
2.14 Operators can reject local suppliers when requirements cannot be met and 
seek international suppliers 
P < 0.0001 
2.15 The executive body’s (the President) prominent role in negotiations with 
operators has been effective in promoting local content 









Question P Value 
2.17 Developing capacity to deliver business, technical and vocational educa-
tion, and training for Uganda’s oil and gas industry has reflected a multi-stake-
holder approach 
P < 0.0001 
 
Questions without statistically significant results 
 
Question P Value 
2.7 Operators and the government share the same objectives for local content 
development 
P = 0.7423 
2.8 All operators are equally committed to local content development P = 0.0681 
2.13 Uganda’s political process has hindered the development of local content P = 0.0975 
2.16 Operators have been the sole providers of the technical expertise guiding 
the development of local content in Uganda 





In order to identify similarities in opinions the mode responses are presented to show the most fre-
quently occurring responses to questions 
 
1. Observing all participants"!results, the following three questions resulted in the mode response 
of #Strongly Agree"! 
 
Questions (Mode Response Strongly Agree) 
2.1 There was very little workforce or supplier capacity in Uganda to support the develop-
ment of an oil industry when commercial quantities of oil were found 
2.2 Employing nationals and procuring from local suppliers represents a cost efficient way 
of operating in Uganda 
2.3 On average, expatriate workers are paid more than local workers in exploration and 
production 
 
2. Observing all participants"!results, these 11 questions resulted in the mode response of #Agree"! 
 
Questions (Mode Response Agree) 
2.4 Operators are employing Ugandan nationals and procuring from the domestic supply 









Questions (Mode Response Agree) 
2.5 The oil price crash in 2014 has intensified the need to develop local competences in 
line with operator requirements 
2.6 Operators have played a leading role in developing local competences (human and 
supplier) 
2.9 Operators have pooled resources (in clusters) to train / up-skill nationals and raise lo-
cal capacity for education and training 
2.10 Operators have worked together to ensure local suppliers have the capacity to meet 
operator requirements 
2.11 NGOs, Development Agencies and Multilateral Organisations (e.g. The World Bank, 
NORAD, GIZ, DFID) have played an integral role in the development of local content and 
capability 
2.12 Uganda’s administrative framework for the oil industry has been conducive to the 
adoption of local content 
2.13 Uganda’s political process has hindered the development of local content 
2.14 Operators can reject local suppliers when requirements cannot be met and seek in-
ternational suppliers 
2.15 The executive body’s (the President) prominent role in negotiations with operators 
has been effective in promoting local content 
2.16 Operators have been the sole providers of the technical expertise guiding the devel-
opment of local content in Uganda 
 
3. No questions returned a modal response on ‘Neutral’ 
 
4. Observing all participants"!results, these two questions resulted in the mode response of #Disa-
gree"! 
 
Questions (Mode Response Disagree) 
2.7 Operators and the government share the same objectives for local content develop-
ment 
2.8 All operators are equally committed to local content development 
 
 












1. Do you believe that "fronting" is common practice in Uganda's oil and gas supply 
chain? Fronting: Using / establishing Ugandan companies in order to conceal the ori-
gins of goods or services produced by a foreign supplier. 
 
2. Does CNOOC have a preferential arrangement / relationship with the Ugandan govern-
ment? 




3. Sponsored programmes for education and training have fallen to Uganda's political elite 
and those connected with them? 
 










4. CNOOC demonstrates a preference towards Chinese service companies? 
 
5. Total E&P demonstrates a preference towards French service companies? 
6. Tullow Oil demonstrated a preference towards British service companies? 
 
7.1 CNOOC: Commitment to employing local people (1 being not committed at all - 5 be-









7.2 Total E&P: Commitment to employing local people (1 being not committed at all - 5 be-
ing totally committed) (average 3.45) 
 
7.3 Tullow Oil: Commitment to employing local people (1 being not committed at all - 5 be-
ing totally committed) (average 3.97) 
7.4 Oranto Petroleum: Commitment to employing local people (1 being not committed at 










7.5 Armour Energy: Commitment to employing local people (1 being not committed at all - 
5 being totally committed) (average 3.14) 
 
7.6 Hardman Oil and Gas: Commitment to employing local people (1 being not committed 
at all - 5 being totally committed) (average 3.12) 
 
7.7 Heritage Oil: Commitment to employing local people (1 being not committed at all - 5 










8.1 CNOOC: Commitment to contracting local service providers (1 being not committed at 
all - 5 being totally committed) (average 2.55) 
 
8.2 Total E&P: Commitment to contracting local service providers (1 being not committed 
at all - 5 being totally committed) (average 3.12) 
 
8.3 Tullow Oil: Commitment to contracting local service providers (1 being not committed 










8.4 Oranto Petroleum: Commitment to contracting local service providers (1 being not 
committed at all - 5 being totally committed) (average 3) 
 
8.5 Armour Energy: Commitment to contracting local service providers (1 being not com-
mitted at all - 5 being totally committed) (average 2.92) 
 
8.6 Hardman Oil and Gas: Commitment to contracting local service providers (1 being not 









8.7 Heritage Oil: Commitment to contracting local service providers (1 being not commit-
ted at all - 5 being totally committed) (average 3.23) 
 
9.1 CNOOC: Commitment to developing / upskilling / training local people (1 being not 
committed at all - 5 being totally committed) (average 2.63) 
 
9.2 Total E&P: Commitment to developing / upskilling / training local people (1 being not 









9.3 Tullow Oil: Commitment to developing / upskilling / training local people (1 being not 
committed at all - 5 being totally committed) (average 3.74) 
 
9.4 Oranto Petroleum: Commitment to developing / upskilling / training local people (1 be-
ing not committed at all - 5 being totally committed) (average 2.37) 
9.5 Armour Energy: Commitment to developing / upskilling / training local people (1 being 









9.6 Hardman Oil and Gas: Commitment to developing / upskilling / training local people (1 
being not committed at all - 5 being totally committed) (average 2.73) 
 
9.7 Heritage Oil: Commitment to developing / upskilling / training local people (1 being not 
committed at all - 5 being totally committed) (average 3.08) 
 
10. Have political elites captured the local content market for their own private gain? Re-














Could you tell me who you perceive to be the main stakeholders / actors in developing lo-
cal content in Uganda 
 
Operating Model: 
Can you characterise the role of the operators in the development of local content? 
How did the 2014 oil price crash effect the way operators approach local content in 
Uganda? If at all in your opinion. 
How would you describe the business model of the operator community with regards to 
local content?  
Can you comment on where operators could have done more to raise local capacity in 
both supplier competencies and people.  
Do you believe that individual operator strategies have overlapped with other operators / 
oil field service providers in the country? 
 
Roles:  
How have operator and government roles differed in the development of local content? 
Could you tell me more about the involvement of NGOs, Development Agencies and Mul-
tilateral Organisations 
Can you tell me more about the remits of different stakeholders in local content develop-
ment. Has one community of stakeholders been more responsible for technical expertise, 
education, training or financial considerations for example.  
Do you believe that all operators have shown an equal level of commitment to local con-
tent development? 




What factors have hindered the development of indigenous capacity? 
How has Uganda’s political process effected the adoption of local content? 
Can you tell me more about how Uganda’s legislation and regulation have impacted the 
employment of Ugandan nationals in the oil industry 
What is driving the Ugandan government strategy for local content? 
What is driving the involvement of NGOs, Development Agencies and Multilateral Organi-
sations? 
Do you believe that the strategies of different stakeholder communities complement each 
other in raising local capacity, both human and supplier? 
 
Multi-stakeholder environment outcomes: 
Do you perceive there to be areas / sectors where this multi-stakeholder environment has 
failed to address local content concerns? 
What have been the main barriers to achieving greater levels of local content? 











 Does Uganda represent a unique case for local content development? 
What lessons can be identified which may be applicable to other nascent oil producing na-
tions? 
 
Questions for young professionals: 
How much information is available to you about reaching the standards required by opera-
tors / oil field service companies?  
What is the government’s role in Ugandans accessing jobs in the industry?  
Could you tell me more about your preparation for work in the oil industry?  
Do you foresee a long career in the Ugandan oil industry, or do you see yourself working 
elsewhere in the world? 
Do you believe that your skills and competencies meet international standards? 
Which community of stakeholders has supported your education most? 
Do you perceive there to be any factors that may hinder your career development in this 
sector? 
 
Questions for suppliers: 
How much information is available to you about reaching the standards required by opera-
tors / oil field service companies? 
Can you tell me more about preparing your companies to supply the oil industry, has there 
been assistance and from who? 
Do you believe that Ugandan regulation and legislation adequately supports you over in-
ternational competition? 
 
Questions for educators: 
What factors have hindered the development of your institution?  
Which stakeholders have been present in ensuring your institution delivers for the oil in-
dustry? 
How would you describe your relationship with the operator community / oil field services? 
 
 
